US embassy cable - 05HANOI951

Disclaimer: This site has been first put up 15 years ago. Since then I would probably do a couple things differently, but because I've noticed this site had been linked from news outlets, PhD theses and peer rewieved papers and because I really hate the concept of "digital dark age" I've decided to put it back up. There's no chance it can produce any harm now.

VIETNAM: DOE'S ASSESSMENT OF RADIOLOGICAL SITE SECURITY THREATS

Identifier: 05HANOI951
Wikileaks: View 05HANOI951 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Hanoi
Created: 2005-04-26 06:19:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: ENRG KNNP PARM VM
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

260619Z Apr 05

ACTION EAP-00   

INFO  LOG-00   NP-00    AMAD-00  A-00     CIAE-00  DODE-00  DOEE-00  
      EB-00    VC-00    H-00     TEDE-00  INR-00   L-00     VCE-00   
      MOFM-00  MOF-00   AC-00    NRC-00   NRRC-00  NSAE-00  NSCE-00  
      OES-00   NIMA-00  PM-00    PRS-00   ACE-00   P-00     FMPC-00  
      SP-00    SS-00    T-00     BBG-00   EPAE-00  IIP-00   SSD-00   
      PMB-00   G-00     NFAT-00  SAS-00   SWCI-00    /000W
                  ------------------E49BF8  260642Z /38    
FM AMEMBASSY HANOI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7429
C O N F I D E N T I A L  HANOI 000951 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPT FOR DOE/NNSA, DOE/NNSA/DWYER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/25/2015 
TAGS: ENRG, KNNP, PARM, VM 
SUBJECT: VIETNAM: DOE'S ASSESSMENT OF RADIOLOGICAL SITE 
SECURITY THREATS 
 
 
Classified By: Jay T. Avecilla, Economic Officer, Reason 1.4 (e) and (g 
) 
 
1. (C) Summary: The Department of Energy,s (DOE) National 
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Nuclear and 
International Radiological Threat Reduction (IRTR) Team met 
with Vietnam nuclear technical experts and government 
officials in Hanoi on April 18-22.  The DOE team recommended 
various security upgrades at several radiological holding 
facilities in Hanoi to protect against the possible use of 
the radiological sources as &dirty bombs.8  The DOE team 
also met with Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) Vice 
Minister Thang who supported the U.S.-led efforts to secure 
Vietnam,s radiological facilities against possible security 
threats.  The Vice Minister expressed optimism that a Basic 
Ordering Agreement between the DOE and Government of Vietnam 
(GVN) could be reached following a thorough review of the 
security proposal by relevant GVN ministries.  A signed Basic 
Ordering Agreement would allow DOE to transfer funds 
officially to the GVN to perform any needed security upgrades 
at their radiological holding facilities.  End Summary. 
 
2. (SBU) DOE,s IRTR undertakes worldwide initiatives to 
reduce the threat of a Radiological Dispersion Device 
Incident or &dirty bomb8 and provides funding to host 
countries to upgrade facilities where radiological sources 
are stored and used.  DOE initially approached the Vietnam 
Agency for Radiation and Nuclear Safety Control (VARANSAC), 
Vietnam Atomic Energy Commission (VAEC) and MOST in 2004 to 
schedule a trip to Vietnam so that it could identify and 
secure high risk radiological materials.  The five member DOE 
IRTR team led by IRTR Project Manager Greg Dwyer met with 
Vietnam nuclear technical experts and government officials in 
Hanoi on April 18-22.  Other members of the team included: 
Walt Sansot, Material Control and Accountability Specialist; 
Gary Stubblefied, Physical Protection Specialist; John 
Haynie, Health Physicist and Hazmat Specialist, and Jay 
Wertenberger, Senior Contracting Officer.  The U.S. team was 
accompanied at all of its meetings by Embassy S&T Officer. 
 
3. (C) During its one week visit, the U.S. team,s main 
interlocutors were Dr. Dang Thanh Luong, Deputy Director 
General of VARANSAC and Mr. Le Quan Hiep, Director of 
Department and Administration and Planning, VARANSAC. 
VARANSAC hosted a seminar on April 19 where representatives 
from VAEC, MOST, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of 
Public Security, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Health and 
Vietnam,s General Agency of Customs discussed DOE,s IRTR 
Program in detail.  According to various GVN representatives, 
the usage of radiological materials in Vietnam is primarily 
focused on health care and food irradiation.  VARANSAC, 
however, admitted that it needed to improve the control and 
security of radiological materials, but there is little or no 
funding to do so. 
 
4. (C) DOE assessed the security vulnerabilities of three 
sites, including the Hanoi Irradiation Center, Hanoi &K8 
Hospital and Hanoi Cancer Hospital.  These radiological 
facilities all had strong safety factors and no radiation 
leakage, but lacked adequate security.  The DOE Team 
recommended that DOE provide funding for security upgrades 
such as balanced magnetic switches, dual motion sensors, 
keypads, panic buttons and alarms, and closed circuit 
television cameras, as well as installation costs.  VARANSAC 
officials were very receptive of the security assessment but 
lacked the authority to sign a Basic Ordering Agreement.  A 
signed Basic Ordering Agreement would allow DOE to transfer 
funds officially to the GVN to perform any needed security 
upgrades at their radiological holding facilities.  The DOE 
team was surprised to learn that most of Vietnam,s 
radiological Cobalt sources 

Latest source of this page is cablebrowser-2, released 2011-10-04