US embassy cable - 05NEWDELHI3242

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 14 NEW DELHI 003242 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR NP/ECC KATHERINE CROUCH 
DEPT FOR SA/INS 
COMMERCE FOR BIS/AJAY KUNTAMUKKALA/MARK FOULON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ETTC, KSTC, PARM, PREL, IN, GOI, Export Control Initiatives 
SUBJECT: EXBS: EXPORT CONTROL SYSTEM STANDARDS FOR INDIA 
 
REF: A. STATE 34282 B. 03 NEW DELHI 2399 
 
1. (SBU) Export Control System Standards for India, in response 
to Ref A.  The GOI is in the process of introducing new 
legislation aimed at licensing and controlling the export of WMD 
and their delivery systems.  MEA contacts have stated that they 
expect to introduce and seek approval of the legislation by May 
13.  Embassy has requested a briefing on the specifics of the 
proposed legislation.  The following answers are based on 
legislation, licensing and enforcement procedures as they 
currently exist. 
 
I.  Adequate commitment, legal and regulatory framework, and 
governmental structure to regulate transfers of weapons and 
weapons-related technology, and to sufficiently deter violations 
and punish violators. 
 
A.  Political Commitment 
 
1.  Is there a national commitment to export control 
development? 
 
The GOI has expressed its commitment to developing better export 
controls as part of the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership 
(NSSP) and hopes to introduce and pass comprehensive export 
control legislation in the next month.  Within Customs, Excise, 
and Narcotics, there is a general recognition, among senior 
level officials that customs needs to expand its interest and 
focus to areas outside of revenue collection, including export 
control. 
 
2.  Do policies currently exist to cooperate internationally on 
harmonization of export control policies? 
 
No, the GOI has not formally undertaken harmonization of export 
control lists, but has expressed an interest in doing so. 
 
3.  Is the subject country willing to work within the 
international community to address common threats? 
 
Yes, the GOI is strongly committed to combating proliferation of 
WMD and sensitive technologies. 
 
4.  Which agencies currently are involved in developing control 
policies?  What are they? 
 
The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) coordinates the work of 
other relevant GOI agencies, including the Ministries of 
Commerce, Defense, and Finance, and the independent Departments 
of Atomic Energy and Space. 
 
5.  Are there key host-government contacts in the national 
commitment area?  Who are they? 
 
-- MEA Additional Secretary (International Security) Meera 
Shankar 
-- MEA Joint Secretary (US and Canada) S. Jaishankar 
 
B.  Legal Basis and Framework 
 
1.  Is there a specific legal basis on which to build or enhance 
an export control system?  Does it consist of laws passed by the 
legislature?  Or constitutional provisions?  Or is it based 
(exclusively or primarily) on executive authority (i.e., 
authority of the president or equivalent official)? 
 
The primary licensing of dual-use items is under the Special 
Chemicals, Organisms, Materials, Equipment and Technologies 
(SCOMET) list, which came into force April 1, 2000.  It is a 
composite of controls from the following laws: 
-- The Explosives Substances Act, 1908 
-- The Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 
-- The Environment Protection Act, 1962, and notifications, 1995 
-- The Customs Act, 1962 
-- The Arms Act, 1959, and the Arms Rules, 1962 
-- The Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992, No. 
22 of 1992, covers items not regulated by any other Act. 
Licensing is administered by the Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry's Directorate General of Foreign Trade (DGFT), except 
for: a) prescribed substances and equipment related to nuclear 
energy, which are regulated by the Department of Atomic Energy 
(DAE) - The Atomic Energy Regulatory Board also licenses 
radioactive material; and 2) Department of Defense Production 
and Supply licenses munitions exports. 
 
2.  Does the legal basis authorize control of the export, 
reexport and transit of all items on the multilateral regime 
lists (see C below)? 
 
There are laws prohibiting and/or controlling the transit of 
controlled items, but these actions are not the focus of customs 
or licensing officials. 
 
3.  Does the legal basis authorize control of the export, 
reexport and transit of items for unilateral foreign policy 
reasons, such as human rights and regional stability? 
 
The licensing board will consider the circumstances of the end 
user and end use country, but the scope of this consideration is 
unclear.  Transit is rarely a concern for licensing or customs 
officials. 
 
4.  Does the legal basis authorize imposition of catch-all 
controls (i.e., controls based on the proposed end-use or end- 
user rather than just the nature of the item)? 
 
No.  According to some GOI officials, the GOI uses specific 
language like "used" or "intended to be used" and "including but 
not limited to" in the Atomic Energy Act and SCOMET lists to 
capture the idea of a catch-all control.  However, Embassy is 
unaware of any enforcement actions taken on any entity based on 
these grounds.  The Indian system lacks the commitment and 
resources to enforce the spirit of catch-all controls. 
 
5.  Does the legal basis authorize imposition of Controls on 
activities, such as brokering, finance, and other services? 
 
No 
 
6.  Is there authority to control transfers of technical data 
and technical assistance, including intangible transfers? 
 
Not under SCOMET, as far as we know. 
 
7.  Are there legal authorities to impose criminal penalties on 
individuals and legal persons for violations of export control 
requirements?  What are the criminal penalties? 
 
-- Explosive substances:  3 years imprisonment and/or Rs 5,000 
fine for an export violation. 
-- Munitions:  3 years imprisonment and/or undetermined fine for 
an export violation. 
-- GOI officials state that criminal penalties for dual use 
items are possible but undefined. 
 
8.  Are there legal authorities to impose civil or 
administrative penalties for violations?  What are the civil or 
administrative penalties? 
 
The typical infraction is revenue-related, and the penalty is a 
fine of Rs 1,000, or an amount five times the value of the goods 
in question, whichever is larger.  Failure to pay the fine could 
result in GOI seizure of the goods, and the 
company's/individual's loss of the Import/Export number (which 
means a loss of the right to import and export). 
 
According to a DGFT representative, it may be legal in some 
cases to export controlled items without a license, but the 
company would do so "without government support," meaning that 
it would not get export subsidies or duty drawbacks for 
exporting the unlicensed item.  The conditions for this 
situation are unclear. 
 
9.  Are there sufficient executive orders, interagency 
agreements, and the like to implement the export control system? 
What do such orders cover? 
 
Yes - described in section I B 1. 
 
10.  Have decrees, regulations or other normative acts been 
promulgated to implement the legal authority? 
 
Yes. 
 
11.  Do they fully implement the authorities provided for?  If 
not, which of the authorities in the items above is not being 
implemented? 
 
Insufficient implementation is a problem: 
-- Export lists lack clarity for most potential dual-use items. 
There are only about 100 applications for export licenses per 
year. 
-- Embassy is unaware of the denial of any export license.  In 
previous exchanges (Ref B), GOI stated that there had not been 
any during the previous calendar year. 
-- Indian Customs does not, on a routine basis, randomly search 
export containers. 
 
12.  Are there legal safeguards against the improper use or 
disclosure of information obtained in the export control 
process? 
 
Unknown. 
 
13.  Are there legal features that routinely interfere with the 
implementation of effective export controls (e.g., rigid privacy 
or property rights, lack of search and seizure authority)? 
Describe them. 
 
-- Indian Customs has limited powers of law enforcement. 
Evidence of criminal wrongdoing outside of the port area must be 
turned over to the police; 
-- There is confusion about what needs a license - SCOMET 
includes few specifics besides chemicals. 
 
C.  Membership or adherence (in terms of policy) to 
Nonproliferation regimes and international nonproliferation 
norms: 
 
1.  Wassenaar Arrangement? 
 
India does not participate in the Wassenaar Arrangement, but has 
made efforts to informally halt the transfer of Wassenaar- 
controlled items, even if they are not on India's own export 
control list, "Special Chemicals, Organisms, Materials, 
Equipments and Technologies"(SCOMET). 
 
2.  Nuclear Suppliers' Group? 
 
No.  The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was formed following 
India's nuclear test in 1974.  Although the NSG continues to 
pursue outreach to key non-member states, including India, the 
GOI considers the NSG to an obstacle to India's pursuit of 
nuclear fuel for civilian purposes, e.g., NSG intervention to 
prevent Russian nuclear supply to India.  As part of its NSSP 
obligations, the GOI intends to adhere to NSG guidelines. 
 
3.  Missile Technology Control Regime? 
 
No.  The GOI believes that the MTCR infringes on their right to 
develop their defensive weapons capabilities, however, it also 
investigates and may prosecute cases when proliferation of MTCR- 
controlled items are brought to its attention.  As part of its 
NSSP obligations, the GOI intends to adhere to the MTCR at a 
date to be determined. 
 
4.  Australia Group? 
 
No, but the GOI investigates and may prosecute cases when 
proliferation of AG-controlled items are brought to its 
attention. 
 
5.  Are there laws/regs/guidelines concerning adherence to 
international nonproliferation norms, such as NPT, CWC, BWC, and 
UN embargoes? 
 
-- India is a party to the CWC and lists restricted chemicals 
clearly on SCOMET (see VII 1 b). 
-- India has signed the BWC (see VII 1 c). 
-- India has also, in general, supported UN embargoes. 
 
II.  Process for controlling items and evaluating transfer 
requests 
 
A.  Control Lists 
 
1.  Are there legal authorities to establish and modify control 
lists? 
 
SCOMET is the primary control list, and has legal basis in the 
following laws: 
-- The Explosives Substances Act, 1908 
-- The Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 
-- The Environment Protection Act, 1962, and notifications, 1995 
-- The Customs Act, 1962 
-- The Arms Act, 1959, and the Arms Rules, 1962 
-- The Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992, No. 
22 of 1992, covers items not regulated by any other Act. 
 
2.  Are the control lists made available to the public? 
 
Yes, they are on the internet. 
3.  Are there agencies/personnel in place who are responsible 
for maintaining and regularly updating control lists? 
 
DGFT is responsible for maintaining most of the list, DAE for 
nuclear-related items, and the Ministry of Defense for 
munitions.  SCOMET categories are broad, do not refer to 
specific items besides chemicals, and are not often updated. 
 
4.  Do the control lists conform with multilateral 
nonproliferation regime/arrangement control lists? 
 
Conforms only with CWC. 
 
a.  Wassenaar Arrangement? 
b.  Nuclear Suppliers' Group? 
c.  MTCR? 
d.  Australia Group? 
 
5.  Are the regulations for catch-all controls public? 
 
The GOI uses specific language like "used" or "intended to be 
used" and "including but not limited to" in the Atomic Energy 
Act and SCOMET lists to capture the idea of a catch-all control. 
However, Embassy is unaware of any license denials or 
enforcement actions taken against any entity based on these 
grounds.  The Indian system lacks the commitment and resources 
to enforce the spirit of catch-all controls. 
 
a.  Are catch-all controls used effectively? 
 
No. 
 
b.  Is there sufficient industry outreach to explain catch-all 
provisions for all types of export control regulations? 
 
No.  The GOI is planning industry outreach programs, but has not 
yet done so.  Confusion within the GOI as to what non-chemical 
items would require licensing may limit the effectiveness of 
outreach. 
 
B.  Authorization Requirements 
 
1.  Is registration of munitions exporters, manufacturers and 
brokers required? 
 
Yes.  All exporters must register with DGFT, MOD has special 
licensing for munitions exports. 
 
2.  Is there a requirement for registrants to Disclose foreign 
ownership/control? 
 
-- Dual-use items:  No. 
-- Munitions:  Unknown.  The GOI limits foreign ownership of 
munitions manufacturers to a maximum of 26%, and most indigenous 
munitions manufacturers are government-owned. 
 
3.  Are the regulations/licensing requirements public? 
 
Yes, as broad regulations. 
 
4.  Do the license applications require information sufficient 
for an informed review and decision? 
 
a.  Quantity and description of items? 
 
Yes. 
b.  Intended end-use? 
 
Yes. 
 
c.  Valid needs of the end-user? 
 
Yes. 
 
d.  Identification of all parties to the transaction, their 
address and destination to include intermediate consignees? 
 
No - exporter and end-user only. 
 
5.  Are licenses/authorizations required for exports?  Which 
exports (e.g., "munitions and dual-use items on the multilateral 
control lists")? 
Yes - for dual use, nuclear-related items, and munitions.  Some 
other products require export licenses, but it is unclear which 
ones. 
 
6.  Are licenses/authorizations required for imports?  Which 
imports? 
 
Yes - U.S. companies have reported the need for an import 
license for some items subject to U.S. export licenses, but it 
is unclear which ones. 
 
7.  Are licenses/authorizations required for transshipment 
(involves off-loading of cargo)? 
 
No, not in practice. 
 
8.  Are licenses/authorizations required for transit (no off- 
loading of cargo)? 
 
No, not in practice at seaports. 
 
a.  What authorization is required for transit?  For 
transshipment? 
 
-- Transit:  None, in practice.  Indian customs claims they do 
not review transit vessel manifests or search transit goods. 
 
-- Transshipment:  None, in practice.  India has agreements with 
Nepal and Bhutan for duty-free transit of goods to those 
countries.  By Indian law, prohibited items cannot be 
transshipped without authorization.  Indian Customs does not in 
practice examine these shipments. 
 
9.  Are licenses required for reexport (controlled item leaves 
country)? 
 
Yes, if they are subject to SCOMET controls. 
 
10.  Are licenses required for retransfer (change of end-use or 
end-user within country)? 
 
Yes, for SCOMET-controlled exports to another country. 
 
11.  Is there authority to require end-user certificates as 
conditions of license approval? 
 
Yes. 
 
12.  Are the requirements for end-user certificates imposed 
regularly and effectively? 
 
Regularly, yes. 
 
13.  Is there legal authority for passing information regarding 
bad actors, known violators, etc., to other cooperative 
governments? 
 
No. 
 
C.  Screening 
 
1.  Are license applications screened to identify suspected bad 
actors? 
 
Yes. 
 
2.  Is there a database drawing on inter-ministerial sources of 
persons/entities who are debarred or suspected of illicit 
activity (i.e. watch list)? 
 
Yes.  The GOI maintains a list of companies and individuals with 
prior import/export violations, called the Denied Entities List 
(DEL).  Conditions for being placed on the list could be both 
from revenue infractions or other violations. 
3.  Are there end-use/end-user verification procedures in place? 
 
Unknown.  The GOI claims there are, but we have not been able to 
verify their use. 
4.  Are end-use/end-user verification checks conducted routinely 
and frequently? 
 
Unknown. 
 
5.  Are there pre-license checks? 
 
Unknown. 
 
6.  Are there post-shipment verifications? 
 
The GOI has legal provisions that authorize an official to 
perform end use verifications on SCOMET exports.  We are unaware 
if they have ever done so. 
 
The GOI requires a copy of the bill of entry for a SCOMET item, 
filed by the importer in the destination country, to be 
submitted to DGFT.  This is the GOI's primary method of 
verifying delivery and end-use of the item. 
 
7.  Is there international cooperation in identifying and 
preventing transfers of proliferation concern? 
 
The GOI has intervened on several occasions to prevent shipments 
brought to its attention by the USG.  In some of these cases, 
the GOI intervened even though the export was not illegal under 
GOI law. 
 
D.  Decision-making 
 
1.  Does the country have responsible transfer policies? 
 
2.  Are there decision-making criteria for approving transfers? 
 
Unclear.  The lack of specifics in export control regulations 
has limited license applications to about 100 per year.  To our 
knowledge, the GOI has not turned down a license application. 
 
3.  Are these criteria reflected in written guidelines, 
standards and procedures? 
 
Unclear - would be internal GOI procedures. 
 
4.  Are there policies with respect to specific countries, 
country groups, and areas of conflict? 
 
Unknown. 
 
5.  Are these guidelines comparable to policy/practice under 
U.S. Conventional Arms Transfer policy and dual-use export 
policy? 
 
No. 
 
6.  Are there adequate referral mechanisms, including case- 
tracking and the forwarding of cases to other agencies for 
review before disposition? 
 
Yes.  License applications must be approved by an Inter- 
Ministerial Working Group (IMWG) composed of ten members that 
meets once per quarter.  Each ministry on the working group 
reviews each application before the committee meets to approve 
the license. 
 
7.  Are policy and national security concerns given sufficient 
weight in decision making (e.g., compared to economic factors)? 
Unknown.  In recent years, economic factors have grown in 
importance. 
 
8.  Are the licensing process and verification procedures being 
enforced? 
 
Licensing for 100 items per year only.  Verification unknown. 
 
9.  Do agencies involved in license processing have the ability 
to deny license applications and to escalate decisions to 
national-level authorities? 
 
Yes, they have the authority.  It is unknown whether they have 
ever done so. 
10.  Are there clear authorities to deny a license, specifically 
for foreign policy and national security reasons? 
 
Reason to deny a license is unclear. 
 
11.  Are there regulations providing for suspension and 
revocation of export licenses/authorizations? 
 
The Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act of 1992 
authorizes DGFT to suspend an Exporter-importer Code Number 
(authority to export and import), if "any person has made an 
export or import in a manner gravely prejudicial to the trade 
relations of India with any foreign country or to the interests 
of other persons engaged in imports or exports or has brought 
disrepute to the credit or the goods of the country."  There is 
no specific language for national security. 
 
12.  Do licensing officials have access to the (intelligence) 
information necessary to make informed decisions during license 
processing? 
 
Unknown. 
 
E.  Training 
 
1.  Are licensing officials adequately trained, including 
technical expertise, to review license/authorization requests? 
 
Unknown. 
 
III.  An enforcement mechanism that provides authority for 
trained enforcement officers to investigate and prevent illegal 
export 
 
A.  Effective enforcement 
 
1.  Are there law enforcement officials with clear lines of 
authority responsible for conducting investigations, making 
arrests, and prosecuting cases under the export control laws and 
regulations? 
 
The lines are not clear in practice, it appears to depend on the 
commodity in question. 
 
2.  Are there legal authorities to enforce trade in controlled 
items at all borders (land, sea, air) for outbound, inbound, and 
in-transit cargo? 
 
Not for in-transit cargo.  They cannot examine it to determine 
whether it is a licensable commodity without having "probable 
cause" indicating a violation has occurred.  Legal precedent has 
not been well established here, as there is much disagreement 
about this issue within GOI customs. 
 
3.  Do export control enforcement officials possess authority to 
search, detain and seize products?  With a warrant?  Without a 
warrant? 
 
Legally Customs is allowed to search and detain without a 
warrant, but the application is difficult.  Custom claims they 
can detain an item scheduled for export for only five days in 
order to get a licensing determination from licensing 
authorities.  Lower level officials cannot search without 
approval from superiors. 
 
4.  Are there limitations imposed on export enforcement 
officials that hinder the effectiveness of their work?  What are 
they? 
 
Yes, they are instructed to target examinations to detect 
revenue fraud.  Other limitations include: the short amount of 
time allowed for a licensing determination (5 days), the 
inability for lower level officials to order examinations, lack 
of training in examination and inspection of goods, conveyances, 
and containers for contraband.  Widespread corruption also 
hinders the ability of officers to examine and seize goods. 
5.  Are inspectors adequately trained to identify controlled 
items? 
 
No, this training is not part of the curriculum.  Some on-the- 
job training takes place, but at a level higher than inspector. 
 
6.  Are inspectors adequately trained in customs inspection 
techniques and procedures? 
 
No, not outside of the area of classification and value.  They 
have little experience examining for contraband in commercial 
cargo.  When examinations take place, it is usually at the 
instruction of outside agencies. 
 
7.  Does the consignee have to be present during a search of 
goods? 
 
Yes, or his customs broker. 
 
8.  Are customs and law enforcement officials held liable for 
damage occurring during a search? 
 
They claim they are.  There certainly is a fear of retribution 
for holding up or examining goods.  This may tie into 
integrity/corruption issues. 
 
9.  Does a frontline inspector have the authority to conduct a 
search on his own, or does he/she need approval from a 
supervisor.  If yes, at what level? 
 
No.  Higher level supervisors must approve in practice. 
 
10.  Is corruption a problem within customs/law enforcement 
organizations? 
 
The corruption problem is well documented and widespread within 
Indian government, especially in Customs and Excise and the CISF 
(police that provide port security). 
 
11.  Are there sufficient personnel devoted to export 
enforcement, including at the borders?  Are they properly 
trained? 
 
No.  There is a large number of persons dedicated to detecting 
export fraud in their government drawback schemes.  They are not 
looking for contraband or controlled items.  Lack of manpower is 
not an issue. 
 
12.  Is there sufficient, functioning equipment and other 
resources devoted to interdicting unauthorized transfers of 
controlled items? 
 
No, The largest land border station in Indian does not have a 
truck dock to unload cargo for inspection.  Most Seaports have 
no inspection facilities. 
 
13.  Are there regulations published on customs/border control 
procedures and requirements? 
 
Unknown. 
 
14.  Are there standard operating procedures at all border 
locations? 
 
Unknown. 
 
15.  Are there actual checks being made at national borders, 
transit points and ports? 
 
Border control authorities check licenses to make sure they are 
valid and in order.  They do not routinely search for smuggled 
or non-revenue generating items. 
 
16.  Are there effective transshipment controls at national 
borders, transit points and ports? 
 
No, there is no interest in this area, as it does not generate 
revenue.  Customs export official repeated that this was "not 
India's problem". 
 
17.  What investigative activities are being carried out? 
Only if info is provided by another agency, e.g., IB or RAW 
 
a.  Undercover operations? 
 
None 
 
b.  Stings? 
 
None that we are aware of 
 
c.  Paid informants? 
 
Not in the export field to our knowledge 
 
d.  Electronic surveillance? 
 
They have the technical capability to do so. 
 
18.  Are the penalties being enforced with actual prosecution? 
 
There are between 3 and 13 prosecutions for export control 
violations (presumably in a 1-year period).  Most of the 
offenses are revenue violations, and Post is unaware of any 
convictions. 
 
19.  Have they conducted any criminal investigations?  What were 
their outcomes? 
 
500 arrests per year for import/export violations, mostly for 
revenue violations, although Embassy is not aware of the 
specific number for exports.  Most cases are settled with fines 
and payment of full customs duties.  Embassy has received no 
examples of arrests or prosecutions for non-revenue issues. 
 
20.  Are there sufficient civil and administrative penalties for 
export control violations? 
 
Fines for export control violations are between Rs 1,000 and 
five times the value of the duty that would have been imposed on 
the goods.  Other civil penalties are the loss of the ability to 
export, for the individual and the company. 
 
21.  Are criminal penalties used for export control violations? 
 
Between 3 and 13 cases (presumably in a year) face prosecutions 
for export violations.  Court cases in India can be drawn out 
over years, and twelve-year prosecutions are not uncommon. 
Courts, however, also have the power of immediate injunction, so 
that illegal activity (or allegedly illegal activity) can be 
stopped pending prosecution and conviction.  Post is unaware of 
non-revenue related prosecutions or convictions. 
 
22.  Are there customs assistance agreements with U.S. and other 
multilateral regime partners? 
 
There are customs bilateral agreements between India and the US, 
Iran, Russia, UK, Uzbekistan, Hong Kong, Israel, Egypt, and the 
Maldives. 
 
23.  Are there extradition treaties with these partners? 
 
No 
 
24.  Does customs have sufficient equipment to detect WMD and 
related items?  Sufficient training? 
 
No, they are interested in increasing their ability through the 
use of technology, by not in manpower resources and targeting 
which would lessen their ability to focus on revenue loss.  This 
is an area that EXBS could assist in at the major seaports and 
airports. 
25.  Are there procedures in place to ensure proper handling of 
detected WMD materials? 
 
No, there is no secure seized property area or area designated 
for the storage of seized or detained property. 
 
a.  What are they (e.g. seizure, proper storage)? 
 
IV.  Procedures for the coordination and exchange of information 
A.  Interagency coordination and exchange of information 
concerning export (transfer) control procedures, involved 
parties, and export (transfer) control violations 
 
1.  Provisions for gathering information on controlled trade 
 
The GOI is developing a database on targeting import and export 
irregularities at major seaports.  Officials have stated that 
the main target is revenue violations and detection of 
corruption. 
 
a.  Is the information being gathered effectively? 
 
The system is not yet in place. 
 
b.  Is the information being analyzed with the intent to affect 
policy? 
 
No. 
 
c.  Are there adequate personnel and other resources devoted to 
gathering information on controlled trade? 
 
No. 
 
2.  Are there mechanisms for timely and discreet information 
exchange among concerned agencies and governments? 
 
Yes, the mechanism is there.  To date, the exchange has not been 
timely. 
 
3.  Do the interdiction officials exchange information with the 
investigatory and prosecutory authorities and vice versa? 
 
Unknown, but they should.  Indian Customs' authority is limited, 
and they must turn over to the police any investigation that 
must be conducted outside of a port area. 
 
4.  Is there an adequate role for intelligence agencies? 
 
Unknown. 
 
5.  Is the intelligence community providing the necessary 
information? 
 
Unknown. 
 
6.  Do border control officials have good working relations with 
their neighboring counterparts at border crossings? 
 
They do appear to have a good relationship with the Bangladeshi 
customs and immigration departments at the Indian-Bangladesh 
border.  The relationships at the Indo-Pakistan and Indo-Nepal 
borders are unknown.  They do not have good relation with other 
Indian border officials at their own ports (CISF, BSF, and 
especially immigration). 
 
B.  Industry, Public, and Government Cooperation (both licensing 
and law enforcement) 
 
1.  Provisions for sharing information with industry and the 
public on export control policy 
 
GOI is arranging an outreach program in conjunction with two of 
the largest trade and industry organizations in the country. 
 
a.  Is the information being shared? 
 
Not yet. 
 
b.  Do the authorities inform industries of export 
licensing/authorization requirements? 
 
Some information is available on official export license 
applications, otherwise no. 
 
2.  Does an industry out-reach program exist? 
 
No, but there are plans to organize them. 
 
a.  Are there meetings, conferences, and symposiums being held? 
Not yet. 
 
b.  What means of dissemination exist for the distribution of 
educational materials to industry? 
The major trade and industry organizations have export control 
specialists. 
 
3.  Does industry have an opportunity to appeal 
license/authorization decisions? 
 
Yes. 
 
4.  Do authorities induce companies to adopt internal compliance 
programs? 
 
No. 
 
5.  Is the government committed to protection of proprietary 
information of businesses that comply with the law? 
 
Unknown. 
 
6.  Are there authorities and procedures for industry to make 
voluntary disclosures? 
 
Unknown. 
 
C.  Bilateral Cooperation 
 
1.  Does subject country exchange policy, license decision, law 
enforcement and intelligence information with the U.S. on a 
bilateral basis as needed and periodically? 
 
Law enforcement information is shared as needed, otherwise no. 
 
2.  Is subject country willing to establish arrangements to do 
so? 
 
The GOI has signed a Customs Mutual Assistance Agreement with 
the U.S. and other trade partners, and is willing to share 
information in this area. 
 
3.  Will the law enforcement authorities work cases with foreign 
law enforcement authorities? 
 
Yes, they have done in the past. 
 
V.  Program Administration and System Automation 
 
A.  Infrastructure 
 
1.  Are there sufficient infrastructure, administrative 
capabilities, facilities, equipment (automation, communications, 
and data-processing systems)? 
 
No.  Automated information systems and equipment are generally 
lacking. 
 
a.  Is the equipment, including software, up-to-date? 
 
No. 
 
2.  Are there agencies/personnel responsible for this component 
of the export control system? 
 
The GOI has an informatics center that is responsible for 
information systems government-wide, and they are involved in 
developing the targeting system described in IV A 1. 
 
3.  Are they adequately trained, including trained to use 
automation equipment? 
 
No, not yet. 
 
4.  Are there enough licensing officers to process license 
applications in a timely fashion? 
 
All license processing is done by the IMWG, once per quarter. 
With the low number of applications, they claim they are able to 
handle all of the pending licenses at one sitting. 
B.  Administrative Structure 
 
1.  Are there procedures to govern the filing, receiving, 
forwarding and tracking of cases and support information? 
Yes. 
2.  Do mechanisms exist for interagency and international 
exchange of classified information? 
 
Unknown. 
 
3.  Is training available for information handlers? 
 
Unknown. 
 
4.  Is there a projected timetable and cost for development and 
implementation of the administrative structure, if not in place 
already? 
 
VI.  Additional "Standards" Questions on Training and Procedures 
 
A.  Licensing Officials 
 
1.  Are licensing officials required to undergo professional 
training with regular updates? 
 
Unknown.  Licensing decisions are made by inter-ministerial 
committee. 
 
2.  Are adequate institutions or procedures in place for 
delivering this training? 
 
Unknown. 
 
3.  Are institutions/procedures in place to control re- 
exports/transits/transshipments? 
 
Legally yes, but Embassy has no evidence of institutional or 
procedural systems of effective control for transit and 
transshipment.  It is also not a priority for Customs. 
 
4.  Are institutions/procedures in place to control technical 
data and assistance (intangible technology or "deemed" exports)? 
 
Not under SCOMET, as far as we know. 
 
5.  Are institutions/procedures in place to control brokering of 
exports extending to persons beyond national borders? 
 
Unknown. 
 
6.  Do laws, decrees, or regulations provide for industry input 
into the decision-making process on export controls? 
 
Unknown, but anecdotal evidence suggests not. 
 
7.  Does the country have procedures for participating or 
unilaterally adhering to the four regimes - including procedures 
for updating national control lists to capture additional items? 
 
See sections I C and VII for formal and informal adherence to 
control regimes. 
 
B.  Enforcement Officials 
 
1.  Are enforcement officials required to undergo professional 
training on nonproliferation policies or WMD awareness with 
regular updates? 
 
No 
2.  Are adequate institutions or procedures in place for 
delivering this training? 
 
Yes, when courses are so desired. 
 
3.  Do laws, decrees, or regulations provide enforcement 
agencies with authority to ascertain actual delivery of licensed 
goods (Delivery Verification)? 
 
No.  End use delivery certificates are delivered to licensing 
agencies. 
 
4.  Do laws, decrees, or regulations provide enforcement 
agencies with authority to conduct post-shipment checks? 
Unknown.  The law authorizes post-shipment checks, but it is 
unclear who performs them. 
 
5.  Are institutions/procedures in place to perform 
delivery/post-shipment verifications? 
 
Unknown. 
 
6.  Do laws, decrees, or regulations provide enforcement 
agencies with authority to gather information on end-users and 
foreign entities of proliferation concern? 
 
Unknown. 
 
VII.  Broad Political Commitment 
 
1.  Is the country a member of/subscribe to the following: 
 
a.  Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) 
 
No.  As a de facto nuclear weapons state, India will not sign 
the NPT, however, it abides by most of the NPT guidelines and 
encourages signatory countries to uphold their obligations under 
the treaty. 
 
b.  Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) 
 
India was one of the original signatories of the CWC in 1993 and 
ratified the Convention in September 1996.  In 1997, India 
admitted that it has produced and stockpiled chemical munitions, 
but only for "defensive purposes."  Under the terms of the CWC, 
India should have destroyed 45 percent of its stockpile by 2004 
and the remaining stockpile by 2007. 
 
c.  Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) 
 
India signed the BWC in 1973 and ratified it the following year. 
In 2003, the Congressional Research Service reported that India 
is believed to have an active biological defense research 
program as well as the necessary infrastructure to develop a 
variant of biological agents." 
 
d.  Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) 
 
India is not a signatory to the CTBT.  India objected to the 
lack of provision for universal nuclear disarmament "within a 
time-bound framework." India also demanded that the treaty ban 
laboratory simulations. In addition, India opposed the provision 
in Article XIV of the CTBT that requires India's ratification 
for the treaty to enter into force, which India argued was a 
violation of its sovereign right to choose whether it would sign 
the treaty. 
 
e.  International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile 
Proliferation (ICOC) 
 
India is not a signatory to the ICOC on the grounds that it is 
discriminatory and interferes with the peaceful uses of space 
technology. 
 
2.  Does the country accept the IAEA safeguards? 
 
India is a member of the IAEA, and four of its 13 nuclear 
reactors are subject to IAEA safeguards. 
 
3.  Does the country accept the IAEA Additional Protocol 
(IAEA/AP)? 
 
India has not signed the Additional Protocol. 
 
4.  Does the country participate in the UN Register of 
Conventional Weapons? 
 
Yes. 
 
5.  Does the country participate in the G-8 Global Partnership? 
No, but the Prime Minister has attended several G-8 summits as a 
special guest, including the upcoming summit at Gleneagles. 
 
6.  Does the country participate in other nonproliferation 
and/or export control arrangements (outside those previously 
listed) or provide bilateral export control-related 
training/assistance? 
 
No. 
 
7.  Is the country a member of a nuclear weapons (or WMD) free 
zone (including but not limited to Tlatelolco, Bangkok, 
Pelindaba, and Rarotonga Treaties)? 
 
No. 
 
BLAKE