US embassy cable - 05RANGOON481

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000481 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV; PACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/25/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, BM 
SUBJECT: BURMA: BEYOND THE ASEAN CHAIR ISSUE 
 
REF: A. VIENTIANE 429 
 
     B. PHNOM PENH 644 
     C. RANGOON 400 AND PREVIOUS 
     D. 04 RANGOON 471 
 
Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez for Reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
1. (C) Summary:  In contrast to considerable regional 
commentary focused on the scheduled rotation in 2006 of the 
ASEAN chair to Burma, the military regime's top generals have 
been silent.  Than Shwe and Maung Aye will be extremely 
reluctant to miss out on the "glory" and legitimacy afforded 
by hosting the ASEAN Summit and related events.  Although it 
is conceivable they could take a face-saving pass on the 
basis that the GOB is "too preoccupied" with its "road map to 
a disciplined democracy," the generals will not bow out in 
direct reaction to international pressure. 
 
2. (C) If the SPDC skips the chair rotation, the generals 
will be further isolated and suffer some damage to their 
pride, but in the process they will also avoid a boycott of 
Rangoon-hosted ASEAN events and forestall an ASEAN 
confrontation on the need for fundamental political change in 
Burma.  Safely out of the spotlight, the SPDC will likely 
prolong the detention of Aung San Suu Kyi and other 
high-profile political prisoners for the foreseeable future. 
We advise formulating a strategy now to ensure that ASEAN 
members look beyond the immediate resolution of the 
chairmanship question.  End Summary. 
 
3. (U) Although individual ASEAN member states, and the 
international press, have devoted considerable commentary in 
recent weeks to issues related to the scheduled rotation of 
the ASEAN chair to Burma in 2006 (refs A-C), the military 
regime's top generals have been mostly silent.  During an 
early April visit to Vietnam, Prime Minister Lt Gen Soe Win 
said cryptically that "it will all be OK" in response to 
reporters who raised concerns that Burma's chairmanship could 
damage the regional organization.  However, the regime's 
official press has given no indication that the SPDC has 
altered plans to take on the chair next year. 
 
4. (C) According to press reports, Cambodia's Prince Norodom 
Ranariddh told reporters in Phnom Penh on April 21, 
apparently with conviction, that "because of internal 
problems, Myanmar has agreed not to host the ASEAN summit 
next year, and in the future Myanmar will announce it." 
However, Cambodia's Ambassador to Burma, Hul Phany, told the 
COM and P/E chief on April 26 that he had not heard about any 
such pronouncement by the National Assembly President and 
that Cambodia's official position, "as expressed publicly by 
Prime Minister Hun Sen, is to support (Burma's) rightful turn 
as ASEAN chair." 
 
5. (C) Ambassador Phany added that Prince Ranariddh would 
address publicly the ASEAN chair issue "only if he had 
coordinated in advance with Hun Sen."  He acknowledged that 
Soe Win and Hun Sen had held a private one-hour bilateral 
meeting on April 8, "with note takers only, not even the 
Foreign Ministers were present," and it was uncertain what 
the two Prime Ministers had discussed. 
 
6. (C) Despite the Cambodian Ambassador's skepticism, Prince 
Ranariddh's surprising announcement appears to corroborate 
GOC information offered to Embassy Phnom Penh that Soe Win 
purportedly informed Hun Sen that Burma would give up its 
turn as ASEAN chair (ref B).  However, at an April 22 
regime-controlled "press conference" in Rangoon, a Japanese 
journalist asked for a reaction to Prince Ranariddh's 
announcement and Minister of Information Brig Gen Kyaw Hsan 
responded: "As it is too early, I cannot say anything by 
myself; when the time comes, the Government will address the 
issue." 
 
7. (C) It is entirely possible that Hun Sen and Soe Win 
discussed the ASEAN chair issue in Phnom Penh, but it is 
unlikely that the SPDC's top leadership has already made a 
final decision.  Chairman Than Shwe and Vice Chairman Maung 
Aye will be extremely reluctant to miss out on the "glory" 
and legitimacy afforded by hosting the ASEAN Summit and 
related events in 2006-2007, no matter what the prognosis is 
for further international pressure and tensions within ASEAN. 
 Past regime practice portends an eleventh hour decision on 
this issue. 
Comment: Look Beyond, the Albatross Remains 
8. (C) We continue to assess that if the SPDC generals 
relinquish the opportunity to chair ASEAN it would be only on 
their own terms and in their own perceived best interests. 
While it is conceivable they could take a face-saving pass on 
the basis that the GOB is "too preoccupied" with the National 
Convention and with the rest of the regime's "road map to a 
disciplined democracy" (their perennial excuse for inaction 
on many issues), the generals will not bow out in reaction to 
international pressure or indirect prodding from other ASEAN 
members. 
9. (C) If the SPDC skips the ASEAN chair rotation, the regime 
will be further isolated and the generals will certainly 
suffer some damage to their pride.  However, in the process 
they will also avoid a U.S.-led boycott of Rangoon-hosted 
events and the generals will again forestall a day of 
reckoning for ASEAN that forces the organization to finally 
confront the Burma problem in a meaningful manner. 
 
10. (C) To a certain extent, ASEAN is poised to lose some 
immediate leverage to demand fundamental changes to regime 
behavior, particularly with regard to human rights and 
political dialogue (safely out of the spotlight, the SPDC 
will likely prolong the detention of Aung San Suu Kyi and 
other high-profile political prisoners for the foreseeable 
future).  We advise formulating a strategy now to ensure that 
ASEAN members look beyond the immediate resolution of the 
chairmanship question, accept that the Burma problem will not 
go away, and undertake serious steps to press the Burmese 
regime toward genuine reform.  End Comment. 
Martinez