US embassy cable - 05NEWDELHI3132

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 003132 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/25/2015 
TAGS: PREL, ETRD, ENRG, KNNP, IN, UNSC, India-Japan 
SUBJECT: INDIA LOOKING TO "SUBSTANTIATE" RELATIONS DURING 
KOIZUMI VISIT 
 
REF: A. NEW DELHI 3087 
 
     B. SINGAPORE 1114 
 
Classified By: PolCouns Geoff Pyatt.  Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
1.  (C) Summary: For Japanese PM Junichiro Koizumi's April 
28-30 visit to New Delhi, the GOI will be focused on giving 
the relationship greater strategic and multilateral breadth, 
and solidifying Japan's support for India's UNSC campaign, 
according to our senior MEA interlocutors.  Following Chinese 
Premier Wen's pointed advice to India to rethink its UNSC 
partnership with Japan, that aspect of the visit will be a 
strength test for the G-4 pact.  The GOI also plans to 
discuss boosting economic relations, to include high-tech 
trade, but is looking for signals that Japan has put aside 
its resentment over India's 1998 nuclear tests, a sentiment 
the MEA would like us to encourage in Tokyo.  Asian regional 
architecture will be on the agenda as well, including India's 
bid to attend the East Asia Summit.  In view of the tacit 
recognition in New Delhi that China has not backed India 
unconditionally for the UNSC, the PM is unlikely to break up 
the G-4, as Wen had advised.  End Summary. 
 
The Agenda 
---------- 
 
2.  (C) In an April 22 conversation with PolCouns and Poloff, 
MEA Joint Secretary Ashok Kantha (China, Japan) summed up 
India's broad approach to the Koizumi visit as an attempt to 
inject "greater strategic focus" into a bilateral agenda that 
is by far the least substantial of any Indian P-5 
relationship.  To "substantiate" their ties, the GOI will 
seek to add a "strategic dimension," moving beyond bilateral 
relations to cooperate on "regional and multilateral issues," 
Kantha explained, suggesting naval maritime security 
exercises in the Indian Ocean as a potential area of 
expansion.  Boosting economic interaction, particularly in 
the area of science and technology, will be another priority. 
 Kantha commented that two-way trade had stagnated at a very 
low level (a paltry USD 4 billion per year since the 
mid-1990s), elaborating that the root problem was Indian lack 
of understanding of the Japanese, and vice versa. 
 
UNSC Drama 
---------- 
 
3.  (C) A major part of India's agenda will be the UNSC and 
UN reform more generally.  As members of the G-4 club of 
Security Council aspirants, India and Japan have previously 
offered each other their mutual endorsement.  This visit, 
however, comes in the aftermath of the April 9-12 Wen visit 
(ref A) during which, Kantha told us, the Chinese leader 
warned PM Manmohan Singh that "India's interests (with 
respect to the UNSC) are not well served," by throwing in its 
lot with Japan.  While Wen offered "fairly categorical 
support" for India's bid (according to Kantha), New Delhi 
joining Japan "complicates this," he had said.  The J/S 
recounted that the PM stiff-armed Wen's advice, noting that 
New Delhi stood by its commitment to Tokyo.  He added that 
perhaps the GOJ is under the impression that because the US 
supports its bid, that Japan's permanent membership is a 
foregone conclusion.  Kantha cautioned, however, that Wen had 
told the PM that it would not be possible for China to 
support Japan. 
 
A Little Help From Our Friends 
------------------------------ 
 
4.  (C) India is also eyeing Japanese high technology, but 
recalling Japanese condemnation of the GOI's 1998 nuclear 
test, Kantha remarked that some "prodding" from the US would 
help Tokyo to overcome its "psychological barrier" against 
high-tech trade with India.  Referring to Japanese 
"proselytizing," he complained that the GOJ "Foreign Office 
fundamentalists" still regularly raise NPT and CTBT signature 
with New Delhi.  Kantha hoped that the US-India example might 
inspire Japan to be able to disagree with India on some 
issues, such as the NPT, but still develop other areas of the 
strategic relationship.  Suggesting that Tokyo may need less 
prodding than the MEA thinks, the Japanese Embassy recently 
told us that they were interested in exploring civil nuclear 
cooperation with New Delhi, along the lines of the US Energy 
Dialogue with India. 
 
The EAS and Beyond 
------------------ 
 
5.  (C) Despite the apparent decision to include India (ref 
B) in the first East Asia Summit (EAS), the MEA does not 
consider its lobbying work done.  Kantha observed that 
although it looks like India will be included, this 
invitation has not been "formalized" yet, and that the GOI 
will press the matter with Koizumi.  Noting that India and 
Japan shared a similar perspective, Kantha remarked that both 
countries did not want the EAS to be "China dominated." 
PolCouns highlighted our view that the new grouping should 
not be exclusive, to which the J/S responded that the GOI was 
comfortable with the US as "an active player."  Because of 
the US role in Asia, he asserted, there should be an 
institutional arrangement whereby Washington is part of the 
process, adding that Secretary Rice's remarks at Sofia 
University had resonated well with the GOI. 
 
6.  (C) Playing down India's likely invitation to the Summit, 
Kantha asserted that New Delhi sees the EAS as "part of a 
larger, long term architecture in Asia," adding that the GOI 
would like to work with Tokyo in shaping it.  India will 
explore with Koizumi a "new Asian era," which may not be 
operational immediately, but would have future possibilities. 
 New Delhi's goal, he stated, was to be part of the "core" 
shaping the process.  Parenthetically, Kantha also wondered 
aloud how India could continue to be excluded from APEC, 
calling it a "misnomer" without GOI participation. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
7.  (C) New Delhi expects from the Koizumi trip the same kind 
of perspective shift that came out of the Wen visit during 
which the PRC for the first time recognized India as globally 
significant.  In view of the tacit recognition in New Delhi 
that China has not exactly backed India for the UNSC, the PM 
is not likely to break up the G-4, as Wen had advised.  The 
GOI recognizes that the India-Japan relationship is vastly 
underdeveloped, especially compared to New Delhi's rapidly 
expanding agenda with the other P-5 members.  As with other 
aspects of the GOI's thrust into East Asia, the encounter 
between India and Japan advances the US interest in building 
networks of market-oriented democracies that share a common 
view of challenges like terrorism, proliferation, and 
strategic stability in Asia. 
BLAKE