US embassy cable - 05COLOMBO792

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SRI LANKAN POST-TSUNAMI RECONSTRUCTION UPDATE (APRIL 27, 2005) 1. (U) This cable contains an action request, please see para 7. Post-tsunami transition from relief to reconstruction continues. The pace and organization of tsunami relief and reconstruction remains on par with

Identifier: 05COLOMBO792
Wikileaks: View 05COLOMBO792 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Colombo
Created: 2005-04-27 11:06:00
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Tags: EAID ECON PGOV CE MV Tsunami
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000792 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EB A/S ANTHONY WAYNE; SA/INS FOR J. BRENNIG, N. 
DEAN; PLEASE PASS TO TSUNAMI RECONSTRUCTION TASK FORCE; 
TREASURY FOR C. CARNES 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID, ECON, PGOV, CE, MV, Tsunami 
SUBJECT: SRI LANKAN POST-TSUNAMI RECONSTRUCTION UPDATE 
(APRIL 27, 2005) 
1.  (U) This cable contains an action request, please see 
para 7.  Post-tsunami transition from relief to 
reconstruction continues.  The pace and organization of 
tsunami relief and reconstruction remains on par with 
 
SIPDIS 
previous reporting. 
 
Joint Mechanism with LTTE: Going nowhere fast 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
2.  (SBU) The mood surrounding a potential joint mechanism 
for tsunami aid distribution in the north and east is 
increasingly negative.  The Government's coalition partner, 
the Marxist-Nationalist Jamuna Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), 
continues is criticisms of a potential mechanism, though we 
hear differing reports about whether they have threatened 
to pull out of the governing coalition over this issue. 
Charge plans to meet the Norwegian Ambassador this week to 
discuss Norway's impressions, though during Special Envoy 
Eric Solheim's recent visit the Norwegians were very 
positive about progress on the joint mechanism. President 
Kumaratunga's return from vacation is a key factor here. 
Septel to follow later this week. 
 
Temporary Shelter: USAID/DART Survey 
------------------------------------ 
 
3.  (U) USAID/OFDA is bringing in an OFDA Urban 
Planning/Urban Disaster Mitigation specialist to monitor 
the transitional shelter program, examine its relationship 
to the larger efforts to build permanent housing, and 
promote coastal zone management.  The issues plaguing the 
transitional shelter process continue to be slow land 
allocation (primarily in the east, a large area of land was 
cleared for the south last week) and a generally tight 
market for building supplies. 
 
GSL HR Commission Consultant: Aid Distribution Fair 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
4.  (SBU) In a recent conversation with Poloff, Lionel 
Fernando (a retired, senior civil servant who has 
previously served abroad in diplomatic assignments and as 
Foreign Secretary), who was appointed by the Human Rights 
Commission to review aid programs in the North and East, 
reported that aid was being distributed fairly in the 
tsunami affected areas of the North and East. He opined 
 
SIPDIS 
that while progress on the political front in Colombo has 
stagnated, cooperation between the various actors in the 
field has continued, although predictably not as 
efficiently as immediately after the tsunami hit. 
100 Meter Zone: GSL Needs Face Saving Way Out 
--------------------------------------------- 
5.  (SBU) The 100/200 meter coastal exclusion zone remains 
an impediment to rebuilding, but has the support of the 
President and, by extension, the rest of the GSL. 
Nonetheless, continued problems in finding land to relocate 
affected persons, as well as haphazard enforcement of the 
rules, has brought pressure on the Government to ease its 
restrictions.  This has become a hot-button political 
issue, however, with opposition politicians calling for the 
GSL to remove the exclusion zone, and the President digging 
in her heels over the issue. 
6.  (SBU) In our discussions with senior GSL officials on 
the exclusion zone, they generally recognize that they have 
an intractable problem and acknowledge there will be need 
for flexibility in implementation.  Some continue to hold 
to the fallacy that there is a "scientific" rationale for 
the exclusion zone, though no explanation based on 
scientific evidence has ever been provided.  Visits to the 
affected areas indicate that enforcement is spotty, with 
the exclusion being outright ignored in several areas. 
Further, the way the regulation was written, which allows 
homes or institutions that were not damaged beyond 40 
percent to remain, creates an equity issue that could 
inflame tensions on the ground. 
 
7.  (SBU) While on the one hand the donor community is 
stymied in its efforts to move forward with implementing 
projects, particularly on the housing front, as a result of 
this regulation, we think that any approach to the 
Government on the issue has to be handled with sensitivity 
to the President's primary concern that a public reversal 
would be used by the opposition to score political points. 
As we have seen on many other fronts, this Government in 
general (and the President in particular) does not respond 
well when cornered.  Therefore, we suggest the following 
path, and request Department and other agency support as 
required: 
 
--We believe it could be useful to host a small digital 
video conference (DVC) with key government players to 
discuss the coastal exclusion zone concept.  From the US 
side, we believe representatives from FEMA, USGS and other 
agencies that might have a perspective on coastal zone 
management would be useful.  Our initial discussions with 
representatives from the Tsunami Warning Center and other 
tsunami threatened areas have revealed that many coastal 
 
SIPDIS 
areas do not enforce building zones, per se, but instead 
focus on creating evacuation zones, with emergency 
preparedness efforts designed to removed people from harm's 
way in the event of an impending emergency.  This DVC 
should not be widely publicized, but merely provide input 
to Government decision makers to help increase their 
understanding of best practices. 
 
--We should avoid publicly chastising the GSL on this 
matter, but should look for ways to promote a proactive 
move by the Government, to abandon the zones in favor of 
another approach, at least in some areas, not just as a 
result of pressure from the opposition and the 
international community.  It could be couched in a decision 
to apply best practices, and could be touted as the result 
of consultations with affected communities and the need to 
be sensitive to their needs.  Such an approach could be 
pursued by the Ambassador and others at Post with key GSL 
officials, including the President, and should be followed 
by an effort to provide public support from key members of 
the international community for the decision. But any 
effort needs to be quiet and discreet devoid of public 
statements and chastising.  We imagine the exclusive zone 
will be discussed considerably at the mid-May development 
forum. 
 
8. (U) Post appreciates Department's consideration of this 
idea and requests support in the development of an 
appropriate DVC program. 
 
ENTWISTLE 

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