US embassy cable - 05NEWDELHI3164

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INDIA WAITING FOR ACTION FROM NEPAL'S KING

Identifier: 05NEWDELHI3164
Wikileaks: View 05NEWDELHI3164 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy New Delhi
Created: 2005-04-27 12:59:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL MASS KDEM PHUM IN NP CH IS SF India
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 003164 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/26/2015 
TAGS: PREL, MASS, KDEM, PHUM, IN, NP, CH, IS, SF, India-Nepal 
SUBJECT: INDIA WAITING FOR ACTION FROM NEPAL'S KING 
 
REF: A. NEW DELHI 0386 
 
     B. NEW DELHI 2951 
     C. KATHMANDU 844 
 
Classified By: PolCouns Geoff Pyatt.  Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
1.  (C) Summary: India wants to see progress toward democracy 
on the ground, not just hear the right words, before resuming 
arms shipments to Nepal, MEA Joint Secretary (North) Ranjit 
Rae told PolCouns and Poloff on April 27.  Dismissing media 
reports of a "U-turn in Indian policy" as "speculation," Rae 
reaffirmed the need for the GOI and USG to coordinate before 
making any major changes in their Nepal strategies, but 
admitted that there is pressure within the Indian system to 
resume military assistance to the RNA.  Rae expressed 
interest in an exchange of views between US and Indian 
defense establishments on the military readiness of the RNA. 
End Summary. 
 
What Happened in Jakarta 
------------------------ 
 
2.  (C) Briefing PolCouns and Poloff on the April 22-23 
Jakarta meetings of PM Manmohan Singh and Foreign Minister 
Natwar Singh with King Gyanendra, J/S Rae underlined that 
despite media reports of a resumption of arms supplies to the 
RNA, India is still looking for concrete actions from the 
King to demonstrate a commitment to multi-party democracy 
before it will relax the current suspension (Ref A).  The 
King gave some "assurances" to the PM of this commitment, Rae 
said, including an understanding that the state of emergency 
would be lifted in most areas of the country.  The King also 
asserted that there was no media censorship (sic), and that 
the RGON was moving toward release of all political 
prisoners.  Rae noted that the GOI has been pressing for an 
end to the ban on Indian TV broadcasts in Nepal, along with 
other benchmarks. 
 
3.  (C) Rae reported that King Gyanendra gave his standard 
justification to the PM and the FM, explaining that the poor 
performance of the Deuba government against the Maoist threat 
left him no choice but to take power.  More worrisome in the 
Joint Secretary's view was the minimal importance Gyanendra 
accorded to political parties.  Recalling the King's recent 
comments in Time Magazine that "parties are merely a vehicle, 
and you can always change vehicles," (Ref C), Rae complained 
that Gyanendra seemed to be refuting India's emphasis on the 
two pillars of constitutional monarchy and multi-party 
democracy, suggesting instead that Nepal needed other pillars 
including anti-corruption measures and good governance. 
 
Steps in the Wrong Direction 
---------------------------- 
 
4.  (C) Citing the arrests of former PM Deuba and other 
student leaders on April 26-27 as worrying steps in the wrong 
direction, Rae opined that it will be difficult to assess if 
any positive actions now are true progress, or merely 
piecemeal steps to please outsiders devoid of any real 
commitment to multi-party democracy.  The J/S said India's 
next step is to wait for action in Nepal that demonstrates a 
"reasonable assurance of forward movement."  Rae stressed 
that the GOI wants to see concrete developments on the 
ground, and "not to keep hearing reassurances" from the 
palace. 
 
5.  (C) Rae admitted that Deuba's arrest at the behest of a 
new anti-corruption commission set up following the February 
1 dismissal of government posed a challenge to the GOI. 
India has been concerned that the new panel would prosecute 
members of the former Deuba government for political reasons, 
but the GOI also did not want to be seen trivializing the 
problem of corruption.  Rae was uncertain whether the MEA 
would issue a statement of concern about Deuba's arrest, but 
was inclined in that direction. 
 
Press Reports to the Contrary, Conditions Remain 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
6.  (C) The Joint Secretary expressed amusement at media 
speculation about a GOI promise to resume arms supplies, 
commenting that the press is "always looking for a big 
story."  He dismissed a "Times of India" account that the 
"arms pipeline" would be restored within ten days, and 
referred back to Manmohan Singh's formulation that the GOI 
would consider resuming arms supplies "in the proper 
perspective," meaning after positive actions by the palace 
(see text of the PM's press appearance in Jakarta para 11). 
 
7.  (C) Rae admitted frankly that the GOI has not decided 
what benchmarks would be sufficient to resume the supply of 
Indian military assistance.  He said he was personally 
pessimistic that the King would be willing to restore 
multi-party democracy, and that it was most important to keep 
up pressure on him until this goal was fully achieved.  Short 
of this, he speculated, the King would be willing to do many 
things to get the arms supply restored, but might use future 
assurances to avoid restoration of democracy.  He conceded, 
however, that there was pressure from other parts of the 
Indian government, notably the military, to resume assistance 
early.  These debates will have to work themselves out within 
the GOI, Rae added. 
 
Military Situation of the RNA Uncertain 
--------------------------------------- 
 
8.  (C) Rae repeated his assessment shared with A/S Rocca 
(Ref B) that the Maoists were militarily incapable of taking 
and holding ground or defeating the RNA, but was unsure about 
the status of RNA supplies.  Commenting that the truth must 
lie somewhere between expressions of anxiety over tight 
supplies made by the RNA to the Indian Army and the confident 
official statements of the RNA's progress against the 
Maoists, the J/S expressed interest in a USG assessment of 
the RNA's capabilities and supplies.  He appreciated 
PolCouns's suggestion that US and Indian military experts 
exchange views on the military situation in Nepal. 
 
9.  (C) Asked about Gyanendra's visit to the Baoa Forum in 
China, Rae said it was unlikely that China would step in to 
provide arms to Nepal.  He noted that A/S Rocca had indicated 
US attention to this issue.  However, the J/S expressed 
concern over possible military supplies from Israel and South 
Africa, despite official assurances from the Embassies of 
both countries in New Delhi that they would not provide arms. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
10.  (C) Although Rae's statements confirm our earlier 
reporting that no fundamental shift has occurred in GOI 
conditionality for resuming military assistance to Nepal (Ref 
A), his admission of the pressure from the Indian Army to 
resume arms supplies and the unnamed sources quoted in media 
reports who speak favorably of an early resumption highlight 
the debate taking place within government circles over how 
much pressure to put on the King over democracy, and how 
badly the RNA needs supplies.  Rae emphasized that a decision 
to resume arms supplies should be based on a political 
calculation, not an assessment of the military balance. 
However, he conceded that India's hang-tough approach rests 
on an assumption that the Maoists are not in a position to 
threaten RNA control.  An exchange of assessments between our 
respective defense intelligence agencies might be useful for 
accurately gauging how much threat the Maoists pose to the 
RNA and the need for outside military assistance to preserve 
Army readiness.  End Comment. 
 
Transcript of Prime Minister Singh's Comments on April 23 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
11.  (U) The following transcript was provided by the MEA. 
 
Questions (inaudible): On meeting with HM the King of Nepal. 
 
I met His Majesty the King, he had asked for a meeting and 
being our close neighbour, a country with which we have 
standing civilisational ties, very intimate relations, I did 
agree to meet His Majesty.  He gave me an account of 
circumstances, compulsions in which he had to take action, 
which he did take.  I explained to him that as a close 
neighbour and friend of Nepal, a country with which we have a 
unique relationship, we have always regarded constitutional 
monarchy and multi-party democracy as the twin pillars of the 
Nepalese polity, and in the light of developments in recent 
months our concern has been this recognition that these two 
twin pillars must work together in harmony.  We discussed the 
situation and his perspective on the evolving situation.  I 
did suggest to him that it is important to take effective 
measures to restart the political process and to work out a 
road map for this purpose.  His Majesty was quite sensitive 
to these concerns, and therefore, on the whole I think the 
meeting was constructive in terms of its outcome. 
Q: What about military supplies? 
 
His Majesty raised that issue with me and I said we will look 
at these things in proper perspective. 
BLAKE 

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