US embassy cable - 05COLOMBO786

Disclaimer: This site has been first put up 15 years ago. Since then I would probably do a couple things differently, but because I've noticed this site had been linked from news outlets, PhD theses and peer rewieved papers and because I really hate the concept of "digital dark age" I've decided to put it back up. There's no chance it can produce any harm now.

SRI LANKA: INTERNECINE FIGHTING IN THE EAST CONTINUES TO SIMMER

Identifier: 05COLOMBO786
Wikileaks: View 05COLOMBO786 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Colombo
Created: 2005-04-27 03:04:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PTER PGOV PINR PHUM CE LTTE
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000786 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SA/INS, S/CT 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/26/2015 
TAGS: PTER, PGOV, PINR, PHUM, CE, LTTE - Peace Process 
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: INTERNECINE FIGHTING IN THE EAST 
CONTINUES TO SIMMER 
 
REF: A. COLOMBO 00669 
     B. COLOMBO 00741 
 
Classified By: CHARGE' D'AFFAIRES A.I. JAMES F. ENTWISTLE. REASON: 1.4 
(B,D). 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  Violence in the East*mainly involving the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Karuna faction 
cadres, and even the Sri Lankan military*continues to 
percolate, keeping tensions raw in this troubled region and 
slowly testing the limits of both the ceasefire agreement 
(CFA) and the patience of either side.  The most egregious 
incidents over the past month include the firing on the Sri 
Lankan Navy cutter on April 5 (ref. A) and the murder of nine 
suspected Karuna cadre at a paramilitary camp near Welikanda 
along the Polonnaruwa-Batticaloa district border. The LTTE 
continues to deny responsibility for the attacks on Karuna 
loyalists and meanwhile blames the Sri Lankan Army (SLA) for 
complicity in attacks on its own cadre, an accusation the 
Army is quick to deny.  Despite the finger-pointing and often 
hostile rhetoric, few observers believe that either the LTTE 
or the SLA is willing or ready for a return to war. End 
Summary. 
 
2.  (SBU) Sri Lanka,s volatile eastern districts continue to 
be the stage for tit-for-tat revenge killings mainly between 
the LTTE and cadres from rival Tamil groups, especially the 
breakaway Karuna faction.  This internecine fighting*which 
comes on top of already existing ethnic tensions and 
underworld crime*has increased in both scope and frequency 
in the last two months.  The violence over the last month 
includes, based on media reports: 
 
-- March 26: Karuna loyalists killed three LTTE cadres in 
Batticaloa District. 
 
-- March 26: Karuna loyalists killed two relatives of LTTE 
cadres in Batticaloa District. 
 
-- March 28: Three people were injured in a grenade attack on 
an LTTE office in Vavuniya by unknown perpetrators. 
 
-- April 3: Karuna loyalists killed a civilian who lived in a 
LTTE held village in Batticaloa District. 
 
-- April 5: LTTE hitmen killed a former cadre of the Eelam 
People,s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF), an 
anti-LTTE Tamil group that reportedly operates with the 
complicity of Sri Lankan military officials, in Ampara 
District. 
 
-- April 5: A former Eelam People,s Democratic Party (EPDP) 
member was shot and seriously wounded by an unidentified 
assailant while sitting in a movie theater in Batticaloa town. 
 
-- April 5: Unknown assailants lobbed a grenade into the EPDP 
office in Karaithivu, 45 kilometers south of Batticaloa; no 
one was injured. 
 
-- April 11: The LTTE killed an EPDP member in Trincomalee. 
 
-- April 14: The LTTE killed a government vocational training 
director*also an EPDP member*in Batticaloa town. 
 
-- April 14: LTTE cadres killed nine Karuna loyalists during 
an attack on three suspected paramilitary camps set up by 
Karuna cadre near Welikanda in Polonnaruwa District. This 
attack and the resulting deaths were later confirmed by Sri 
Lankan Army officials. 
 
-- April 15: Suspected Karuna cadres shot and killed a 
divisional secretary with ties to the LTTE while he was 
riding his motorcycle near a Special Task Force camp in 
Thirukkovil, south of Batticaloa. 
 
-- April 20: The LTTE kidnapped an inspector for the Mt. 
Lavinia police who had been investigating LTTE activities in 
his district south of Colombo, according to his wife. 
 
-- April 24: Suspected LTTE gunmen critically injured the 
head of a local temple they believed to be a former informant 
for the Sri Lankan military; three bystanders*including two 
young girls*were also injured in the attack, which occurred 
during a Hindu religious procession in Batticaloa town. 
 
-- April 25: Unidentified gunmen killed a suspected Karuna 
loyalist in Karapola, a Tamil town near the 
Polonnaruwa-Batticaloa district border. 
 
3.  (SBU) Recent tensions also have involved the Sri Lankan 
military.  In the past two weeks, government troops have 
reported incidents in which the LTTE has fired rounds over 
Army detachments.  The most recent incident came in the 
evening of April 23 when LTTE cadre located about 200 meters 
away fired about 20 rounds over an Army detachment in the 
area of Kaddaiparichan in Trincomalee.  Similar incidents had 
occurred in previous days at a detachment in Mahindapura. 
These incidents were reported to the Sri Lankan Monitoring 
Mission (SLMM) and come only two and a half weeks after the 
LTTE fired upon a Sri Lankan naval patrol ship in Trincomalee 
(reftel). 
 
4.  (SBU) Predictably, a war of words between the LTTE and 
the Sri Lankan military has accompanied the recent spate of 
violence.  The LTTE*via their media proxy, 
Tamilnet*continues to accuse the Sri Lankan military of 
knowing about the existence of anti-LTTE paramilitary camps 
in government-held areas and permitting attacks on LTTE cadre 
to occur.  For its part, the government shot back on April 
22.  At a ceremony marking the commissioning of the former US 
Coast Guard vessel &Courageous8 into the Sri Lankan naval 
fleet, acting Defense Minister Ratnasiri Wickramanayake 
accused the Tigers of &cowardly acts of provocation8 to 
lure government forces into violating the Ceasefire Agreement 
(CFA).  Wickremanayake went on to vow that the military would 
have no option but to retaliate if the LTTE continued &to 
make things difficult.8 
 
5.  (C) While many observers see the war of words as mere 
rhetoric and continue to argue that neither side is prepared 
to return to full scale war, some do note that the infighting 
is casting a shadow over what potential there was following 
the tsunami for positive momentum on the peace front. 
Kethesh Loganathan of the Center for Policy Alternatives 
recently told poloff that the LTTE,s commitment to the CFA 
might languish if it continues to believe that the Sri Lankan 
military,s connections to the Karuna faction were more 
substantial than merely turning a blind eye to their 
operations.  He went on to argue that until the tsunami hit 
the Tigers likely were preparing to unilaterally abrogate the 
CFA by its third anniversary in early February.  He cited as 
evidence for this assertion not only increased Tiger rhetoric 
but also recruitment surges and movement of cadres (Note: 
rumors that the LTTE is ready to call off the CFA tend to 
circulate every few months in Colombo. End note.). One of his 
colleagues in the think tank was less sanguine, arguing that 
the violence in the East is one of the gravest threats to the 
CFA and stating that &although no one wants war, we can 
easily stumble into it8 if the problems in the East are not 
brought under control.  The two agreed, however, that the 
most likely scenario for the near-term would be a 
continuation of the muddled status quo. 
 
6.  (C) Comment:  Although the recent spate of killing is 
disturbing, intra-Tamil violence is nothing new, and the East 
has long been a volatile area given its ethnic diversity. 
There is no evidence that the nature of the past month,s 
violence presages a more menacing trend. In terms of the 
LTTE-SLA dynamic, we expect the inflammatory 
rhetoric*especially on the part of the government*to 
subside once President Kumaratunga returns from London this 
week, given that she has reined in Wickramanayake in previous 
instances when his overheated rhetoric in her absence has 
gone too far.  Although the Norwegian peace process 
facilitators and the Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission--along 
with many ordinary Sri Lankans--are increasingly convinced 
that the military is providing support to the Karuna faction 
(ref. B), there is nothing more than circumstantial evidence 
supporting such a claim.  Government forces realize it would 
be a huge mistake to play into the LTTE,s provocations and 
have made a concerted effort to adhere to the CFA.  For its 
part, the LTTE remains more concerned about consolidating its 
control in the East following the Karuna split and the 
tsunami than engaging in hostilities with the SLA. 
 
SIPDIS 
ENTWISTLE 

Latest source of this page is cablebrowser-2, released 2011-10-04