US embassy cable - 05BOGOTA3928

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 003928 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/25/2015 
TAGS: PTER, ASEC, MOPS, PREL, CO 
SUBJECT: GENERAL MYERS MEETS WITH MOD AND HIGH COMMAND 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons 
1.5 (b) and (d) 
 
1. (U) April 10, 2005, Ambassador's residence, Bogota. 
 
2. (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
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Ambassador William B. Wood 
Gen Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(CJCS) 
Mr. Milton K. Drucker (DCM) 
COL William G. Graves (Defense Attach) 
COL Simeon Trombitas (Military Assistance Group Commander) 
COL Rodney Anderson (CJCS Executive Assistant) 
Mr. Paul Hanley (CJCS Communications Director) 
Mr. Roger Carignan (NAS) 
Mr. Craig Osth (ORA) 
Mr. Jeffrey DeLaurentis (POL) 
COL Rudesheim (CJCS J-5) 
 
Colombia 
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Minister of Defense (MOD) Jorge Alberto Uribe Echevarria 
GEN Carlos Ospina Ovalle (Armed Forces Commander) 
GEN Freddy Padilla de Len (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff) 
GEN Edgar Alfonso Lesmez Abad (Air Force Commander) 
ADM Mauricio Alfonso Soto Gomez (Navy Commander) 
MG Reinaldo Castellanos Trujillo (Army Commander) 
MG Jorge Daniel Castro Castro  (National Police Director) 
MG Fernando Soler Torres (Joint Staff Operations Chief) 
VMOD Andres Mauricio Penate Giraldo 
Presidential Chief-of-Staff Juan Lozano 
 
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Summary 
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3.  (C)  Summary: On April 10, 2005, General Myers, MOD 
Uribe, and senior Colombian military and government officers 
discussed security achievements and the importance of 
continued U.S. support.  The Colombians noted that almost 
every category of first quarter security results were better 
than the previous year and that the GOC would be able to 
negotiate with the illegal armed groups from a position of 
power.  The MOD and the service chiefs emphasized their 
commitment to operating more jointly but noted that the 
transformation has been slow and difficult.  They praised 
President Uribe for supporting the military, pressing for 
change, and selecting new, innovative leaders.  The MOD said 
that lower level terrorists were being captured frequently 
and that they and deserters were providing valuable 
intelligence.  In closing, the MOD and his colleagues 
emphasized the importance of continued U.S. support.  End 
summary. 
 
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Colombian Achievements 
---------------------- 
 
4.  (C)  The Ambassador asked what the experience of the 
Colombians in the first three months of 2005 had been and 
what they expected for the next three months.  The MOD 
credited Uribe's security policy with improved quality of 
life, more confidence in the government (higher approval 
ratings than the Church), erosion of support for terrorists, 
and illegal armed groups being forced to move to increasingly 
remote areas.  Although there had been some setbacks, he 
noted that the trend was positive and that there was 
improvement from 2004 in almost every category of first 
quarter security results.  Only attacks on the power 
infrastructure and oil pipelines had increased.  He said the 
GOC expected the positive trend to continue but emphasized 
the GOC must "stay the course" and not get impatient.  CJCS 
agreed maintaining momentum and keeping public opinion aware 
of achievements was key. 
 
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Negotiated End 
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5.  (C)  The Ambassador noted that opinion polls indicate 
strong support for a negotiated settlement with illegal armed 
groups and praised the GOC for being able to negotiate from a 
position of strength.  Lozano said four to six years ago the 
public was in favor of a negotiated peace accord, but the 
government was dealing from a position of weakness, which 
made negotiations unviable.  VMOD Penate added that the 
public also used to fear that a stronger military and police 
force would prevent peace, but instead the security forces' 
increased capacity had made peace talks more possible. 
 
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Focus on Reform 
--------------- 
 
6.  (C)  Admiral Soto emphasized the military's focus on new 
joint commands in the Plan Patriota area of operations and 
the Caribbean.  Soto acknowledged that the military still had 
a long way to go, especially in sharing intelligence. 
General Lesmez stated that military culture, especially in 
the Air Force, was changing, and that the Air Force was 
working closely with other services and police.  The 
Ambassador noted that military spending favors the Army (36 
percent) and police (34 percent) and asked General 
Castellanos how this would change in a more joint 
environment.  Castellanos defended the large Army budget, 
emphasizing that the Army was responsible for vast swaths of 
territory.  He acknowledged that President Uribe had directed 
the security forces to operate jointly, but that the military 
had to be careful to create joint commands where they were 
viable in order to get positive results. 
 
7.  (C)  CJCS said that during his visit in 2001, he visited 
each of the services and observed military training and noted 
that with a little assistance the Colombian military could 
serve anywhere in the world.  Ospina praised Uribe for having 
provided a clear objective for the military.  The MOD 
credited President Uribe's support for the military, new 
leadership selections, and pressure to perform as the impetus 
for many changes.  For example, the MOD said that within a 
year and a half the military would have an entirely new and 
updated logistics system that will be the best on the 
continent.  CJCS noted that change, even from the top, is 
very difficult, and that finding leadership willing to 
implement is even more difficult. 
 
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High Value Targets 
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8.  (C)  The MOD reported that security forces had been 
capturing numerous lower level commanders of the illegal 
armed groups, which, although not as important as capturing a 
senior commander, had weakened the enemy.  Penate predicted a 
senior commander would be captured in the next three months. 
CJCS warned that U.S. experience had demonstrated the 
difficulty of capturing of HVTs.  The MOD also noted that the 
GOC's reinsertion program for deserters had led to an influx 
of deserters, who were providing vast amounts of actionable 
intelligence, including on HVTs' locations and habits. 
 
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U.S. Support 
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9.  (C)  In closing, the MOD emphasized that U.S. assistance 
was crucial both financially and politically.  He expressed 
concern that U.S. was increasingly shifting focus to the 
Middle East and away from Colombia's still unsolved problems. 
 Lozano echoed this concern, warning that Colombia's illegal 
armed groups were threats to the hemisphere with world-wide 
links and a clear capacity to expand beyond Colombia's 
borders.  The Ambassador agreed and noted that international 
terrorist groups could easily take advantage of Colombia's 
tenuous security situation and expertise of the illegal armed 
groups.  In a separate breakfast meeting with General Myers, 
the MOD said Colombia needs included logistical and 
intelligence assistance and funding to update the Air Force's 
OV-10s, A-37s, and KFIRs.  He expressed concern that 
President Chavez had control over oil revenue and the press, 
restricted civil liberties, and was buying up arms.  He noted 
that Colombia would maintain an internal focus and count on 
U.S. support against Chavez.  He said the upcoming bi-lateral 
working group (U.S./Colombia) was of great importance. 
Penate said he hoped General Myers would take two messages 
back to the U.S.: (1) HVTs are important to the success in 
Colombia and (2) Colombia needs financial and political 
support from the U.S. 
 
 
 
WOOD