US embassy cable - 05CARACAS1283

C O N F I D E N T I A L  CARACAS 001283 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
NS FOR C. BARTON 
USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, MARR, KDEM, VE 
SUBJECT: VENEZUELA: THE MILITARY IN GOVERNMENT 
 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Abelardo A. Arias for reason 1.4 (d) 
. 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1.  (SBU) At least 180 military officers, both active and 
retired, currently occupy positions in the Venezuelan 
government. Some estimates range higher, but this figure 
reflects Embassy's specific information at this time. 
Seventy-nine of the 179 are/were in the Army (44%), 25 the 
Navy (14%), 25 the Air Force (14%), and 22 the National Guard 
(12%).  (We have been unable to determine accurately the 
remainder's service affiliation.)  A fair number occupy 
elected offices, but the vast majority work in executive 
ministries, embassies abroad or hold key positions in state 
companies.  Personal ties to President Hugo Chavez seem 
significant, since fully a quarter of the 180 officers 
graduated with Chavez or attended the Venezuela Military 
Academy while he was teaching there; many participated in the 
two 1992 coup attempts.  End Summary. 
 
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MIXING MILITARY WITH THE CIVILIAN 
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3.  (U) President Hugo Chavez speaks often of civic-military 
relations and the prominent role the military ought to play 
in his Bolivarian Revolution.  Post has examined a variety of 
sources to discern the number and locations of active and 
retired military officers in the Venezuelan government. To 
date, post has knowledge of 180 such officers, though some 
estimates put the number much higher (note: DAO believes 
there are easily over 200 active duty and retired military 
officers working as government officials).  The majority of 
the 180 confirmed military officers in positions of power 
fall into three categories: executive ministries, Venezuelan 
diplomatic missions abroad, and state companies. 
 
4.  (U) In executive ministries, 7 ministers (Defense, Food, 
Popular Economy, Infrastructure, Tourism, Production & 
Commerce, and Interior & Justice) and 7 vice-ministers are 
military officers, as well as numerous lower-ranking 
officials.  Particular concentrations of military officers 
are found in: the Ministry of Infrastructure, with 19, mostly 
in the National Institute for Aquatic Spaces (INEA); the 
Ministry of Environment, with 9, all presidents of state 
institutions or directors of projects; the Ministry of 
Finance, with 7, including the Director of the National 
Budget Office and the President of SENIAT, the federal tax 
institution; and the National Institute of Education 
Cooperation (INCE), with 4, including the Secretary General. 
 
5.  (U) There are at least 18 retired military officers 
working in diplomatic missions abroad as ambassadors (11) or 
consuls.  There is a particular concentration in South 
American countries, but military officers are also in 
embassies/consulates in Russia, Israel, Malaysia, the Czech 
Republic, China, South Korea and the United States. 
 
6.  (U) Though their numbers are slightly lower in state 
companies than in ministries, military officers do hold key 
positions of power in the country's largest corporations, 
including an external director and two board members of the 
state oil company PDVSA; the president of CVG, the country's 
second-largest corporation; the president of Corpozulia 
(Zulia state development company) and Carbozulia (coal 
production operation in Zulia); Director of the Industrial 
Credit Fund (FONCREI), at least 5 offices in Corpovargas 
(Vargas state development corporation), including the 
president; and until recently, one of Citgo's top executives 
(Note: DAO believes at least another 30 military officers - 
mostly active duty Army - are heading PDVSA security). 
 
7.  (U) Other military officers in important positions 
 
include 2 justices in the Venezuelan Supreme Court (including 
the President of the penal chamber of the Court) and the 
Director General of the National Electoral Council (CNE), and 
the head of the National Defense and Security Council 
(CODENA). 
 
8.  (U) Elected military Chavistas include 9 of the 23 state 
governors and 8 deputies in the National Assembly (including 
its 2nd vice-president). All governors and deputies that are 
military officers are members of Chavez's MVR political 
party. Additionally, at least four mayors are former military 
officers (note: a January 11, 2005 article in the liberal 
opposition newspaper "El Universal" claims more than 30 
mayors are retired military officers). 
 
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FAMILIARITY BREEDS POWER 
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9.  (U) Those with personal ties to Chavez through the 
Venezuela Military Academy are particularly well represented. 
More than a quarter (45) of known military officers in 
positions of power in the Venezuelan government and state 
companies graduated from the Academy either in 1975 or 
between 1982-1989.  (Note: Since post's information 
concerning graduation years is incomplete, that percentage 
could be even higher.)  President Chavez graduated from the 
Academy in 1975 and taught at the four-year academy from 1980 
through 1984. In addition, a number of Chavez' military 
supporters have worked with him since he began to plan the 
overthrow the GOV back in the 1980s, and/or participated in 
the coup attempts in February and November of 1992. 
 
10.  (U) An instructive example of the power of personal ties 
to Chavez is General (active duty) Carlos Martinez.  Martinez 
graduated with Chavez in 1975, and is concurrently serving as 
the President of Corpozulia, President of Carbozulia, 
External Director of PDVSA, and Vice President of a bank in 
the state of Zulia. Prior to this, he worked in Miraflores 
Palace as Secretary to the Presidency.  Others from the class 
of '75 include the Minister of Defense, a Vice Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, a Vice Minister of Interior and Justice, and 
the Secretary of the National Defense and Security Council 
(CODENA). 
 
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COMMENT 
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11.  (C) The preponderance of the military in the Chavez 
administration reflects his dependence on the one institution 
that formed him professionally, where he developed his 
closest personal relationships, and from where he launched 
his 1992 coup attempts. It also fits in with his concept of a 
new Bolviarian revolution. In the six years he has been in 
power, Chavez has transformed loyalties and bonds into 
commitments to his revolution.  Giving trusted allies 
authority, and in some cases control of large budgets in an 
environment almost void of fiscal oversight, ensures 
loyalists are on the front lines of the Bolivarian Revolution 
with resources that can be used at their discretion.  It also 
makes it more difficult for the military to boot Chavez out. 
There is even the added benefit of political enforcement as 
with the tax service SENIAT - whose president, Jose Vielma, 
was a student of Chavez at the Military Academy - which has 
been accused of selectively targeting investigations, 
including charges by the NGO Sumate of raiding companies as 
retribution for their support of Sumate (reftel). 
 
12.  (C) The military presence in government also fuels 
speculation about differences among Chavez supporters.  The 
civilian-military split was more pronounced some two or three 
years ago, when the military side of the Fifth Republic 
Movement were known by the civilians as the "vampires." 
That, however, dissipated with the change in the composition 
of the MVR's central committee favoring civilians in early 
 
2003.  The military side, with the exception of those called 
upon to run for office in October 2004, has been tapped more 
appointed administrative offices.  For his part, Chavez is 
not shy about calling on the military to participate, casting 
their role as part of his civic-military vision for the 
Bolivarian Revolution. This "civil-military alliance" 
reflects the influence of Peru's Velasco Alvarado as well as 
Cuba's Castro. 
 
13.  (C) The Venezuelan military has never had a reputation 
for administrative efficiency, and even in the pre-Chavez era 
was plagued by corruption and favoritism. Corpovargas, with 
five military officers now in top positions, plainly 
illustrates the potential for corruption.  Created following 
40 days of rain and devastating flooding in the state of 
Vargas in 1999, Corpovargas initially had a budget of $1.4 
billion.  However, after just three days of rain in February 
of this year caused yet more flooding in Vargas, it was 
revealed that the state company has completed only four of 23 
canal projects to date (their ostensible priority), never 
finished a key road and changed many of the original 
construction plans to use cheaper, lower-quality materials. 
No accounting of the funds has yet been brought forth. 
Brownfield 
 
 
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      2005CARACA01283 - CONFIDENTIAL