US embassy cable - 05BOGOTA3937

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 003937 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/25/2015 
TAGS: ASEC, PTER, MOPS, PREL, CO 
SUBJECT: GENERAL MYERS MEETS WITH GENERAL OSPINA 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons 
1.5 (b) and (d) 
 
1.  (U)  April 10, 2005, National Administrative Center 
(CAN), Bogota 
 
2.  (U)  Participants: 
 
U.S. 
---- 
 
General Richard B. Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff (CJCS) 
 
Ambassador William B. Wood 
 
US Defense Attach, Colonel William Graves 
 
Military Group Commander, Colonel Simeon Trombitas 
 
Mr. Paul Hanley, Director of Strategic Communications 
 
Colonel Rodney O. Anderson, Executive Assistant 
 
Colonel Frederick S. Rudesheim, J-5 Action Officer 
 
Colombia 
-------- 
 
General Carlos Ospina Ovalle, Commander of Colombian Military 
Forces 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
3.  (C)  On 10 April 2005, General Myers and General Ospina 
discussed leishmaniasis and other health and welfare issues, 
morale, challenges to the joint commands, Venezuela, 
Colombian cross border cooperation and operations, and the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) attacks. Ospina 
reported that leishmaniasis had seriously impacted the 
Colombian Army, and there was a shortage of glucantime, one 
of the few medications used to treat this disease, due to 
budgetary and distribution problems.  Ospina mentioned the 
need to maintain good morale among his troops in the field 
and underscored the importance of instilling the joint 
command concept in the minds of Colombian military officers. 
Ospina said he saw a lack of unity among the Venezuelan armed 
forces; he believed the Venezuelan military was going along 
with Chavez policies for self-preservation.  Ospina admitted 
that cross-border operations were illegal but still a 
necessity given Venezuela's tendency not to take action. 
Ospina stated that the apparent upsurge in FARC activity was 
in direct reaction to the government's operations in the Plan 
Patriota IIB area of operations. End Summary. 
 
------------------------------------- 
LEISHMANIASIS AND OTHER HEALTH ISSUES 
------------------------------------- 
 
4.  (C)  Ospina warned the biggest health and welfare issue 
for the Colombian military was the high incidence of 
leishmaniasis among deployed combat units.  Ospina, himself a 
leishmaniasis victim about 10 years ago, stated that there 
were over 1,000 cases.   (Comment: The Colombian military and 
medical community reported 3,163 cases in 2004 and 2,089 
cases for the first three months of 2005.)  Ospina mentioned 
the shortage of glucantime, one of the few medications used 
to treat this disease.  Colombia obtains this medication from 
a Brazilian manufacturer, but budget limitations and 
distribution problems are making it hard for the military to 
obtain the drugs in sufficient quantities.  Ospina attributed 
the increase in leishmaniasis cases to long-term exposure to 
the vector; Colombian troop rotations in the Plan Patriota 
IIB area of operations are for five months, with one month of 
leave between rotations. A secondary, but by no means minor, 
problem is malaria. 
 
------------- 
MORALE ISSUES 
------------- 
 
5.  (C)  To help boost morale among his troops in the field, 
Ospina and his staff made great efforts to visit deployed 
troops. Ospina believed these visits were having a direct and 
positive impact on morale and asserted that soldiers and 
officers were dealing well with the hardships of long-term 
deployments.  Moreover, he noted that the 30-day rest and 
relaxation period figured prominently in the morale and 
command climate of deployed units.  Ospina emphasized that 
any U.S. support that ensured the availability of helicopter 
assets to support these troop rotations would be of critical 
importance. 
----------------------------------- 
JOINT COMMANDS AND THEIR CHALLENGES 
----------------------------------- 
 
6.  (C)  According to Ospina, the toughest aspect of his 
position is changing the mindset of the services and getting 
joint force commanders to report directly to him, while still 
answering to their respective service chiefs.  The services 
see this arrangement as a loss of power and control over 
their subordinates.  He has struggled to excercise control 
over the two existing joint commands, Joint Task Force Omega 
(JTF-O) and the 1st Joint Command, also known as the 
Caribbean Command. Ospina said that he would continue his 
efforts to change the mindset and that the next joint command 
under consideration will be in the Pacific region.  General 
Myers applauded this commitment to joint operations, and 
Ambassador Wood remarked that the Colombian military has 
undergone a parallel transformation from a static, 
garrison-based force to forward-deployed, mobile combat 
forces. 
 
--------- 
VENEZUELA 
--------- 
 
7.  (C)  When asked by Ambassador Wood for his perception of 
the Venezuela situation, Ospina said he saw a lack of unity 
among the Venezuelan armed forces.  He believed the 
Venezuelan military was trying to go along with Chavez 
policies out of self-preservation.  Ospina expected less 
cooperation between Venezuelan and Colombian military units 
along the border; the Chavez regime exercised tight control 
on any official contact with Colombian civilian and military 
border units.  He cited frequent low-level hot pursuit and 
shooting incidents that could be further complicated by bad 
decision-making on one or both sides of the border.  Ospina 
was particularly concerned with the existing and potentially 
growing corruption of Venezuelan border security personnel 
and how this would favor the FARC's acquisition and movement 
of Venezuelan arms into Colombia.  When questioned by 
Ambassador Wood on the potential strategic threat, Ospina 
mentioned that Venezuela's plan to acquire warships from 
Spain may become a threat in the future.  He also mentioned 
Venezuela's purchase of 100,000 rifles could result in some 
of these ending up in the hands of the FARC.  Ospina saw no 
imbalance between what he described as light infantry forces 
in Venezuela and Colombia.  However, he was aware of heavier 
Venezuelan forces farther away from the border. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
COLOMBIAN CROSS BORDER COOPERATION AND OPERATIONS 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
8.  (C)  Ambassador Wood asked about Colombia's intentions on 
continued cross border intelligence collection and ground and 
air operations against FARC elements in Venezuela.  Ospina 
reacted with a surprised look and a nervous chuckle.  He then 
explained that these operations are not officially recognized 
but that it was frustrating for Colombia to pass actionable 
information to Venezuelan authorities just to have them sit 
on it without taking any action.  He indicated that the 
capture of FARC international representative Rodrigo Granda 
was justified in light of the FARC's unchecked operations in 
Venezuela. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
FARC OFFENSIVE OR INFORMATION OPERATIONS CAMPAIGN? 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
9.  (C)  When asked to comment on what some in the press were 
calling a FARC offensive since 1 Jan 2005, Ospina stated that 
the apparent upsurge in FARC activity was in direct reaction 
to the government's operations in the Plan Patriota IIB area 
of operations.  According to Ospina, the FARC was hoping to 
divert Colombian military resources away from the JTF-O area 
of operations, drawing regional and international attention 
to what they hope is their continued viability as a fighting 
guerrilla force.   Moreover, he downplayed the significance 
of recent FARC attacks and ambushes by portraying them as 
being more the result of government mistakes rather than the 
result of FARC military prowess.  He said the military grew 
somewhat complacent from the successes of 2004, and some 
low-level, inexperienced commanders had made some 
understandable, but costly, mistakes.  Ospina concluded that 
the guerrillas were still being forced out of their 
traditional strongholds, its leaders were still on the run, 
and they were in no position to tip the strategic balance in 
their favor.  Ospina believed President Uribe was 
successfully mobilizing the public and the government, as 
evidenced by his successful legislative push to raises taxes 
and move the government in the right direction in support of 
the war effort. 
WOOD