US embassy cable - 05COLOMBO797

Disclaimer: This site has been first put up 15 years ago. Since then I would probably do a couple things differently, but because I've noticed this site had been linked from news outlets, PhD theses and peer rewieved papers and because I really hate the concept of "digital dark age" I've decided to put it back up. There's no chance it can produce any harm now.

NORWEGIANS SEE NO PROGRESS ON JOINT RELIEF MECHANISM

Identifier: 05COLOMBO797
Wikileaks: View 05COLOMBO797 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Colombo
Created: 2005-04-28 09:52:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PTER EAID PGOV CE NO LTTE
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000797 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/28/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PTER, EAID, PGOV, CE, NO, LTTE - Peace Process, Tsunami 
SUBJECT: NORWEGIANS SEE NO PROGRESS ON JOINT RELIEF 
MECHANISM 
 
REF: (A) COLOMBO 0789 (B) COLOMBO 0741 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires James F. Entwistle for reason 1.4 (d). 
 
 1.  (C)  Summary.  The Norwegians report no progress on 
the joint relief mechanism since Solheim's visit earlier in 
April.  Norwegian FM Peterson will try to cajole CBK (just 
returned from vacation) towards progress in an imminent 
phone conversation; DFM Helgesen may appear on BBC to rebut 
the view that the mechanism is a Norwegian initiative being 
imposed on the local parties.  Norwegian ambassador opines 
that his government should seriously reassess its 
facilitation role if the mechanism effort fails, as should 
the co-chairs.  End Summary 
 
2.  (C)  Charge' called on Norwegian Ambassador Hans 
Brattskar April 28 for a status report on the joint 
mechanism between the government of Sri Lanka (GSL), the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the Muslim 
community on tsunami relief in the north and east.  A glum 
Brattskar said there has been no progress since Norwegian 
envoy Solheim's visit (Ref B), especially since President 
Kumaratunga (CBK) had been abroad on vacation (she returned 
to Colombo April 26).  He told the Charge' that Norwegian 
Foreign Minister Peterson would be calling CBK in the next 
twenty-four hours (a planned call earlier on April 28 had 
not worked out due to a misunderstanding over time 
differences).  In that call, Brattskar said, Peterson will 
tell CBK that it is time to fish or cut bait on the joint 
mechanism.  If she is serious, the Foreign Minister will 
say, it must be signed by next week at the latest. 
Brattskar said he has been making the same points at the 
working level already. 
 
3.  (C)  Brattskar said he is not at all sanguine that CBK 
has the political courage to go forward on the mechanism. 
She is under increasing attack on numerous fronts from 
coalition "partner" JVP; the rhetoric will only get harsher 
over the upcoming "May Day weekend."  Moreover, her Muslim 
allies in her coalition are harshly critical of the joint 
mechanism.  For their part, the LTTE has told Brattskar it 
wants to sign but will not publicly "say yes" if there is a 
chance the GSL will publicly "say no."  Brattskar 
underlined that all of the substantive and textual 
differences have been resolved.  What remains is the 
political question of whether to sign.  Even if both sides 
agree to go forward, Brattskar noted, the mechanics of a 
"signing" will be problematic.  The document would likely 
be signed by the LTTE Peace Secretariat.  On the government 
side, however, Brattskar has been told that GSL Peace 
Secretariat chief Jayantha Dhanapala would not sign. 
 
SIPDIS 
Rather, it should be one of the "line ministers" who would 
have some responsibility for implementing the mechanism. 
Brattskar said he doubts there would be an actual joint 
ceremony.  Rather, he would take the document up to 
Kilinochchi for a signature and then bring it back 
down for the same in Colombo. 
 
4.  (C)  Brattskar agreed with the Charge's assessment that 
the public campaign against the mechanism and against the 
Norwegian facilitators had become extremely ugly in recent 
days (although knocked off the April 28 front pages by 
coverage of a serious rail accident); the local press was 
becoming subsumed in the issue of who first came up with 
the idea of a mechanism.  (Examples: A number of editorials 
have cast the mechanism as something being imposed by the 
Norwegians, rather than the product of Sri Lankan 
negotiations facilitated by Norwegians, to which Sri Lanka 
must accede if it wants to receive donor assistance.  The 
Patriotic National Movement (a JVP front) plastered city 
streets with a particularly gruesome image - the photo of a 
slain public servant, killed by the LTTE while having his 
lunch, accompanied by the comment "Do we give murderous 
tiger terrorists who murdered Mr. Kallanathan (who was then 
a Director in the Ministry of Vocational Training for the 
North and East) while having his meal, a joint mechanism?" 
The right-wing Buddhist Monk party, Jathika Hela Urumaya 
(JHU), asked how the GSL could enter into the deal "with a 
criminal and terrorist."  During an April 27 meeting with 
Polchief, JHU representatives claimed that, despite never 
having seen the draft of the joint mechanism agreement, it 
would confer status and legitimacy on the LTTE and provide 
a means for direct payments to the LTTE, which they would 
use to purchase weapons.) 
5.  (C)  Brattskar said that Norwegian Deputy Foreign 
Minister Helgesen probably would be interviewed on BBC 
April 28 from Oslo and would make the point that the GSL 
and the LTTE both had, immediately after the tsunami, 
recognized the need for some sort of joint arrangement and 
that Norway had been facilitating a Sri Lankan initiative, 
not imposing its own ideas.  Brattskar said Helgesen also 
might make the point (as Brattskar has been doing) that 
much of the criticism of the mechanism is misguided since 
it implies that, if the GSL agrees to the mechanism, it 
will be initiating a process of consultation with and 
outreach to the Tigers.  "The government crossed that 
bridge with the cease-fire agreement," Brattskar noted.  If 
the joint mechanism founders, Brattskar commented, it would 
be time for the Norwegians to seriously reconsider whether 
they should continue the facilitation effort since, absent 
a mechanism, there is no chance of progress back towards 
the peace table.  Brattskar said the early June timeframe 
for a co-chairs meeting in Washington would be perfect 
since "we may have to have some serious discussions." 
ENTWISTLE 

Latest source of this page is cablebrowser-2, released 2011-10-04