US embassy cable - 05ANKARA2324

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 002324 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/19/2015 
TAGS: PREL, MARR, ETRD, TU, IZ, NATO 
SUBJECT: "OUR VIEWS ARE THE SAME AS YOURS," TURKISH IRAQ 
ENVOY TELLS S/I AMBASSADOR JONES 
 
REF: BAGHDAD 1645 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Eric S. Edelman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (C) Turkey almost entirely shares our views on Iraq, GOT 
Special Envoy Koruturk told Senior Adviser and Coordinator 
for Iraq Policy Amb. Richard Jones on April 19.  Amb. Jones 
outlined for the Turks our approach over the coming year, 
including providing support for the Iraqi Security Forces 
(ISF) and the constitutional process.  Koruturk highlighted 
Turkish offers to train ISF, police, and politicians in 
Turkey.  Koruturk bluntly stated that any second border gate 
must bypass territory under KDP leader Barzani's influence, 
but hinted that a package deal (two new gates) might be a way 
around the impasse.  Koruturk asked for us to urge the Iraqis 
to permit the Turkish consulate in Mosul to re-open, and 
recited familiar Turkish concerns about Kirkuk.  Jones 
requested that Turkey also consider forgiving Iraqi debt and 
assisting Iraq's agricultural sector; the Turks will look 
into this.  While the Turks broad agreement on the future of 
Iraq is significant, we need to push them to be more 
forthcoming in how they support their newly democratic 
neighbor.  End summary. 
 
Briefing in the Turks 
--------------------- 
 
2. (C) GOT Special Envoy for Iraq Amb. Osman Koruturk hosted 
a working dinner in Istanbul April 19 for visiting Senior 
Advisor and Coordinator for Iraq Policy Amb. Richard Jones 
(full list of participants in para. 16).  Amb. Jones began by 
highlighting the USG's main priorities in the coming months: 
security for the Iraqi people, and supporting the 
constitutional process.  He briefed Koruturk on his recent 
trip to Iraq, where he urged the Iraq leadership to keep up 
the political momentum.  On security, Jones noted the 
ongoing, gradual shift in emphasis from the CF to the ISF in 
providing a safe environment for the Iraqi people.  CF are 
increasingly engaged in training the ISF, including teaching 
them how to deal with crime, not just a political insurgency; 
criminals, he noted, are the main force behind kidnappings in 
Iraq. 
 
3. (C) Jones reported that the USG is urging the Iraqis not 
to avail themselves of the six-month extension available in 
the Transitional Administrative Law for drafting the 
constitution.  He noted that many in the coalition are eyeing 
the end of 2005 to rotate or reduce troops in Iraq; delaying 
the constitution--and thus the referendum and general 
election--would throw a wrench into coalition planning. 
Perhaps more important, availing the extension would 
encourage political inertia and provide encouragement to the 
insurgency.  Jones said that IIG Deputy PM Barham Salih made 
it clear during their recent discussion that the Iraqi Kurds 
would strongly oppose the extension.  Since their vote would 
essentially be required to approve an extension, the Kurds 
may be able to quash this idea on their own even if other 
political parties were to support it. 
 
Koruturk: We Agree, and This Is What We're Doing to Help 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
4. (C) Koruturk responded that Turkey's views "are almost 
exactly the same" on Iraq, including on the extension issue. 
He said that the GOT was "cautiously optimistic" that the 
insurgency is waning.  He outlined Turkey's efforts to 
support nascent democracy in Iraq, including: 
 
--dispatch of two (soon to be five) military personnel to 
Iraq in support of NTM-I; 
--course offerings in Turkey for ISF officers under NTM-I 
(the Turks said this offer is bilateral as well if more 
convenient for both sides); 
--continuing outreach to Sunni political parties and 
religious bodies; 
--five-day political training courses planned for Da'wa, PUK, 
Sunni parties, and the Turkmen Assembly (Koruturk added that 
Turkey is seeking out other parties and is willing to offer 
training to all political parties in Iraq); 
--police training in Turkey, offered either bilaterally or 
through the EU rule of law initiative; 
--planning to increase electricity exports to Iraq; and, 
--lobbying within the "neighbors' group" on like-minded 
goals, such as holding elections on time.  Koruturk revealed 
that the Turks' draft communique for the (postponed) April 
18-19 Istanbul neighbors' conference included language urging 
that the ITG not extend the constitutional deadline. 
(COMMENT: WE note that the language in the draft obtained by 
Embassy Baghdad (reftel)--which refers to the timeline laid 
out in UNSCR 1546--tends to support this statement.  END 
COMMENT.) 
 
5. (C) Amb. Jones expressed the USG's appreciation for these 
efforts.  He added that Turkey--in addition to training 
police and ISF--might also consider training Iraqi prison 
workers or support the building of additional prisons.  He 
recalled that before hostilities commenced in March 2003, 
Saddam Hussein released thousands of prisoners, some of whom 
later returned to the prisons after April 2003 and torched 
them.  Given both the insurgency and criminality, Iraq is 
desperately short of both prisons and corrections officers. 
Koruturk said this was something he could look into. 
 
Second Border Gate: Must Go Around Barzani 
------------------------------------------ 
 
6. (C) Amb. Koruturk raised the issue of the second border 
gate with Iraq.  He stated candidly that Turkey seeks to 
build the second gate at Ovakoy on the far western side of 
the border in order to avoid the area of northern Iraq 
controlled by KDP leader Masoud Barzani.  "We don't want to 
be at the mercy of Barzani all the time," he said.  (NOTE: 
Turkey's relationship with Barzani is prickly at best, and 
the Turks have long complained that Iraqi border personnel at 
Habur and security personnel on the route through the 
KRA--who are all KDP--harass Turkish drivers and demand 
excessive fees and extra fines.  END NOTE.)  Koruturk noted 
the importance of Habur for both CF and Iraq and that the 
crossing is enormously busy with long backups.  (NOTE: 25% of 
CF sustainment and two-thirds of humanitarian fuel imports to 
Iraq come through Habur.  END NOTE.)  He said Turkey would 
support not only a second gate, but a third or a fourth as 
well.  But one of these gates--he maintained--must bypass 
Barzani, to allow a "direct" connection between Turkey and 
the Iraqi heartland. 
 
7. (C) Koruturk noted that Turkey is prepared to guarantee in 
writing that the volume at Habur--and thus presumably the 
revenue Barzani can collect--will not decrease with the 
building of another crossing at Ovakoy.  "For Turkey the 
issue is not only economic, it is political."  Therefore 
Turkey does not see the point in pursuing a USTDA feasibility 
study which would explore options other than Ovakoy. 
However, Koruturk added, Turkey would have no problem with 
two new gates going forward, as long as one of them avoided 
Barzani's turf. 
 
8. (C) Jones responded that economic concerns must be part of 
the conversation on a second--or third--gate.  For example, a 
gate at Ovakoy would require approximately 100 kilometers of 
new road construction in Iraq.  (NOTE: Moreover, the road 
would run close to the Syrian border, where the insurgency is 
currently active.  END NOTE.)  Koruturk responded that Turkey 
could offer loans to finance the Iraqi road construction, but 
Jones noted that Iraq can only receive limited debt financing 
under IMF rules.  MFA Deputy Director General Safak Gokturk 
responded that "We shall find our own funding," but provided 
no other specifics.  Jones repeated our concern that the 
decision about a second gate cannot be divorced from good 
economic sense. 
 
U.S./EU Iraq Conference 
----------------------- 
 
9. (C) Amb. Jones touched on U.S., EU, and Iraqi plans for a 
large meeting to offer support for democracy and economic 
development in Iraq planned for this summer in Brussels.  He 
reported that we are working to sort out details with the EU 
based on the Iraqis' desires.  Koruturk reiterated Turkey's 
strong interest in participating in the conference. 
Mosul Consulate... 
------------------ 
 
10. (C) Koruturk requested U.S. backing to persuade the 
Iraqis to allow Turkey to re-open its consulate in Mosul.  He 
said that at any given time there are about 10,000 Turks in 
Iraq--many in northern Iraq--and the embassy in Baghdad is 
simply unable to serve these citizens effectively.  A 
consulate in Mosul would allow Turkey to serve its citizens 
and also issue visas for Iraqis to visit Turkey.  Koruturk 
complained that the Iraqi argument--that Iran would pressure 
Iraq to open a consulate if it allowed Turkey to do so--was 
illegitimate; "the Iranians are already there, de facto," he 
said. 
 
...Support for Iraqi Agriculture... 
----------------------------------- 
 
11. (C) Jones noted that Turkey should consider assisting 
Iraq in providing services for the Iraqi people, for example 
in the agriculture sector.  He noted that Sadr City has been 
relatively quiet of late, not only because Muqtada al-Sadr is 
starting to work within the political process, but also 
because we have been successful in working to provide sewer, 
water, and electricity services there.  USDA will soon sign 
an MOU with the Iraqi Agriculture Ministry to provide 
exchanges and training.  An uptick in agriculture, which is 
labor-intensive, would help cut down unemployment in Iraq. 
Koruturk agreed to look into this; MFA Director General for 
the Middle East Oguz Celikkol added that perhaps the Turkish 
Agriculture Minister could invite his Iraqi counterpart to 
Turkey. 
 
...Debt Relief... 
----------------- 
 
12. (C) Amb. Jones noted that we are working hard with the 
Saudis and other Gulf states on debt relief.  We understand 
Kuwait and the UAE may/may provide 100% forgiveness.  While 
Turkey's held debt is relatively small (about $ 1.6 billion, 
$ 1.3 billion of which is held by the independent Central 
Bank), it would still be important for Turkey to take a 
leadership role in forgiving Iraq debt.  MFA Deputy DG 
Gokturk responded that because of treasury regulations, 
Turkey cannot just write off the debt, though it can be 
flexible in restructuring it.  DCM noted that long-term 
rescheduling and at a generous interest rate could stretch 
out repayment and be considered the equivalent of 
forgiveness; Amb. Jones added that as long as the debt is on 
the books, it will work to stifle Iraq's struggling economy. 
 
...and Kirkuk 
------------- 
 
13. (C) At the end of the conversation, Amb. Koruturk raised 
Kirkuk.  He recited an argument that we have heard from him 
before: Turkey's greatest concern is that Iraq remain united, 
not because of the threat that an independent Kurdish state 
could pose, but because of what could happen elsewhere in 
Iraq.  The Sunni center would become a hotbed of terrorism, 
and while the Shia south might not automatically gravitate 
toward Iran, it would eventually be forced to due to the 
antagonism it would face from its Sunni neighbors.  Iran 
would then have influence geographically closer to Israel. 
This loss of balance in favor of Iran would threaten Turkey, 
Israel, and the entire region.  Thus Kirkuk must remain an 
Iraqi city and the process of carrying out the requirements 
of Article 58 must be laid out in the constitution, must be 
clear, fair, and transparent, and should be implemented after 
the constitutional process.  Turkey does not favor Kirkuk 
becoming part of the KRA, and has heard similar sentiments 
from Iraqi Sunnis and Shias as well as others of Iraq's 
neighbors. 
 
14. (C) Amb. Jones responded that the process for dealing 
with Kirkuk must be acceptable to all Iraqis.  Additionally, 
we must work together to improve the conditions for the 
people of Kirkuk.  The U.S. has contributed $50 million to 
the Kirkuk Foundation (though the money is still in the hands 
of the IIG), and the KRG reportedly has another $50 million 
in escrow awaiting implementation of the Fund.  This Fund 
must get going to work on the infrastructure projects Kirkuk 
so sorely needs. We are also lacking adequate funding for the 
Iraqi Property Claims Commission (IPCC).  The IPCC can and 
has adjudicated thousands of claims, but cannot settle claims 
requiring compensation due to lack of funding.  Koruturk 
noted that the GOT may be able to assist the IPCC because it 
has in its possession Ottoman land deed records dating up to 
1917; some of these might be helpful in adjudicating claims. 
Amb. Jones responded that this could be a welcome 
contribution. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
15. (C) This and other conversations with the Turks indicate 
that they do see eye to eye with us in general terms on the 
political future of Iraq.  Turkey has calculated that it is 
better off with a democracy on its borders, yet it does not 
now seem ready to lean further forward on supporting this 
democracy.  The GOT has offered training courses for the ISF 
in Iraq, but seems unprepared to send more than a handful of 
officers under NATO auspices.  Turkey wants a second border 
gate, but cannot see past its problems with Barzani to make 
it happen quickly.  Nagging issues such as Kirkuk and the PKK 
(Koruturk never once mentioned the latter, although it was 
the only criticism CHOD GEN Ozkok had of the U.S. in a major 
speech on April 20) will continue to linger in the background 
as we push Turkey to be more forthcoming.  End comment. 
 
16. (U) List of participants: 
 
Turkey: 
Amb. Osman Koruturk, GOT Special Envoy for Iraq 
Amb. Oguz Celikkol, MFA Director General for the Middle East 
Safak Gokturk, MFA Deputy Director General for the Middle East 
Ozcan Sahin, MFA Iraq Desk (notetaker) 
 
U.S.: 
Amb. Richard Jones, Senior Advisor and Coordinator for Iraq 
Policy 
Amb. Eric Edelman 
DCM Robert Deutsch 
Stuart Smith, POL/ECON Chief, AmConGen Istanbul 
PMA notetaker 
 
17. (U) Ambassador Jones cleared this message. 
 
18. (U) Iraq posts minimize considered. 
EDELMAN