US embassy cable - 05ASUNCION556

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ASUNCION 000556 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PLEASE PASS TO USAID 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/25/2015 
TAGS: PREL, SNAR, US, PA 
SUBJECT: DUARTE FORETELLS CABRAL'S OUSTER, SEEKS CLOSER 
COOPERATION 
 
REF: A. ASUNCION 531 
 
     B. ASUNCION 499 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John F. Keane for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  Duarte invited me to see him early on April 
22.  His purpose was to assure me that controversial police 
commissioner Aristides Cabral would be taken out of the 
picture, although it had not been easy because of Cabral's 
powerful backers.  Cabral would be indicted soon, or he would 
retire.  (Later that day, Cabral announced his retirement.) 
This led to a soliloquy about the tentacles of corruption 
which pervade Paraguayan society and the need for 
perseverance as well as patience.  He touched on his 
relations with the South American neighborhood, particulary 
Brazil.  I told him that the local Venezuelan Ambassador's 
remarks implying U.S. involvement in the attack on the 
Paraguayan Ambassador in Caracas were ridiculous and stupid. 
Other topics included counterdrug cooperation and Paraguayan 
security concerns.  Senior Duarte advisor Carlos Walde was 
present.  End Summary. 
 
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CABRAL TO LEAVE 
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2.  (C) President Duarte's aide called me at 6:30 a.m. on 
April 22 asking me to come see Duarte at 8:30 that morning. 
Duarte got right to the point.  Maintaining "governability" 
in Paraguay, he said, is a difficult balancing act.  "I don't 
run things any way I want here" he went on; "there are many 
powerful players.  I cannot divide my party (Colorados), my 
block in the Senate.  I would not be able to govern.  I have 
to bring along my allies (Senator) Galaverna and the 
President of the (Colorado) Party (Senator Herminio Caceres). 
 Without a united block we will lose governability.  This 
Cabral ... it takes time, perseverance, patience." 
 
3.  (C) He said he had requested Attorney General LaTorre 
sometime ago to build a case to indict Cabral so that he 
would have unchallenged grounds to withdraw his promotion, 
and he did not know why it had not happened.  I told Duarte 
of my conversation with LaTorre (ref A), and explained that 
with a little effort investigating the disapearance of 
500,000 dollars in 2001 they should be able to build a good 
case. 
 
4.  (C) The President said that even if LaTorre delays, the 
problem should go away because Cabral told him he is going to 
request retirement.  (I suspect Duarte instructed him to do 
so.)  One way or another, Duarte assured me, Cabral will not 
become Police Commander and will not be promoted.  I replied 
that I welcome that news because Cabral is a "big stone in 
the road impeding closer bilateral cooperation." 
 
5.  (U) Later that day, Cabral announced that he was 
requesting retirement "due to personal reasons."  The press 
speculated that he knew he could not be promoted and he might 
be indicted again if he did not remove himself. 
 
------------------------------- 
TILTING AT CORRUPTION WINDMILLS 
------------------------------- 
 
6.  (C) Duarte then requested my forebearance with an 
explanation of his discouragement.  For twenty minutes or 
more he went on about how corruption was deliberately 
nurtured by the dictatorship (pre-1989) and subsequent 
governments; it was the "business model," and leaders of all 
powerful sectors benefitted handsomely:  political leaders of 
all parties, GOP bureaucrats, the private sector.  They are 
resisting reform, and it takes time to chip away at it, to 
strengthen institutional capacity to prevent, detect and 
attack it.  He gave many familiar examples (state 
enterprises, ministries, the public health and pension 
system, etc.), but new to me was his complaint that Brazil 
will not cooperate with Paraguay in trying to bring 
transparency to the Itaipu Binational Entity which manages 
the billion dollar hydroelectric facilities of the same name. 
 He claimed to be so disheartened that he is not interested 
in re-election.  (Comment:  He was not convincing and his 
supporters are gearing up for this without any signs Duarte 
disagrees with the effort.) 
 
----------------------------------- 
THE NEIGHBORHOOD'S LEFTWARD SLOPE 
AND VENEZUELA'S LACK OF CREDIBILITY 
----------------------------------- 
 
7.  (C) What followed was a quick review of how the 
"neighborhood" has become more unfriendly toward the U.S.  He 
mentioned that Vazquez (Uruguay), Lula (Brazil), Kirchner 
(Argentina) and Chavez (Venezuela) are exerting pressure on 
the other South Americans to tilt "leftward," but asserted 
that he has a different outlook vis-a-vis the U.S. and wants 
closer cooperation, particularly on the counterdrug, 
anti-organized crime, security and anti-corruption efforts. 
He said he strongly disagreed with Chavez. 
 
8.  (C) The Venezuelan Ambassador in Asuncion, I noted, 
recently made outrageous allegations implying that the U.S. 
was behind the April 8 attack on the Paraguayan Ambassador in 
Caracas.  I told him the remarks were ridiculous and stupid. 
Duarte replied that no one believes what the Venezuelans say 
and he knows the charge was absurd. 
 
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DEEPENING COOPERATION 
--------------------- 
 
9.  (C) Duarte returned to the topic of enhancing 
U.S.-Paraguayan cooperation and requested helicopters, fuel 
for the air force, and trucks for the police and military.  I 
replied that U.S. assistance is continuing and that we were 
turning over to Paraguay that very morning 6 vehicles for the 
counterdrug secretariat (SENAD).  Moreover, we had provided 
fuel for many operations.  I noted that we were awaiting a 
reply on our request for a capability to detect and monitor 
airborne trafficking.  Walde said he was aware of a U.S. 
program to provide excess defense articles.  I replied that 
significant provision of U.S. equipment was not possible due 
to budget and other constraints.  Moreover, I added, lack of 
an Article 98 agreement, negotiation of which has entailed 
three years of effort without results, precludes the 
possibility of excess defense articles.  Duarte offered no 
reaction.  With respect to cooperation on public safety and 
against trans-national organized crime and terrorism, I noted 
that we are prepared to be supportive and suggested that a 
visit by Vice President Castiglioni to Washington to explore 
ideas might be useful.  Duarte concurred.  We agreed to meet 
again soon to discuss other topics. 
 
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MENDING FENCES 
-------------- 
 
10.  (C) Comment:  Duarte was obviously eager to let me know 
that the Cabral issue was near resolution, and to explain why 
it was so difficult.  I do not doubt that, but remain 
troubled by the implication that drug traffickers' allies 
have gained so much power in Congress, the courts and the 
Public Ministry.  Duarte's stress on the need to retain the 
undivided support of his party block in Congress (which hold 
only 40% of seats in the Senate) is well placed; all of his 
predecessors as President during the democratic era lost that 
support and with it the ability to govern at first and, 
ultimately were overwhelmed by political instability. 
Cabral's departure removes a significant impediment to closer 
cooperation, but the whole episode is a reminder that 
progress against corruption will require constant vigilance 
and at times relentless pressure.  We will need to take 
account of this as we work with the GOP in the formulation of 
its MCC Threshold program implementation plan including 
quantifiable measures of results.  A case in point is the 
Public Ministry, whose flaws are a major factor in the 
impunity which is so pervasive. 
KEANE