US embassy cable - 05NEWDELHI3218

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NEW DELHI 003218 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/27/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PTER, PGOV, PK, IN, Kashmir 
SUBJECT: PARADIGM SHIFT ON KASHMIR UNDERWAY 
 
REF: NEW DELHI 2823 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: Charge Robert O. Blake, Jr. for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
1.  (C) Summary: President Musharraf's landmark visit to 
Delhi has strengthened the paradigm shift underway in India 
about the prospects for progress on Kashmir.  Under the 
leadership of PM Manmohan Singh and the Pakistani President, 
the two countries have broken their impasse over Kashmir as 
the "core issue" and a "dispute," and adopted the "soft 
border" framework as a roadmap, albeit vague, for the future. 
 Musharraf's decision in Delhi to read a stern message to the 
most pro-Pakistan separatist, SAS Geelani, and to embrace the 
moderate faction of the All-Parties Hurriyat Conference 
(APHC) has reshuffled the separatist deck.  The moderate APHC 
is pleased with the trends, but sees no evidence that the PM 
has a strategy to deal with Kashmiri alienation, after its 
leaders received what appears to have been a hamhanded 
invitation to talks from the PMO prior to Musharraf's visit. 
Journalists in the Valley tell us the changed Indo-Pak 
template -- from "Kashmir First" to "Kashmiris First" -- has 
triggered new hopes, but that they want more.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (C) Demonstrating statesmanship, leadership and realism, 
PM Manmohan Singh and President Musharraf broke major new 
ground on Kashmir during their April 16-18 meetings in New 
Delhi, producing better prospects for progress than at any 
time since bilateral differences degenerated into insurgency 
in 1988.  Prior to the visit, there was considerable 
speculation in India about how soon New Delhi's refusal to 
accede to Islamabad's demand to recognize Kashmir as a 
"dispute" and the "core issue" would cause the Composite 
Dialogue to peter out.  While we predicted (reftel) that the 
two leaders would finesse their differences, there was also a 
strong undercurrent of concern among Pakistan watchers that 
the two sides would -- sooner rather than later -- run up 
against the hard reality that their respective positions on 
Kashmir were mutually exclusive. 
 
Breaking the Impasse: Soft Borders 
---------------------------------- 
 
3.  (C) The two countries' positions on Kashmir remain very 
different, but the visit produced a breakthrough in how 
Indians and Kashmiris are talking about and dealing with the 
issue.  A consensus is emerging in the Indian political class 
that the two sides have broken the impasse that has 
surrounded the Kashmir issue for so long and that Manmohan 
Singh and Pervez Musharraf have found a way to show concrete 
movement that also produces concrete results for Kashmiris, 
long a major priority for residents in the Valley and for 
Pakistan.  The visit also sidelined the question of Kashmir 
as the "core issue," although New Delhi implicitly 
understands that it is a "dispute" that has to be addressed 
(although has never admitted as such). 
 
4.  (C) The general formula agreed to -- which both sides 
refer to as "soft borders" and encouraging people-to-people 
ties and trade -- is still necessarily very vague about the 
outlines of a final settlement, but it offers something of a 
roadmap that both sides can live with for the short- to 
medium-term that is both realistic and people-oriented, while 
waiting for conditions to ripen to the point where the more 
difficult territorial issues can be addressed.  In India, 
Musharraf also referred to the "soft borders" option as "not 
a solution, but a facilitation towards a solution." 
 
5.  (C) From the Delhi perspective, we would point out that 
Musharraf has not rejected the PM's two cardinal principles 
-- no second partition of J&K along religious lines, and no 
redrawing of existing borders -- and that this "Cricket 
Summit" roadmap also takes into account the Pakistani 
President's inability to accept the LOC as a border.  The 
PM's approach is to work towards a situation in which borders 
become irrelevant, and pre-partition economic, cultural and 
linguistic linkages are restored.  Whether these are the 
"hazy contours of a solution," as "Outlook" Foreign Affairs 
correspondent V. Sudarshan recently put it, remains to be 
seen, but they provide a course of action on which both 
leaders have signed off, which until very recently was only 
mentioned during Indo-Pak Track 2 seminars and at academic 
conferences. 
 
6.  (C) The PM's approach involves a progressive softening of 
the LOC and international border and removing consular and 
other barriers between Kashmiris.  India-based Pakistan 
watchers are concluding that Musharraf has accepted this, as 
well as the PM's point that the process will lead to an 
outcome, and that there can be no timeframe for resolving the 
problem.  Jammu University Professor Siddiq Wahid, who 
chaired an April 22-23 Pugwash seminar on Kashmir in 
Srinagar, told D/Polcouns that Musharraf's remark that 
"territorial disputes are very difficult to resolve and take 
a long time" was widely noted in India.  The PM had also said 
that "if Kashmiris from both sides are free to meet and talk 
to each other, they may come up with proposals we can look 
at," on the grounds that he did not know how long the process 
would take, nor could he predict where it would lead, but 
that "each step we complete will unfold new possibilities 
that we cannot see at this time." 
 
Other Developments 
------------------ 
 
7.  (C) We draw attention to a number of additional 
Kashmir-related developments that affect the calculus 
surrounding this issue: 
 
-- With the primary exception of the Hindu nationalists, 
Kashmiri Pandits, and sections of the military and security 
services, the Indian political class (to include the BJP) now 
widely perceives Musharraf as a changed man, and "much more 
realistic" about Kashmir.  His visit is widely perceived to 
have delivered the most important Kashmir-specific results at 
least since Shimla (1972), if not longer. 
 
-- Particularly notable are changes we have observed among 
perennial anti-Pakistan hawks (such as the Observer Research 
Foundation's Wilson John and the Insititute for Conflict 
Management's Ajay Sahni), who have adopted a "trust but 
verify" view of Musharraf in place of their former intense 
distrust of the Pakistani President.  Those hawks whose 
problems with Pakistan are more intellectual than ideological 
have taken serious note of Musharraf's repeated comments that 
"Kashmir is a difficult issue," and the fact that he "no 
longer talks in terms of deadlines." 
 
-- There is also a widespread understanding (and 
appreciation) in India that Musharraf took major risks to 
"de-link" Kashmir from the rest of the Indo-Pak relationship, 
and a growing sense that India will eventually have to "do 
something" to help him fend off his domestic critics for 
taking this step.  Musharraf's decision to move ahead on the 
larger bilateral agenda without holding it hostage to Kashmir 
is viewed in India as a major step forward. 
 
-- Indian analysts point out that the entire tenor of the 
conversation on Kashmir was people-centric rather than 
territory-centric, and that Musharraf no longer claimed that 
the Hurriyat is the sole representative of the Kashmiri 
people (although he still clearly prefers them to mainstream 
politicians like Chief Minister Mufti Mohammad Sayeed, PDP 
President Mehbooba Mufti, and National Conference President 
Omar Abdullah, whose hands he shook in Delhi for the first 
time ever). 
 
-- Musharraf also praised Omar, Mehbooba, and the Mirwaiz as 
"the future leaders of J&K" during his meeting with the PM, 
according to several media sources, the first time since the 
legendary, late J&K Chief Minister Sheikh Abdullah that a 
pro-India Kashmiri politician has received such an 
endorsement from Pakistan. 
 
-- Moderate APHC leader Mirwaiz Umar Farooq told Kashmiris 
during Friday prayers on April 22 that India has "accepted 
the disupted nature of the Kashmir issue."  (Note: No GOI 
official has said this explicitly, with the PM's comments 
limited to reiterating that he is sincere about working 
towards a final settlement, which the moderate separatists 
interpret as acknowledgement of the problem.  End Note) 
 
-- The Indian press has given prominent coverage to April 27 
remarks by Pakistani Information Minister Sheikh Rashid, who 
advised the Hurriyat that they should take cognisance of 
"changed world realities" and consider accepting a solution 
to the Kashmir problem that does not necessarily meet their 
aspirations, comparing their plight to that of the 
Palestinians, who are being offered much less than was 
offered to them and rejected by them in the past. 
 
-- For the first time in more than 50 years, India and 
Pakistan have agreed to open trade across the LOC. 
 
-- Indian observers have picked up on the fact that Musharraf 
also referred publicly to "Jammu and Kashmir" while in India, 
rather than "Kashmir" -- a semantic difference with 
significant political implications. 
 
-- There was no "resiling" during or after the Musharraf 
visit, as "Hindu" foreign affairs correspondent Amit Baruah 
recently noted, referring to a "disease" that has plagued 
India and Pakistan in the past as diplomatic nuance has been 
used to wriggle out of commitments. 
 
Reshuffling the Separatist Deck 
------------------------------- 
 
8.  (C) During his visit to Delhi, Musharraf also reordered 
the heirarchy of separatist leaders, sending a clear message 
to the Kashmiris that his preferances and priorities have 
changed.  In recent meetings, various separatists have 
confirmed to D/Polcouns that: 
 
-- they were surprised by the stern message Musharraf read to 
SAS Geelani, the oldest, most loyal, and most reliably 
pro-Pakistan of the Kashmiri politicians still operating 
above ground in the Valley.  The Pakistani President 
reportedly told Geelani that he did not understand the logic 
behind his opposition to the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus, and 
that he should "use his brain" with regard to developments in 
J&K.  Musharraf was also clearly angry that Geelani had been 
criticizing him on Islamabad's policy towards its western 
tribal areas, which was "none of his business," as moderate 
APHC leader Prof AG Bhat put it.  Geelani responded by 
telling the Kashmiri press that the meeting with Musharraf 
had been a "failure," that the Pakistani President had been 
"caught in Delhi's trap," and that the Joint Statement 
contained "nothing for us." 
 
-- Musharraf displayed continuing coolness towards the 
pro-independence JKLF, whose leader Yasin Malik expressed 
amazement at how unceremoniously Geelani had been dumped as 
Islamabad's favorite Kashmiri.  Malik was sufficiently 
annoyed at the turn of events that he did not rule out a 
non-violent agitation campaign against India to force New 
Delhi to accord him a role in the peace process, and hinted 
that the sidelining of Geelani could radicalize rejectionist 
milieux in the Valley and in Pakistani Kashmir. 
 
-- Musharraf clearly annointed the moderates (led by the 
Mirwaiz, with AG Bhat, Bilal Lone, and Maulana Abbas Ansari) 
as Islamabad's new favorites, although the Pakistani High 
Commission continues its contacts with the Geelani group and 
several of the other four groups into which the former unite 
APHC split in August 2003.  We assume that Pakistani agents 
continue to subsidize all the groups, as widely alleged in 
Delhi.  While the moderates still harbor resentment against 
Pakistan for its role in breaking up the Hurriyat (which 
shows no sign of being overcome), they were extremely pleased 
that Musharraf had sidelined Geelani, whom they refer to with 
barely disguised contempt.  In the meantime, they have been 
positive about the Indo-Pak peace process, but with the 
proviso that it be broadened to include the them. 
 
Hamhanded GOI Approach? 
---------------------- 
 
9.  (C) Moderate APHC leaders also told D/Polcouns about an 
approach a senior PMO official made to them prior to 
Musharraf's visit, reportedly in order to discuss the 
resumption of dialogue.  Lone (protect) said NSA MK Narayanan 
had called the Mirwaiz to offer a meeting with the PM on 
April 15 or 16, but that the separatists were put off by the 
brusque manner in which they had been "ordered to Delhi." 
The Mirwaiz reportedly replied that a meeting on those days 
would not be possible, whereupon (according to Lone) 
Narayanan responded along the lines that "then the PM will 
not be available for the next six months." 
 
Ceasefire? 
--------- 
 
10.  (C) The shifting plates in the Indo-Pak relationship 
over Kashmir have renewed speculation in India that the GOI 
may offer a ceasefire in J&K to offer a respite to the 
Kashmiris and with a view to bringing the Hizbul Mujahideen 
(HM) into a dialogue.  After press reports that the 
Muzaffarabad-based United Jihad Council (UJC) might be 
interested in such a scenario, but then backgtracked on it, 
public speculation has largely ceased. 
 
11.  (C) Unlike the Vajpayee PMO, this government lacks a 
senior interlocutor with broad contacts and credibility among 
the Kashmiris.  The Home Ministry -- from the little we can 
discern based on their embargo against Kashmir discussions 
with the Embassy -- appears to be completely disengaged from 
Kashmiri politics, and focused narrowly on the internal 
security mission.  Under these circumstances, and absent the 
emergence of a trusted interlocutor akin to Vajpayee's AS 
Dulat, it is difficult to imagine how the GOI would 
practically implement a ceasefire initiative, were it 
inclined to do so. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
12.  (C) Embassy Islamabad will have its own perspectives on 
these developments, but the evidence in India is strong that 
while Kashmir remains on the table, the Indo-Pak template has 
changed significantly.  What used to read "Kashmir First," 
now reads "Kashmiris First."  This subtle change from a 
terrority- to a people-based approach has triggered new hopes 
among Valley residents, who are by virtually all accounts 
very happy with developments -- but want more.  The UPA 
government has not made internal New Delhi-Srinagar dialogue 
a priority, but it remains a necessary precondition to 
addressing alienation against India that continues to plague 
the Valley.  Until that dialogue begins, the roadmap the two 
leaders worked out in New Delhi provides a set of actions 
that address Kashmir seriously and realistically, while 
setting the stage for more ambitious GOI initiatives. 
BLAKE