US embassy cable - 05COLOMBO788

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000788 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA/INS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2015 
TAGS: PTER, PGOV, PREL, CE, LTTE - Peace Process, Political Parties 
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA:  A/S ROCCA'S DISCUSSIONS ON THE PEACE 
PROCESS 
 
Classified By: AMB. JEFFREY J. LUNSTEAD.  REASON:  1.4 (B,D). 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1.  (C) In meetings with Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) and 
political leaders on April 20, Assistant Secretary for South 
Asian Affairs Christina Rocca and the Ambassador urged 
greater flexibility from both the GSL and the Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in approaching the peace 
process.  The A/S and Ambassador cautioned that the lack of 
progress could result in less attention to the issue from the 
international community.  While each interlocutor asserted 
its organization's unwavering support for peace in principle, 
each also cited numerous stumbling blocks to resumed progress 
on the peace front. 
End summary. 
 
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PM:  JVP Ready to Play Ball 
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2.  (C) In a meeting with Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapakse on 
April 20, Assistant Secretary Rocca, accompanied by the 
Ambassador, expressed U.S. concern that internal politics was 
impeding efforts to achieve peace with the Liberation Tigers 
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).  The Prime Minister responded that, in 
his personal opinion, the government erred in not involving 
the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), the Government's 
alliance partner, at the beginning of the peace process.  A 
long-time opponent of the JVP, the PM said he now felt that 
the alliance partner would be cooperative in the GSL's 
efforts to go forward with the peace process.  The Ambassador 
noted a number of other policy differences between the GSL 
and the JVP, especially on the economic front.  Rajapakse 
responded that he believes it best to work with the JVP on an 
issue-by-issue basis, rather than attempt to confront the 
party on the whole waterfront of policy differences.  The 
alliance party officials meet weekly to discuss and agree on 
issues, he added. 
 
3.  (C) Rajapakse mentioned that he had recently visited 
Northern Ireland to study the peace process there.  He told 
A/S Rocca he saw one major difference between the two peace 
processes.  In Northern Ireland, the leaders want peace but 
do not have the support of the populace.  In Sri Lanka, he 
said, the citizens want peace, but the leaders are fighting 
and are unable to lead people to peace. 
 
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URGING PROGRESS TOWARD PEACE 
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4.  (C) In an April 20 meeting with Foreign Secretary 
H.M.G.S. Palihakkara, A/S Rocca and the Ambassador reiterated 
strong U.S. support for the peace process but cautioned that 
international sympathy could wane in the face of the extended 
stalemate.  While there may be legitimate reasons for careful 
deliberations before resuming dialogue, "to the outside 
world, it looks like nothing is progressing in Sri Lanka. 
People don't want to hear about all the details," the 
Ambassador advised.  The world's attention will shift 
elsewhere if Sri Lanka 
cannot move ahead, A/S Rocca stressed. 
 
5.  (C) Agreeing that the stalemate cannot go on 
indefinitely, Palihakkara then commenced a lengthy 
explanation of the difficulties the government faced dealing 
with an unelected terrorist group claiming sovereignty and 
unwilling to compromise on any issue.  JVP intransigence also 
rendered the situation complex, he admitted, but the JVP 
presented less of an obstacle than the LTTE. "They won't 
stand in the way of an agreement, even if they make political 
trouble for the President," he opined. 
 
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WILL THE REAL OPPOSITION PLEASE STAND UP? 
UNP, JVP APPROACHES TO PEACE PROCESS 
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6.  (C)  A/S Rocca's April 20 discussion with Opposition 
Leader Ranil Wickremasinghe and other United National Party 
(UNP) leaders revealed little daylight between GSL and UNP 
views of the peace process.  Wickremasinghe stressed the UNP 
is ready to support the President on the peace process, but 
she must decide if she wants to continue a partnership with 
the JVP.  He remarked that her relationship with the JVP is 
strained; JVP opposition to the joint mechanism on tsunami 
aid and the proposed Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA) 
is preventing progress.  A/S Rocca cautioned that while the 
U.S. wants to see the peace process continue, if internal 
politics continue to get in the way, international attention 
could begin to drift. 
 
7.  (C) UNP MP Milinda Moragoda raised the possibility of 
including India in the Co-chairs group (an idea he has pushed 
for some time), adding that lately both the Indian Foreign 
Secretary and Prime Minister have shown more interest in Sri 
 
SIPDIS 
Lanka and the process.  When A/S Rocca asked if they wanted 
to "be in the tent," he replied, "India doesn't want to be in 
the tent, but neither do they want anyone else in the tent." 
The GSL views Indian participation favorably, he asserted, 
and the LTTE is interested in dialogue and would not 
necessarily be against Indian involvement.  A/S Rocca assured 
her UNP interlocutors that the U.S. ensures its South Asia 
policies are very transparent to India and that India seems 
comfortable with U.S. aims and activities here.  She added 
that the Indians did not raise the Co-Chair issue during her 
visit to New Delhi two days earlier.  Nevertheless, she said 
she would bring the issue back to Washington. 
 
8.  (C)  In a separate meeting April 20, JVP Leader Somawansa 
Amarasinghe told A/S Rocca and the Ambassador that while the 
JVP, like everyone in Sri Lanka, wanted lasting peace, its 
stance on the peace process adheres strictly to what was 
agreed upon in the coalition manifesto.  This limits the 
range of possible options to restart talks, he indicated, 
since any initiatives to deal with the LTTE and jumpstart the 
peace process must not stray from the manifesto.  He 
complained that the GSL has already ceded too much to the 
LTTE without garnering any guarantees that the LTTE will put 
down its weapons or give up its fight for an independent 
state. 
 
9.  (C) Amarasinghe asserted that the JVP is not against 
Norwegian faciltators per se but what he described as their 
partiality and tendency to go beyond their consultative role. 
 He cited unsubstantiated rumors that the Norwegians were 
using their diplomatic immunity to import equipment for the 
LTTE and vowed that the JVP was "waiting for the Norwegians 
to correct themselves" and become more objective before the 
party would meet with them.  Amarasinghe did not agree with 
the Ambassador's suggestions that the JVP meet with Norwegian 
officials to discuss these concerns in person instead of 
relying on dubious media reports. 
 
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MUSLIMS CLAMOR FOR PLACE AT TABLE 
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10.  (C)  In his April 20 discussion with A/S Rocca and the 
Ambassador, Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) leader Rauff 
Hakeem expressed disappointment that the GSL and the LTTE 
continue to exclude the Muslim community in any discussions 
on the joint mechanism.  He cautioned that the growing 
frustration among Muslims in the north and east, especially 
given the slow pace of reconstruction, could encourage 
greater radicalization in that sector of the population. 
Hakeem argued that the international community, led by the 
United States, should help ensure that all minorities in the 
north and east be allowed a seat at the negotiating table. He 
reported that the few meetings on the matter that the SLMC 
have had with government officials have resulted in little 
more than unfulfilled promises of greater coordination. 
Responding to the Ambassador's question about whether Muslim 
MPs from the ruling parties could provide a voice for Muslim 
interests, Hakeem asserted that even those MPs would welcome 
a more institutionalized Muslim role. 
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TNA ACKNOWLEDGES LTTE VIOLENCE; 
ALLEGES GSL AID TO PARAMILITARIES 
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11.  (C) In a separate meeting on April 20, Tamil National 
Alliance (TNA) MPs R. Sampanthan (Trincomalee) and 
Gajendrakumar Ponnambalam (Jaffna) told A/S Rocca and the 
Ambassador that no one-including the LTTE-wants to return to 
hostilities.  Sampanthan said that the GSL may have thought 
it could levy LTTE factional fighting (which he described as 
"the Karuna disturbance") into greater political advantage, 
but now appears to appreciate the futility of that aim. 
President Kumaratunga seems to realize this, he commented, 
but is prevented by her JVP ally from adopting a more 
accommodating position. 
12.  (C)  Besides using every opportunity to obstruct 
dialogue, the JVP is trying to subvert the principle of 
devolution, enshrined in the 13th Amendment, by usurping the 
functions and responsibilities accorded to the Provincial 
Councils, Sampanthan charged.  For example, the JVP is 
"becoming more aggressive" in allocating resources in 
ministries under its control, e.g., irrigation, fisheries and 
agriculture, he said.  In particular, the MP asserted, the 
JVP is trying to divert irrigation resources away from Tamil 
and Muslim families in the east to provide water for 
"Sinhalese resettlement" in the area.   In Trincomalee, for 
example, the JVP had halted a Japanese project to 
rehabilitate irrigation tanks that would have benefited 900 
Tamil families, he claimed. 
 
13.  (C)  Unfortunately, the LTTE's continued violence gives 
the JVP mileage to oppose possible GSL concessions, the 
Ambassador remarked.  The LTTE's ongoing assassinations of 
political opponents make it difficult to argue that progress 
in changing Tiger behavior is being made, he observed.  A/S 
Rocca and the Ambassador reiterated that if the LTTE 
renounces violence in word and deed, the U.S. would 
re-examine its policy. 
 
14.  (C) "We don't defend the killing of opponents," 
Sampanthan responded, although he cited alleged GSL support 
to armed anti-LTTE paramilitaries as a partial explanation 
for continued Tiger violence.  The Tigers want to change; 
they have to change; the Tamil people want them to change, he 
continued, but they have to be given the opportunity to do 
so.  The LTTE entered the ceasefire as a "ruthless, 
diabolical, militant organization."  It is "unfortunate that 
it has not been given any responsibility or encouragement by 
the Government" since then to transform itself, he charged. 
If the LTTE were given a greater stake in the democratic 
process, it would have to accept the tenets of pluralism, 
diversity and human rights, he said.  "We have to bring them 
in," he concluded. 
 
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COMMENT 
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15.  (C) Our interlocutors' comments on the peace process 
indicate little movement on long-entrenched positions and no 
fresh initiatives to end the stalemate.  Prospects for 
agreement on a GSL/LTTE "joint mechanism" on tsunami relief 
seem brighter, however (septel), and may offer the best hope 
of resumed progress in the near term. 
 
16.  (U) A/S Rocca has cleared this message. 
 
 
ENTWISTLE