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| Identifier: | 05COLOMBO789 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05COLOMBO789 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Colombo |
| Created: | 2005-04-27 06:45:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PGOV EAID PTER CE Tsunami Political Parties LTTE |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 000789 SIPDIS STATE FOR SA/INS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2015 TAGS: PGOV, EAID, PTER, CE, Tsunami, Political Parties, LTTE - Peace Process SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: A/S ROCCA DISCUSSES TSUNAMI RECONSTRUCTION AND JOINT MECHANISM WITH GOVERNMENT, POLITICAL LEADERS REF: COLOMBO 471 Classified By: AMB. JEFFREY J. LUNSTEAD. REASON: 1.4 (B,D). ------- SUMMARY ------- 1. (C) In an April 19 visit to the eastern district of Ampara and in discussions with government and political leaders in Colombo on April 20, Assistant Secretary for South Asian Affairs Christina Rocca reviewed the progress of post-tsunami reconstruction efforts and prospects for a proposed "joint mechanism" between the government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) to coordinate assistance. A/S Rocca urged timely agreement on the joint mechanism and cautioned that emerging perceptions of an inefficient relief effort could jeopardize future assistance. Government interlocutors indicated that they expected agreement on the joint mechanism soon; representatives of the Tamil National Alliance share that view. Government coalition partner Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) continues to oppose the agreement, although JVP Leader Somawansa Amarasinghe stopped short of confirming press reports that the party would quit the alliance if the agreement were signed. End summary. ------------------- VISIT TO THE EAST ------------------- 2. (U) On April 19 Assistant Secretary for South Asian Affairs Christina Rocca, accompanied by the Ambassador and AID Mission Director Carol Becker, visited Kalmunai, a Muslim-majority town in the tsunami-ravaged eastern coastal district of Ampara, to assess the reconstruction efforts underway. She visited a transitional housing project built by USAID local implementing partner GOAL and viewed a dike fortification project that uses tsunami rubble. Rocca handed over USAID-provided vocational tools to tsunami-affected carpenters, masons and welders. 3. (U) A/S Rocca was received at a tsunami-damaged school once attended by about 1600 students, but which now cannot be rebuilt due to its location within the 200-meter buffer zone. A local representative explained that it is difficult to find, and prohibitively expensive to purchase, suitable land for the school outside the buffer zone. On her return trip to Colombo, A/S Rocca viewed the Arugam Bay area, another tsunami-devasted locale in Ampara currently proposed for SIPDIS road, causeway and bridge reconstruction, as well as projects to revitalize the tourist industry. ----------------------------------------- GREATER EFFICIENCY, BETTER ORGANIZATION IN RECONSTRUCTION EFFORT NEEDED ----------------------------------------- 4. (C) A/S Rocca, accompanied by the Ambassador, raised U.S. concerns with the pace and efficiency of reconstruction efforts in an April 20 meeting with Foreign Secretary H.M.G.S. Palihakkara in Colombo. A/S Rocca opened the meeting by recounting her trip to the East, where, she said, she was impressed with reconstruction so far despite the obvious need for much more work to be accomplished. There remains keen interest in tsunami relief in the U.S., Rocca added. Palihakkara then offered his thanks and gratitude for U.S. assistance, particularly for the U.S. military effort, a deployment that had left a good impression among the people, he said. Palihakkara made a plea for the U.S. to send a high-level representative to the upcoming May Development Forum. The forum would be important for Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) attempts to integrate tsunami reconstruction into medium-term development plans. A/S Rocca and the Ambassador re-assured the Foreign Secretary that the USG was taking the forum seriously and was considering who might come from Washington. Both the Ambassador and Palihakkara agreed that U.N. envoy Clinton would most likely not attend, although his deputy, Erskine Bowles, was a possibility. 5. (C) A/S Rocca proceeded to voice our concern that Americans' and other donors' willingness to remain engaged in Sri Lanka in general and to assist in further tsunami relief and reconstruction would begin to wane if the agreement between the GSL and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) on a "joint mechanism" to coordinate relief were not signed and implemented soon. Frustration was mounting at the lack of movement, she continued, and the world presented numerous other crises for people to focus on rather than wait for Sri Lankans to sort out their domestic political disputes. To people in the outside world, the Ambassador added, it appears that nothing is happening. Agreement on the joint mechanism could ameliorate that perception. Acknowledging the GSL may have legitimate concerns about details in the agreement, the Ambassador urged the timely resolution of these outstanding issues. 6. (C) In response, Palihakkara emphasized that the government's position on the joint mechanism remained "open and forthcoming. The problems don't relate to tsunami assistance, but rather to rights over territorial waters," he insisted. The LTTE was bringing other issues into the discussion of a joint mechanism. Nevertheless, Palihakkara sounded optimistic that an agreement could be reached, and that GSL coalition partner Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), while finding it distasteful, would still go along. Furthermore, the GSL was willing to resume peace talks immediately if the LTTE would compromise on its proposal for an Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA) and allow other parties, such as Muslim parties, to take part, he averred. Palihakkara also felt that reaching agreement on the joint mechanism would help the peace process. 7. (C) A/S Rocca noted that the GSL policy of taxing assistance supplies was having a "chilling effect" and could impose a "real obstacle" to eliciting more aid. The Foreign Secretary said his ministry had recommended to the Finance SIPDIS Ministry that the latter revisit the issue, and that they had agreed to do so. The Ambassador replied that Congress would balk at providing more aid to Sri Lanka if it thought that the supplies the aid bought were going to be taxed upon entry into the country or subject to value-added tax if purchased in the country. ---------------------------- MUSLIMS FEAR BEING SHUT OUT ---------------------------- 8. (C) In a separate meeting on April 20, Rauff Hakeem, leader of the Sri Lankan Muslim Congress (SLMC), warned A/S Rocca that growing Muslim frustration at being excluded from talks on the joint mechanism and the slow pace of reconstruction in the East could foster greater radicalization within the community. Hakeem reported that people in the tsunami-affected areas increasingly are angry at the lack of progress in reconstruction. He blamed much of the hold-up on the unresolved issue of the 100-200 meter buffer zone for reconstruction along the coast that the government is insisting upon. 9. (C) Highlighting the need for some alternative or compromise on the issue, Hakeem complained that there was no land to which many communities could move. If Muslims were forced to move, they would probably expand into Tamil-dominated areas, he warned, thereby exacerbating already problematic ethnic tensions. If Muslims refused to move, Hakeem believed that the government would use bureaucratic coercion-including the suspension of utilities-to force them out. Repeated attempts by the SLMC to raise this issue with President Kumaratunga had proven unsuccessful, he asserted. The Ambassador noted that he had raised his own concerns about the buffer zone with various officials, but there seemed much confusion within the government about its details and status. Hakeem said that the longer that government waits to deal with it, the more frustrated people will become, aggravating the tense climate already created by the internecine fighting between the LTTE and Karuna supporters. 10. (C) Although agreeing with it in principle, the SLMC refuses to support the joint mechanism unless Muslims were given a more institutionalized role in negotiations and in the implementation, Hakeem said. He also argued that the mechanism should be devolved further to the divisional level "because it is easier to manage diversity on that level" and would provide "a greater feeling of justice" in the Muslim community. He put little faith in either the LTTE's claims that they support separate Muslim representation or in the effectiveness of government agents to stand up to the LTTE. When the Ambassador pointed out that the joint mechanism already provided de facto recognition for the need for Muslim representation by promising Muslim representation at each of the three levels, Hakeem cynically noted that he would only believe such a set-up when he saw it. (Note: In a discussion later the same day, Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapakse assured A/S Rocca and the Ambassador that the Muslims would be represented in the joint mechanism. Per reftel, Norwegian facilitator Solheim is quite clear that Muslims would have a key role in the mechanism. Solheim and Hakeem met later in the week and may have sorted this out. End note.) ------------------------------------ JVP: MECHANISM NOT IN MANIFESTO, SO CAN'T BE DONE ------------------------------------ 11. (C) On April 20 JVP Leader Somawansa Amarasinghe told A/S Rocca and the Ambassador that his party opposes the proposed joint mechanism because the United People's Front Alliance manifesto does not provide for such an arrangement. Any decisions regarding relations with the LTTE must not deviate from the manifesto, he insisted. He asserted that, in fact, there was no need for such a mechanism because the current effort to rebuild the tsunami-affected areas was working well. He attempted to support this claim by noting that there were no food riots or other "impediments" in getting aid to those who needed it and citing his own party's successful relief campaign in the East immediately following the tsunami. 12. (C) The JVP also refuses to support the joint mechanism out of longstanding unwillingness to reward the LTTE when it has not proven in word and deed that it will renounce violence and join the democratic mainstream, Amarasinge continued. Moreover, the mechanism would undermine the efforts of legitimate Tamil parties-such as the EPDP-who subscribe to the democratic process and would line LTTE pockets with public monies, according to Amarasinghe. The Ambassador countered that the mechanism might bring the LTTE into the democratic mainstream by forcing it to work in a political context in which it would not have a majority and would thus have to work with others. He asked whether the JVP would abandon the coalition over the joint mechanism. Amarasinghe dismissed reports in local newspapers that the party would leave the coalition should the mechanism proceed (note: Amarasinghe insisted that the JVP politburo had not/not met on 19 April or voted to leave the coalition over the joint mechanism. End note.). The JVP was still waiting to see copies of the draft agreement and other related documents and felt assured by Kumaratunga's pledges that she would not make any substantive decisions without first consulting her coalition partners, Amarasinghe said. --------------------------------------- TNA SEES MECHANISM AS POTENTIAL START OF "CONSTRUCTIVE PROCESS" --------------------------------------- 13. (C) Tamil National Alliance (TNA) MPs R. Sampanthan (Trincomalee) and Gajendrakumar Ponnambalam (Jaffna) sounded a more optimistic note about prospects for the joint mechanism in their April 20 meeting with A/S Rocca and the Ambassador. Sampanthan reported "indications that something may happen" to spring the agreement loose, adding hopefully that the joint mechanism "could be the beginning of a constructive process" of LTTE/GSL engagement leading to a final negotiated resolution of the conflict. Despite vociferous opposition from its JVP coalition partner, events are "coming to the stage where the Government must realize the joint mechanism is needed," he concluded. 14. (C) The Ambassador asked if the LTTE would allow NGOs to work unhindered in tsunami-affected areas under its control, citing a recent report from a private corporate donor of LTTE demands that reconstruction funds be delivered directly to its coffers. The MPs professed surprise and consternation at the report, asserting that the LTTE had assured them of non-interference with relief work. Ponnambalam said that the LTTE understands that donor money is unlikely to be given directly to it and had thus urged TNA MPs to encourage private NGOs to work in LTTE territory. The corporate donor's experience does not reflect "the official line" from the LTTE, Sampanthan said, promising to take up the matter with the Tiger leadership. 15. (U) A/S Rocca has cleared this message. ENTWISTLE
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