US embassy cable - 05COLOMBO789

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SRI LANKA: A/S ROCCA DISCUSSES TSUNAMI RECONSTRUCTION AND JOINT MECHANISM WITH GOVERNMENT, POLITICAL LEADERS

Identifier: 05COLOMBO789
Wikileaks: View 05COLOMBO789 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Colombo
Created: 2005-04-27 06:45:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV EAID PTER CE Tsunami Political Parties LTTE
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 000789 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA/INS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, EAID, PTER, CE, Tsunami, Political Parties, LTTE - Peace Process 
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA:  A/S ROCCA DISCUSSES TSUNAMI 
RECONSTRUCTION AND JOINT MECHANISM WITH GOVERNMENT, 
POLITICAL LEADERS 
 
REF: COLOMBO 471 
 
Classified By: AMB. JEFFREY J. LUNSTEAD.  REASON:  1.4 (B,D). 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1.  (C) In an April 19 visit to the eastern district of 
Ampara and in discussions with government and political 
leaders in Colombo on April 20, Assistant Secretary for South 
Asian Affairs Christina Rocca reviewed the progress of 
post-tsunami reconstruction efforts and prospects for a 
proposed "joint mechanism" between the government and the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) to coordinate 
assistance.  A/S Rocca urged timely agreement on the joint 
mechanism and cautioned that emerging perceptions of an 
inefficient relief effort could jeopardize future assistance. 
 Government interlocutors indicated that they expected 
agreement on the joint mechanism soon; representatives of the 
Tamil National Alliance share that view.  Government 
coalition partner Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) continues 
to oppose the agreement, although JVP Leader Somawansa 
Amarasinghe stopped short of confirming press reports that 
the party would quit the alliance if the agreement were 
signed.  End summary. 
 
------------------- 
VISIT TO THE EAST 
------------------- 
 
2.  (U) On April 19 Assistant Secretary for South Asian 
Affairs Christina Rocca, accompanied by the Ambassador and 
AID Mission Director Carol Becker, visited Kalmunai, a 
Muslim-majority town in the tsunami-ravaged eastern coastal 
district of Ampara, to assess the reconstruction efforts 
underway.  She visited a transitional housing project built 
by USAID local implementing partner GOAL and viewed a dike 
fortification project that uses tsunami rubble.  Rocca handed 
over USAID-provided vocational tools to tsunami-affected 
carpenters, masons and welders. 
 
3.  (U) A/S Rocca was received at a tsunami-damaged school 
once attended by about 1600 students, but which now cannot be 
rebuilt due to its location within the 200-meter buffer zone. 
 A local representative explained that it is difficult to 
find, and prohibitively expensive to purchase, suitable land 
for the school outside the buffer zone.  On her return trip 
to Colombo, A/S Rocca viewed the Arugam Bay area, another 
tsunami-devasted locale in Ampara currently proposed for 
 
SIPDIS 
road, causeway and bridge reconstruction, as well as projects 
to revitalize the tourist industry. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
GREATER EFFICIENCY, BETTER ORGANIZATION 
IN RECONSTRUCTION EFFORT NEEDED 
----------------------------------------- 
 
4.  (C) A/S Rocca, accompanied by the Ambassador, raised U.S. 
concerns with the pace and efficiency of reconstruction 
efforts in an April 20 meeting with Foreign Secretary 
H.M.G.S. Palihakkara in Colombo.  A/S Rocca opened the 
meeting by recounting her trip to the East, where, she said, 
she was impressed with reconstruction so far despite the 
obvious need for much more work to be accomplished.  There 
remains keen interest in tsunami relief in the U.S., Rocca 
added.  Palihakkara then offered his thanks and gratitude for 
U.S. assistance, particularly for the U.S. military effort, a 
deployment that had left a good impression among the people, 
he said.  Palihakkara made a plea for the U.S. to send a 
high-level representative to the upcoming May Development 
Forum.  The forum would be important for Government of Sri 
Lanka (GSL) attempts to integrate tsunami reconstruction into 
medium-term development plans.  A/S Rocca and the Ambassador 
re-assured the Foreign Secretary that the USG was taking the 
forum seriously and was considering who might come from 
Washington.  Both the Ambassador and Palihakkara agreed that 
U.N. envoy Clinton would most likely not attend, although his 
deputy, Erskine Bowles, was a possibility. 
 
5.  (C) A/S Rocca proceeded to voice our concern that 
Americans' and other donors' willingness to remain engaged in 
Sri Lanka in general and to assist in further tsunami relief 
and reconstruction would begin to wane if the agreement 
between the GSL and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE) on a "joint mechanism" to coordinate relief were not 
signed and implemented soon.  Frustration was mounting at the 
lack of movement, she continued, and the world presented 
numerous other crises for people to focus on rather than wait 
for Sri Lankans to sort out their domestic political 
disputes.  To people in the outside world, the Ambassador 
added, it appears that nothing is happening.  Agreement on 
the joint mechanism could ameliorate that perception. 
Acknowledging the GSL may have legitimate concerns about 
details in the agreement, the Ambassador urged the timely 
resolution of these outstanding issues. 
 
6.  (C) In response, Palihakkara emphasized that the 
government's position on the joint mechanism remained "open 
and forthcoming.  The problems don't relate to tsunami 
assistance, but rather to rights over territorial waters," he 
insisted.  The LTTE was bringing other issues into the 
discussion of a joint mechanism.  Nevertheless, Palihakkara 
sounded optimistic that an agreement could be reached, and 
that GSL coalition partner Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), 
while finding it distasteful, would still go along. 
Furthermore, the GSL was willing to resume peace talks 
immediately if the LTTE would compromise on its proposal for 
an Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA) and allow other 
parties, such as Muslim parties, to take part, he averred. 
Palihakkara also felt that reaching agreement on the joint 
mechanism would help the peace process. 
 
7.  (C) A/S Rocca noted that the GSL policy of taxing 
assistance supplies was having a "chilling effect" and could 
impose a "real obstacle" to eliciting more aid.  The Foreign 
Secretary said his ministry had recommended to the Finance 
 
SIPDIS 
Ministry that the latter revisit the issue, and that they had 
agreed to do so.  The Ambassador replied that Congress would 
balk at providing more aid to Sri Lanka if it thought that 
the supplies the aid bought were going to be taxed upon entry 
into the country or subject to value-added tax if purchased 
in the country. 
 
---------------------------- 
MUSLIMS FEAR BEING SHUT OUT 
---------------------------- 
 
8.  (C) In a separate meeting on April 20, Rauff Hakeem, 
leader of the Sri Lankan Muslim Congress (SLMC), warned A/S 
Rocca that growing Muslim frustration at being excluded from 
talks on the joint mechanism and the slow pace of 
reconstruction in the East could foster greater 
radicalization within the community.  Hakeem reported that 
people in the tsunami-affected areas increasingly are angry 
at the lack of progress in reconstruction.  He blamed much of 
the hold-up on the unresolved issue of the 100-200 meter 
buffer zone for reconstruction along the coast that the 
government is insisting upon. 
 
9.  (C)  Highlighting the need for some alternative or 
compromise on the issue, Hakeem complained that there was no 
land to which many communities could move.  If Muslims were 
forced to move, they would probably expand into 
Tamil-dominated areas, he warned, thereby exacerbating 
already problematic ethnic tensions. If Muslims refused to 
move, Hakeem believed that the government would use 
bureaucratic coercion-including the suspension of 
utilities-to force them out.  Repeated attempts by the SLMC 
to raise this issue with President Kumaratunga had proven 
unsuccessful, he asserted.  The Ambassador noted that he had 
raised his own concerns about the buffer zone with various 
officials, but there seemed much confusion within the 
government about its details and status.  Hakeem said that 
the longer that government waits to deal with it, the more 
frustrated people will become, aggravating the tense climate 
already created by the internecine fighting between the LTTE 
and Karuna supporters. 
 
10.  (C) Although agreeing with it in principle, the SLMC 
refuses to support the joint mechanism unless Muslims were 
given a more institutionalized role in negotiations and in 
the implementation, Hakeem said.  He also argued that the 
mechanism should be devolved further to the divisional level 
"because it is easier to manage diversity on that level" and 
would provide "a greater feeling of justice" in the Muslim 
community.  He put little faith in either the LTTE's claims 
that they support separate Muslim representation or in the 
effectiveness of government agents to stand up to the LTTE. 
When the Ambassador pointed out that the joint mechanism 
already provided de facto recognition for the need for Muslim 
representation by promising Muslim representation at each of 
the three levels, Hakeem cynically noted that he would only 
believe such a set-up when he saw it.  (Note:  In a 
discussion later the same day, Prime Minister Mahinda 
Rajapakse assured A/S Rocca and the Ambassador that the 
Muslims would be represented in the joint mechanism.  Per 
reftel, Norwegian facilitator Solheim is quite clear that 
Muslims would have a key role in the mechanism.  Solheim and 
Hakeem met later in the week and may have sorted this out. 
End note.) 
 
------------------------------------ 
JVP:  MECHANISM NOT IN MANIFESTO, 
SO CAN'T BE DONE 
------------------------------------ 
 
11.  (C)  On April 20 JVP Leader Somawansa Amarasinghe told 
A/S Rocca and the Ambassador that his party opposes the 
proposed joint mechanism because the United People's Front 
Alliance manifesto does not provide for such an arrangement. 
Any decisions regarding relations with the LTTE must not 
deviate from the manifesto, he insisted.  He asserted that, 
in fact, there was no need for such a mechanism because the 
current effort to rebuild the tsunami-affected areas was 
working well.  He attempted to support this claim by noting 
that there were no food riots or other "impediments" in 
getting aid to those who needed it and citing his own party's 
successful relief campaign in the East immediately following 
the tsunami. 
 
12.  (C)  The JVP also refuses to support the joint mechanism 
out of longstanding unwillingness to reward the LTTE when it 
has not proven in word and deed that it will renounce 
violence and join the democratic mainstream, Amarasinge 
continued.  Moreover, the mechanism would undermine the 
efforts of legitimate Tamil parties-such as the EPDP-who 
subscribe to the democratic process and would line LTTE 
pockets with public monies, according to Amarasinghe.  The 
Ambassador countered that the mechanism might bring the LTTE 
into the democratic mainstream by forcing it to work in a 
political context in which it would not have a majority and 
would thus have to work with others.  He asked whether the 
JVP would abandon the coalition over the joint mechanism. 
Amarasinghe dismissed reports in local newspapers that the 
party would leave the coalition should the mechanism proceed 
(note: Amarasinghe insisted that the JVP politburo had 
not/not met on 19 April or voted to leave the coalition over 
the joint mechanism. End note.).  The JVP was still waiting 
to see copies of the draft agreement and other related 
documents and felt assured by Kumaratunga's pledges that she 
would not make any substantive decisions without first 
consulting her coalition partners, Amarasinghe said. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
TNA SEES MECHANISM AS POTENTIAL START 
OF "CONSTRUCTIVE PROCESS" 
--------------------------------------- 
 
13.  (C)  Tamil National Alliance (TNA) MPs R. Sampanthan 
(Trincomalee) and Gajendrakumar Ponnambalam (Jaffna) sounded 
a more optimistic note about prospects for the joint 
mechanism in their April 20 meeting with A/S Rocca and the 
Ambassador.  Sampanthan reported "indications that something 
may happen" to spring the agreement loose, adding hopefully 
that the joint mechanism "could be the beginning of a 
constructive process" of LTTE/GSL engagement leading to a 
final negotiated resolution of the conflict.   Despite 
vociferous opposition from its JVP coalition partner, events 
are "coming to the stage where the Government must realize 
the joint mechanism is needed," he concluded. 
 
14.  (C)  The Ambassador asked if the LTTE would allow NGOs 
to work unhindered in tsunami-affected areas under its 
control, citing a recent report from a private corporate 
donor of LTTE demands that reconstruction funds be delivered 
directly to its coffers.  The MPs professed surprise and 
consternation at the report, asserting that the LTTE had 
assured them of non-interference with relief work. 
Ponnambalam said that the LTTE understands that donor money 
is unlikely to be given directly to it and had thus urged TNA 
MPs to encourage private NGOs to work in LTTE territory.  The 
corporate donor's experience does not reflect "the official 
line" from the LTTE, Sampanthan said, promising to take up 
the matter with the Tiger leadership. 
 
15. (U) A/S Rocca has cleared this message. 
ENTWISTLE 

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