US embassy cable - 05MADRID1587

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MADRID 001587 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/22/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, SP, American - Spanish Relations 
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF FBI DIRECTOR MUELLER 
 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Bob Manzanares; reasons 1.4 (B) and (D 
) 
 
-------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1. (C) Your visit to Madrid comes after a difficult year in 
our bilateral relationship but also at a time when we are 
gradually moving relations to a more positive track.  Our 
counter-terrorism cooperation with Spain remains strong 
despite problems in other areas and your visit will help 
demonstrate our commitment to work with Spain to defeat this 
common threat.  Interior Minister Alonso's visit to 
Washington, including his meeting with you, helped advance 
our counter-terrorism cooperation.  The Madrid train bombings 
in March 2004 came as a terrible shock 
to a country that felt it was accustomed to dealing with 
terrorism (in the form of its 30-year conflict with ETA) and 
considered itself a bridge between the Islamic world and the 
West.  Voters punished the then-ruling Popular Party after 
the attacks out of resentment over President Jose Maria 
Aznar's decision 
to ignore strong public opposition to the deployment of 
Spanish forces to Iraq, and for the government's mishandling 
of the investigation into the train bombings.  A year later, 
President Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero's Socialist Party has 
consolidated its 
control at the national level and the Popular Party remains 
very much on the defensive. 
 
2. (C) At the international level, Zapatero is working to 
repair relations with the USG damaged by Spain's sudden and 
poorly coordinated pullout from Iraq and by the Spanish 
government's sharp rhetoric against U.S. policy in Iraq. 
While the public strongly supported Zapatero's withdrawal of 
troops from Iraq, the Socialists' mishandling of relations 
with the U.S. exposed the GOS to media and opposition 
attacks.  We are slowly putting relations back on track, 
though differences remain on some issues, such as Spain's 
unwillingness to permit the deployment of Spanish NATO 
officers to support NATO operations in Iraq.  Our objective 
is to work with Spain on issues of importance to us and, 
where possible, to steer the Zapatero government away from 
actions that undermine USG policy objectives.  Much like 
counter-terrorism relations, military to military cooperation 
remained strong despite turbulence in other aspects of our 
bilateral relationship.  Spain continues to provide 
U.S. forces full access to its naval base at Rota and its air 
base at Moron, as well as providing blanket flight clearances 
for U.S. forces moving to and from Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Spanish Foreign Minister Moratinos and Minister of the 
Interior Alonso held good meetings in the U.S. in April and 
Minister of Defense Bono and Minister of Justice Aguilar are 
scheduled to visit Washington in early May.  End Summary. 
 
------------------------ 
A YEAR AFTER THE ATTACKS 
------------------------ 
 
3. (C) You arrive in Spain just over a year after the Madrid 
train bombings of March 11, 2004 killed 191 people and 
wounded over 1,600.  It was the worst terrorist attack ever in 
an EU country and shook a nation that felt it was accustomed 
to dealing with terrorism as a result of its 30-year conflict 
with ETA.  Attorney General Alberto Gonzales's attendance at 
the one-year commemoration of the bombings symbolized USG 
support for the victims of the attack and our respect for the 
Spanish people.  Secretary Powell's visit to Spain in the 
wake of the 3/11 attacks was appreciated as a positive 
gesture, but bilateral friction between the USG and the 
Zapatero government since that time has generated a public 
perception that the USG is punishing Spain for Zapatero's 
actions.  Both the USG and the Zapatero government have an 
interest in putting relations on a more positive track and 
your visit is a signal that despite our differences we value 
Spain as an ally and that we are committed to working with 
Spain to defend the citizens of both countries. 
 
----------------------------- 
COUNTER-TERRORISM COOPERATION 
----------------------------- 
 
4. (C) Spain remains an active front in 
the War on Terror. Investigations since the 3/11 attack have 
confirmed suspicions that there is a large pool of Islamic 
extremists throughout the country, including one cell that 
plotted attacks against Spain's High Court and other targets 
during the latter half of 2004.  The high-profile trial of 
al-Qa'ida financier Imad Eddin Barakat Yarkas and 23 other 
suspected Islamic extremists began on April 22.  Yarkas and 
three other defendants are charged with having provided 
logistical support to the September 11 hijackers and face up 
to 40 years in prison.   ETA continues to carry 
out small-scale bombings, though it has been greatly weakened 
in the last year by arrests of key leaders in Spain and 
France. 
5. (C) Spanish authorities arrested 117 suspected Islamic 
terrorists during 2004, routinely sharing with USG 
officials information derived from those arrests.  A DOJ team 
met with Spanish counterparts in December to identify 
mechanisms for improving information sharing and judicial 
cooperation, particularly on counter-terrorism 
investigations.  The next DOJ-Spanish meeting is tentatively 
scheduled for May 19 in Madrid.  Attorney General Gonzales 
and Minister of 
Justice Aguilar issued a joint statement on March 11, 2005 
committing the USG and GOS to closer cooperation on 
counter-terrorism investigations.  Aguilar and Minister of 
Interior Jose Antonio Alonso had excellent meetings with 
Attorney General Gonzales.  Alonso was pleased with the 
success of his recent visit to Washington and there was 
positive local media coverage of his meeting with you. 
Minister of Justice Aguilar will visit Washington on May 5. 
 
6. (U) Spain cooperates with the U.S. on terrorism finance 
issues.  Working-level contacts have repeatedly sought 
information on pre-notifications.  The GOS checks for assets 
upon receiving information from us, but to date has not found 
such assets.  The Interior Ministry is working on 
implementing regulations to a terrorism finance law that will 
enhance the government's ability to freeze assets. 
 
7. (C) Though overall cooperation on counter-terrorism is 
very good, there are some problems that occasionally 
complicate our efforts.  We have sometimes had to turn down 
requests from Spanish judges, who in the Spanish system hold 
primary responsibility for investigating criminal cases, for 
testimony from U.S.-held terrorist suspects or for access to 
U.S. intelligence information because such information would 
enter the public domain.  On our side, U.S. investigators 
have encountered problems obtaining official investigative 
information regarding terrorism cases because of the tendency 
of some Spanish judges to tightly control access to such 
information.  Also, Spanish security agencies are generally 
receptive towards the USG, but are often suspicious of each 
other, a factor that impedes information sharing in many 
investigations. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
SOCIALISTS IN CONTROL OF NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
8. (C) The 3/11 attacks and their aftermath were a turning 
point in modern Spanish politics.  After taking office in 
1996, President Aznar led his center-right Popular Party (PP) 
to unprecedented power at the national and regional level. 
Although Aznar was not a candidate in 2004, the PP was poised 
to 
win its third national election in a row, despite widespread 
dissatisfaction with Aznar's decision to contribute forces to 
U.S.-led operations in Iraq.  The Madrid train attacks 
shocked the Spanish public and triggered an outpouring of 
grief and sadness, but then anger when the PP government 
continued to blame ETA for the bombings after evidence arose 
pointing to Islamic radicals as authors of the attacks.  The 
bombings allowed the Socialists to capitalize on simmering 
resentment of Aznar's decision to send troops to Iraq, 
leading to a huge voter turnout and a Socialist victory. 
 
9. (C) Zapatero moved quickly on his pre-election promise to 
withdraw Spanish forces from Iraq, a move widely supported by 
the Spanish public.  He then pressed forward on a social 
agenda that appealed to Spain's center-left electorate (gay 
rights, curbing the power of the Catholic Church, better 
relations with regional governments in Catalonia and the 
Basque Region) further broadening the Socialists' appeal. 
Aznar and the PP, meanwhile, remained unapologetic for their 
handling of the 3/11 bombings and declined to sideline 
leaders discredited by their actions in the wake of the 
bombings, further eroding their public support.  Zapatero's 
main internal challenge is an effort by the Basque Regional 
Government (comprised of moderate Basque nationalists opposed 
to ETA violence) to increase its autonomy from Spain's 
central government.  This is a potential powder keg since 
most other regions of Spain strongly oppose increasing the 
Basque Region's already considerable independence, unless 
they too are given greater independence.  Zapatero scored a 
recent victory on this issue when his Socialist Party gained 
seats in Basque regional elections and the Basque 
nationalists lost seats, but the Basque question will remain 
problematic.  Zapatero now enjoys 
an approval rating of over 60 percent and, barring a major 
setback, is likely to remain in power for at least one term 
(until 2008).  The Socialist Party (PSOE) as a whole also 
gets much higher marks today than the PP opposition. 
 
---------------------------- 
STRAINED BILATERAL RELATIONS 
---------------------------- 
 
10. (C) The first months of the Zapatero administration 
proved among the most difficult in recent U.S.-Spanish 
history.  Throughout the most frustrating episodes, the USG 
won points for sticking to the high road and refusing to be 
baited into public disputes with the GOS.  Despite our 
efforts, senior GOS officials continued to make unhelpful 
remarks throughout 2004, particularly regarding the U.S. role 
in Iraq.  Spain has also irritated us by leading an effort to 
ease EU pressure on Cuba and selling $1.7 billion in military 
vessels and other equipment to the Chavez government 
in Venezuela. 
 
11. (C) The turning point in Zapatero's approach to the U.S. 
came when former Ambassador Argyros declined to attend 
Spain's October 12 national day parade, putting the public 
spotlight on our disappointment with the tone and direction 
of Spanish foreign policy.  This episode undermined Spanish 
government assertions in the press that Zapatero's policies 
had not strained ties with Washington.  This exposed Zapatero 
to withering opposition criticism that he had scuttled one of 
Spain's most important bilateral relationships and relegated 
Spain to second-class status.  While polls consistently 
demonstrate widespread hostility among Spaniards to USG 
foreign policy, the public still expects the GOS to maintain 
healthy working relations with the U.S.  Zapatero has 
responded accordingly and has initiated moves to repair ties 
with the USG. 
 
------------------------ 
RECENT POSITIVE GESTURES 
------------------------ 
 
12. (C) Since November, Spanish officials at all levels have 
made clear their desire to restore strong bilateral ties, 
with the Foreign Ministry's Director General for Foreign 
Policy (under secretary equivalent) telling us bluntly, "We 
want back in."  In 
response, we've told our Spanish contacts 
that we are prepared to move forward on issues of bilateral 
importance and that unambiguous, positive steps by Spain 
would be the best signal to the USG that they too were ready 
to move forward.  Spain subsequently agreed to USG requests 
that it lead a Provincial Reconstruction Team and a Forward 
Support Base in western Afghanistan as part of NATO's mission 
in that country, issued positive statements regarding the 
Iraq elections, and contributed $20 million to the Iraq 
elections fund.  Spain also continues to disburse $300 
million in assistance to Iraq pledged during the 2003 Iraq 
Donors Conference in Madrid, and has agreed to train Iraqi 
security forces in Spain.  Foreign Minister 
Moratinos highlighted these moves during his April 15 
meeting with Secretary Rice. 
 
13. (C) Secretary Rice welcomed these steps, while making 
clear 
that we remain troubled by mixed signals from Spain.  She 
expressed our continuing concern regarding Zapatero's sale of 
naval vessels to 
Venezuela to support Spain's troubled shipbuilding industry 
and Spain's push for closer EU ties with Castro.  Separately, 
we 
want Spain to lift its caveats on the deployment of Spanish 
NATO officers to participate in NATO missions, including in 
Iraq 
Despite these differences, we believe relations are moving in 
a positive direction and we want to move ahead in our 
significant bilateral agenda with Spain. 
 
-------------------- 
MILITARY COOPERATION 
-------------------- 
 
14. (C) Military to military relations remain very strong 
despite the change in government; the Zapatero government has 
continued to provide broad access for U.S. forces to Rota 
Naval Base (on Spain's southern coast) and Moron Air Base 
(southwest Spain).  There are currently over 2,500 active duty 
U.S. military stationed at the two bases, the vast majority 
at Rota.  The American presence at the bases tops 5,000 when 
U.S. civilians and dependents are included.  Zapatero has 
also left untouched Spain's practice of providing blanket 
flight clearances for U.S. military aircraft, including in 
support of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.  The Spanish 
military is still smarting from its ignominious withdrawal 
from Iraq and, largely as a result of the Iraq withdrawal, is 
very unhappy with the Socialist government.  The Spanish 
armed forces strongly support close relations with the U.S. 
and consider Zapatero's distancing from the U.S. a profound 
error.  Minister of Defense Bono will meet with Secretary 
Rumsfeld May 3 in Washington. 
 
--------------------------------- 
ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL RELATIONS 
--------------------------------- 
 
15. (C) We have important commercial interests in Spain as 
well, with a business community that is staunchly supportive 
of U.S. investment and concerned that Zapatero's policies 
will lead to a decrease in U.S. business involvement.  At 
every opportunity, we work to encourage a business-friendly 
environment in Spain.  We 
are working to improve respect for intellectual property 
rights (IPR) in Spain.  The GOS has 
agreed to participate in a U.S.-Spain IPR roundtable 
scheduled for the end of June or September.  Commerce 
Assistant Secretary Lash will lead the U.S. delegation at 
this event. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
YOUR VISIT WILL HELP KEEP RELATIONS ON POSITIVE COURSE 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
16. (C) The USG will not re-establish with Zapatero the deep 
and close relationship we had with the Aznar administration. 
However, we are currently moving towards a more productive 
course that achieves USG interests in Spain and in other 
regions.  Your visit will help us emphasize to the Zapatero 
government and the Spanish people that despite our 
differences with the Zapatero administration, we continue to 
consider Spain a close and important ally and, provided Spain 
works with us, we can move ahead together on robust bilateral 
and multilateral agendas. 
MANZANARES