US embassy cable - 05MADRID1626

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MADRID 001626 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/WE, EUR/RPM AND WHA/AND 
DEFENSE FOR OSD/ISP (P. GRAFF) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/26/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MOPS, PTER, SP, Counterterrorism, American - Spanish Relations 
SUBJECT: SPAIN: SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY RUMSFELD'S 
MEETING WITH DEFENSE MINISTER BONO 
 
REF: MADRID 1604 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires J. Robert Manzanares, 
reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1. (C) The Zapatero government believes it has taken 
significant steps to put relations with the U.S. back on 
track, such as agreeing to lead both a PRT and an FSB in 
western Afghanistan.  Military-to-military relations between 
Spain and the U.S. have remained strong over the past 14 
months despite the change in government, as has bilateral 
cooperation against terrorism.  Spain continues to provide 
U.S. forces full access to its naval base at Rota and its air 
base at Moron, as well as providing blanket flight clearances 
for U.S. forces moving to and from Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Defense Minister Bono will acknowledge that the U.S. and 
Spain still have differences over issues such as Venezuela 
but will ask that the U.S. focus on areas of cooperation, and 
not only on areas of disagreement.  Your meeting with Bono 
can be an opportunity to send a clear message to the Spanish 
government that while the U.S. appreciates Spain's 
cooperation in Afghanistan and other areas, the U.S. remains 
concerned about Spanish actions that negatively affect our 
interests, such as Zapatero's Venezuela policy. End Summary. 
 
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MILITARY COOPERATION 
-------------------- 
 
2. (C) Military to military relations between Spain and the 
U.S. remain very strong despite the change to a Socialist 
government; the Zapatero government has continued to provide 
broad access for U.S. forces at Rota Naval Base and Moron Air 
Base.  There are currently over 2500 active duty U.S. 
military stationed at the two bases, the vast majority at 
Rota.  Including U.S. civilians and dependents, the American 
presence at the Spanish bases tops 5,000.  Zapatero has also 
left untouched Spain's practice of providing blanket flight 
clearances for U.S. military aircraft, including in support 
of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.  The Spanish military 
is still smarting from its ignominious withdrawal from Iraq 
and, largely as a result of the Iraq withdrawal, is 
displeased with the Socialist government.  The Spanish armed 
forces  strongly support close relations with the U.S. and 
consider Zapatero's distancing from the U.S. a profound 
error. 
 
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COUNTER-TERRORISM COOPERATION 
----------------------------- 
 
3. (C) A critical element in our bilateral relationship is 
our high level of cooperation on law enforcement and 
counter-terrorism issues.  Spain remains an active front in 
the War on Terror. Investigations since the 3/11 attack have 
confirmed suspicions that there is a large pool of Islamic 
extremists throughout the country, including one cell that 
plotted attacks against Spain's High Court and other targets 
during the latter half of 2004.  ETA also continues to carry 
out small-scale bombings, though it has been greatly weakened 
in the last year by arrests of key leaders in Spain and 
France.  Spanish authorities arrested 117 suspected Islamic 
terrorists during 2004, routinely sharing with USG officials 
information derived from those arrests.  Attorney General 
Gonzales and Minister of Justice Aguilar issued a joint 
statement on March 11, 2005 committing the USG and GOS to 
closer cooperation on counter-terrorism investigations. 
 
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ISSUES BONO WILL LIKELY RAISE 
----------------------------- 
 
Venezuela 
--------- 
 
4.  (C) While he hopes Venezuela will not be the focus of 
your meeting with him, Bono will come prepared to discuss 
Spain's outreach to Venezuela, including its planned sale of 
military ships and planes.  Bono has told us the reason Spain 
is selling the ships to Venezuela is to save ailing 
state-owned shipyard Izar (reftel).  This is probably partly 
true -- it is also clear President Zapatero believes he can 
influence Chavez and restrain his anti-democratic tendencies 
by engaging him.  Nonetheless, Bono will point out that the 
sale amounts to USD 1.7 billion in equipment and will provide 
Izar with 600 jobs over a 4-5 year period.  He will also 
insist that neither the ships nor the planes will have 
offensive capability, and that Chavez has agreed not to use 
the equipment for offensive purposes. 
 
5.  (C) Embassy and other USG officials have made clear many 
times to high-level GOS officials (including to President 
Zapatero himself by Deputy Secretary of State Zoellick) that 
the U.S. believes the sale would bolster Chavez' military 
capabilities and thus his capacity to cause instability in 
the region, and would also lend him political credibility 
when he is taking steps to curb democracy in his own country. 
In addition, we have told Spanish officials that given that 
Spain-U.S. relations were slowly improving, now was not the 
time to make a major military sale to Venezuela. 
 
 
S-80 Submarine Program 
---------------------- 
 
6.  (C) The Spanish Navy plans to procure 4 new diesel 
submarines of Spanish design, called the S-80A.  Izar will be 
the prime contractor for the vessel's construction.  Izar has 
put out for competition a contract to assist in the building 
of the sub's combat system.  Two American companies, Raytheon 
and Lockheed Martin, are competing with each other and 
against a French and German company for the $115 million 
deal.  The Spanish government has been mulling the 
competitors' submissions for nearly a year and has yet to 
reach a decision.  The Spanish Navy has made clear its 
support for a U.S. solution for the combat system, arguing a 
U.S. system will provide critical interoperability with the 
U.S. Navy.  The Zapatero government, however, has told us 
they have received significant pressure from the French 
government to award the contract to the French competitor. 
Embassy has advocated tirelessly on behalf of the U.S. 
companies. 
 
 
Tomahawk Missile 
---------------- 
 
7.  (C) Bono has said that if the U.S. government releases 
the Tomahawk missile to Spain, Spain will purchase the 
missile.  We understand the release of the missile has 
cleared a number of hurdles in Washington.  He may well 
express the Spanish government's interest in purchasing the 
Tomahawk missile to you and his hope that the release will be 
approved. 
 
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BACKGROUND: SOCIALISTS REMAIN POPULAR 
------------------------------------- 
 
8. (C) One year after taking over the presidency, President 
Zapatero enjoys an approval rating of over 60 percent and, 
barring a major setback, is likely to remain in power for at 
least one term (until 2008).  The Socialist Party (PSOE) as a 
whole also gets much higher marks today than the PP 
opposition.  Zapatero's withdrawal of Spanish troops from 
Iraq was wildly popular with the Spanish public and the 
social agenda he has pushed appeals to Spain's center-left 
electorate (gay rights, curbing the power of the Catholic 
Church, better relations with regional governments in 
Catalonia and the Basque Region) further broadening the 
Socialists' appeal.  Aznar and the PP, meanwhile, remain 
unapologetic for their handling of the 3/11 bombings and 
declined to sideline leaders discredited by their actions in 
the wake of the bombings, further eroding their public 
support.  Zapatero's main internal challenge is an effort by 
the Basque Regional Government (comprised of moderate Basque 
nationalists opposed to ETA violence) to increase its 
autonomy from Spain's central government.  This is a 
potential powder keg since most other regions of Spain 
strongly oppose increasing the Basque Region's already 
considerable independence, unless they too are given greater 
independence. 
 
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RECENT POSITIVE GESTURES 
------------------------ 
9. (C) Since November 2004, Spanish officials at all levels 
have made clear their desire to restore strong bilateral 
ties, with the Foreign Ministry's Director General for 
Foreign Policy (under secretary equivalent) telling us 
bluntly, "We want back in."  In response, we've told our 
Spanish contacts that we are prepared to move forward on 
issues of bilateral importance and that unambiguous, positive 
steps by Spain would be the best signal to the USG that they 
too were ready to move forward.  Spain subsequently agreed to 
USG requests that it lead a Provincial Reconstruction Team 
and a Forward Support Base in western Afghanistan as part of 
NATO's mission in that country, issued positive statements 
regarding the Iraq elections, and contributed $20 million to 
the Iraq elections fund.  Spain also continues to disburse 
$300 million in assistance to Iraq pledged during the 2003 
Iraq Donors Conference in Madrid, and has agreed to train 
Iraqi security forces in Spain.  We fully expect Minister 
Bono to highlight these moves to you as evidence that Spain 
has taken significant steps to demonstrate its interest in 
improving  relations with the U.S. 
 
10. (C) The USG has welcomed these steps, while making clear 
that we remain troubled by mixed signals from Spain, such 
as that sent by Spain's policy of engagement with Hugo 
Chavez.  We also  want Spain to lift its caveats on the 
deployment of Spanish NATO officers to participate in NATO 
missions, and lift the caveats on its national forces' 
actions in Afghanistan. 
 
11.  (C) Some in the Spanish government, including Bono, have 
expressed the belief that Spain is getting little in return 
for these positive steps.  Bono has said that at times it 
appears the U.S. focuses only the on the problems in 
U.S.-Spain relations, not the positives (reftel). 
 
-------------------------------- 
COMMENT: SENDING A CLEAR MESSAGE 
-------------------------------- 
 
12. (C) The USG will not re-establish with the Zapatero 
government the deep and close relationship we had with the 
Aznar administration.  Nonetheless, the U.S. has key 
interests in Spain we are working hard to promote and secure, 
not the least of which are continued access to Spanish 
military bases (including flight clearances) and 
counterterrorism cooperation.  Spanish officials -- including 
Zapatero and Bono -- have expressed surprise that their 
Venezuela policy could derail recent improvements in 
U.S.-Spain relations.  This is despite that fact that this 
embassy and various U.S. officials, including Deputy 
Secretary Zoellick, have told the Spanish that engaging 
 
SIPDIS 
Chavez and selling him military hardware could hurt relations 
at this sensitive time.  Bono and others have also said they 
feel that the U.S. does not sufficiently recognize the 
positive steps Spain has taken to improve relations with the 
U.S. Your meeting with Bono can be an opportunity to make 
clear that while the U.S. appreciates Spain's cooperation in 
Afghanistan, the full access Spain has granted U.S. forces to 
its military bases, its continued monetary contributions to 
Iraq reconstruction and other positive steps, the U.S. 
remains concerned about Spanish actions that negatively 
affect our interests, such as Zapatero's Venezuela policy. 
 
MANZANARES