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| Identifier: | 05DJIBOUTI407 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05DJIBOUTI407 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Djibouti |
| Created: | 2005-04-24 12:53:00 |
| Classification: | UNCLASSIFIED |
| Tags: | ACOA AMTC AMGT ASEC PREF |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 DJIBOUTI 000407 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ACOA, AMTC, AMGT, ASEC, PREF SUBJECT: DJIBOUTI: FOOD SECURITY AND REFUGEES UPDATE 1. REDSO/FFP OFFICER TRAVELED TO DJIBOUTI 5-7 APRIL, MET WITH WFP, UNHCR AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS, TRAVELED TO HOLL-HOLL AND ALI ADDE REFUGEE CAMPS AND VISITED FOOD INSECURE AREAS OF ALI SABIEH DISTRICT. 2. FFP RECENTLY CONTRIBUTED AN ADDITIONAL $500,000 TO WFP'S PROTRACTED RELIEF AND RECOVERY OPERATION (PRRO) FOR REFUGEES, BRINGING ITS FY2005 TOTAL TO $1,000,000. DUE TO PIPELINE SHORTAGES, WFP REDUCED REFUGEE RATIONS TO 50% FROM MARCH UNTIL AT LEAST JUNE WHEN THE FIRST FFP COMMODITIES ARE DUE TO ARRIVE. DUE TO WHAT ARE BELIEVED TO BE EXAGGERATED OFFICIAL REFUGEE POPULATION FIGURES, NO ADVERSE NUTRITIONAL EFFECTS ARE ANTICIPATED FROM THIS REDUCTION. FROM JUNE, OUR TWO CONTRIBUTIONS WOULD SOLIDIFY WFP'S PIPELINE THROUGH THE END OF CY2005. 3. UNHCR PLANS TO REPATRIATE 8,000 REFUGEES (MAINLY SOMALILANDERS) THIS YEAR. WHILE CURRENT REFUGEE REPATRIATIONS HAVE BEEN SLOW - 2,319 PEOPLE OUT OF 4,380 PLANNED TO DATE - VOLUNTEERS ARE NOW INCREASING RAPIDLY, PRIMARILY BECAUSE OF THE REDUCED FOOD RATIONS. 4. DUE MAINLY TO POOR HEYS/DADA RAINS AND INCREASED STRESS ON PASTORALISTS SEARCHING FOR WATER AND PASTURE, THE FOOD SECURITY SITUATION FOR RURAL DJIBOUTIANS HAS BECOME QUITE FRAGILE, AND IS LIKELY TO DETERIORATE FURTHER IN THE BLISTERING SUMMER MONTHS. WFP IS CURRENTLY PROVIDING EMERGENCY TWO-MONTH FOOD RATIONS TO 25,000-30,000 AFFECTED PEOPLE. BASED ON THE UPCOMING WFP/FEWSNET ASSESSMENT IN LATE APRIL, WFP WILL LIKELY DEVELOP A SMALL EMERGENCY OPERATION (EMOP) BEGINNING IN JUNE TO PROVIDE SUPPORT TO APPROXIMATELY 50,000 PEOPLE FOR SIX MONTHS. 5. WHILE RECOGNIZING THAT A CERTAIN NUMBER OF ETHIOPIAN AND SOUTHERN SOMALI REFUGEES WILL CONTINUE TO REQUIRE SOME SUPPORT FOR THE TIME BEING, WE ARE CONCERNED AT THE RELUCTANCE OF SOMALILANDERS TO RETURN HOME. IN ORDER TO ALLOW THESE REFUGEES TO REPATRIATE VOLUNTARILY, WE BELIEVE THAT STRONG INERTIA-INDUCING DRAGS TYING THEM TO THE CAMPS SHOULD BE REMOVED, AND THAT WFP IS FULLY JUSTIFIED IN MAINTAINING THE REDUCED REFUGEE RATION. 6. WE RECOMMEND THAT - ONCE THE EMOP IS APPROVED IN MAY - FFP TRANSFER ITS SECOND $500,000 TRANCHE FROM THE REFUGEE PRRO TO THE DJIBOUTIAN EMOP. THIS WOULD BE DOUBLY BENEFICIAL FROM OUR PERSPECTIVE, ALLOWING WFP BOTH TO SUPPORT VULNERABLE DJIBOUTIANS AS WELL AS TO CONTINUE REDUCED REFUGEE RATIONS WITH A SOMEWHAT LESS- ROBUST PIPELINE. END SUMMARY -------------- REFUGEE STATUS -------------- 7. REDSO/FFP HAS FOR YEARS MAINTAINED THAT DJIBOUTI'S REFUGEE PROGRAM WAS ONE OF THE BIGGEST HEADACHES PER CAPITA WORLDWIDE - AND WE CONTINUE TO DO SO. WITH ONLY 15,630 REFUGEES ON PAPER (AND PROBABLY LESS THAN 10,000 IN REALITY), THESE FEW REFUGEES HAVE REFUSED UNHCR RE-REGISTRATION HEADCOUNTS SINCE 1997, THROWING LIBERAL AMOUNTS OF BOTH THREATS AND STONES, AND SOMALILAND REFUGEES CONTINUE THEIR STEADFAST UNWILLINGNESS TO REPATRIATE. THE SITUATION HAS CERTAINLY NOT BEEN HELPED OVER THE YEARS BY LOCAL PARTNER ONARS' INEFFICIENCY AND CORRUPTION, TOGETHER WITH ITS STRONG SELF-INTEREST IN BLOCKING REFUGEE RETURN (SEE PARA 26). 8. ALL THAT SAID, IT APPEARS THAT THE MIGRAINE MAY SLOWLY BE EASING, WITH UNHCR SHOWING SOME FORTITUDE, TOGETHER WITH GREATER HIGH-LEVEL GRD SUPPORT FOR REFUGEE RETURN. UNHCR PLANS TO REPATRIATE AROUND 8,000 REFUGEES (MAINLY TO SOMALILAND) IN CY2005, AND WHILE ACTUAL REPATRIATION TO DATE HAS BEEN LOW - 2,319 PEOPLE OUT OF 4,380 PLANNED - VOLUNTEERS HAVE BEEN INCREASING STEADILY SINCE WFP REDUCED THE FOOD RATION IN MARCH (SEE BELOW). 9. IF SOMALILAND AUTHORITIES WOULD AGREE TO ADDITIONAL CONVOYS IN APRIL/MAY BEFORE THE SWELTERING SUMMER HEAT (THE APRIL/MAY BREAK WAS THOUGHT PRUDENT DUE TO POST- ELECTION UNCERTAINTIES IN DJIBOUTI, BUT IS NOW BEING RECONSIDERED), UNHCR MAY BE ABLE TO FACILITATE THE RETURN OF AN ADDITIONAL 1,500-2,000 REFUGEES. IF NOT, REPATRIATION WILL BREAK NOW UNTIL THE SEPTEMBER- DECEMBER PERIOD, DURING WHICH UNHCR HOPES TO REPATRIATE AN ADDITIONAL 5,400 REFUGEES. 10. FFP RECENTLY CONTRIBUTED AN ADDITIONAL $500,000 TO WFP'S REFUGEE PRRO, BRINGING ITS FY2005 TOTAL TO $1,000,000. BEGINNING IN MARCH, AND AT LEAST UNTIL THE FIRST TRANCHE OF FFP COMMODITIES ARRIVES IN JUNE, WFP HAS REDUCED FOOD RATIONS TO THE 50% LEVEL. WFP WILL HOWEVER CONTINUE ITS SUPPORT TO SUPPLEMENTARY AND THERAPEUTIC FEEDING CENTERS IN THE CAMPS. 11. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT WFP MAINTAINED 50% REFUGEE RATIONS FOR SIX MONTHS IN 2004. THE MEDICAL NGO AMDA CONDUCTED MONTHLY NUTRITIONAL ASSESSMENTS WITH WFP, AND NOTED NO ADVERSE EFFECTS FROM THIS REDUCTION. THIS WAS LIKELY DUE TO WHAT ARE BELIEVED TO BE SIGNIFICANTLY EXAGGERATED OFFICIAL REFUGEE NUMBERS. WFP OF COURSE WILL NOW CONTINUE TO MONITOR THE NUTRITIONAL SITUATION IN THE CAMPS WITH AMDA AS IT DID LAST YEAR. ---------------------------------- DJIBOUTIAN FOOD SECURITY SITUATION ---------------------------------- 12. THE CURRENT FOOD SECURITY SITUATION OF RURAL DJIBOUTIANS ACTUALLY APPEARS TO BE WORSE THAN THAT OF THE REFUGEES. WHILE DJIBOUTI COULD NEVER BE DESCRIBED AS LUSH - WITH LESS THAN 150 MM AVERAGE ANNUAL RAINFALL - PASTORALISTS ARE DEPENDENT ON THIS MINIMAL RAINFALL TO SUSTAIN THEIR LIVESTOCK WITH WATER AND PASTURE. ACCORDING TO FEWSNET, THE RECENT HEYS/DADA RAINS ENDED EARLY AND WERE POORLY DISTRIBUTED. THE CURRENT DELAY OF DIRAA/SOUGOUM RAINS ARE ALSO NOT A GOOD SIGN. DUE TO SUCCESSIVE POOR RAINFALL SEASONS, PASTORALIST LIVELIHOODS ARE ESPECIALLY STRESSED. 13. A JOINT GRD/WFP/FEWSNET ASSESSMENT 21-25 MARCH CONFIRMED THAT TRADITIONAL PASTURE AREAS HAD RECEIVED INSUFFICIENT RAINFALL, AND THAT WHILE DIKHIL AND ALI SABIEH DISTRICTS WERE WORST AFFECTED, THE PROBLEM AFFECTED PARTS OF THE ENTIRE COUNTRY. NOTE: A SIMILAR ASSESSMENT IN OCTOBER/NOVEMBER 2004 FOLLOWING POOR RAINS RECOMMENDED SIX MONTHS OF WFP DISTRIBUTIONS; WFP DID DISTRIBUTE ONE-TWO MONTHS IN EARLY 2005, BUT WAS SOMEWHAT WARY OF CONDUCTING DISTRIBUTIONS SO CLOSE TO THE 8 APRIL ELECTIONS. END NOTE 14. BASED ON THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE MARCH ASSESMENT, WFP IS NOW DISTRIBUTING A TWO-MONTH (APRIL/MAY) HALF-RATION TO 25,000-30,000 PEOPLE COUNTRYWIDE. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THESE DISTRIBUTIONS DO NOT INCLUDE CEREALS AND ARE BORROWED FROM WFP'S DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM. IF EMERGENCY NEEDS SHOULD CONTINUE (OR INCREASE, AS APPEARS QUITE LIKELY), WFP WOULD BE UNABLE TO SUSTAIN THESE DISTRIBUTIONS WITHOUT SUBMITTING A NEW OPERATION FOR DONOR FUNDING. 15. IF THE RAINS FAIL IN APRIL, THE SITUATION WILL BECOME MORE SERIOUS, AND THERE WILL LIKELY BE A NEED FOR A SMALL EMOP. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THIS IS A REGIONAL PROBLEM, AFFECTING NEIGHBORING AREAS OF ETHIOPIA AND ERITREA AS WELL. IN FACT, NOMADS SAY THAT IN GOOD YEARS, ETHIOPIA HAS THE BEST SUPPLY OF WATER AND PASTURE; BUT IN BAD YEARS, DJIBOUTI IS THE PREFERRED DESTINATION. SO DJIBOUTI IS CURRENTLY SUPPORTING MANY AFFECTED PASTORALISTS FROM THE NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES AS WELL. 16. USAID/WFP/FEWS VISITS TO NOMADIC WATER POINTS IN ALI SABIEH DISTRICT FOUND MOST CATCHMENTS COMPLETELY DRY, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THEY SHOULD HAVE BEEN RELATIVELY WELL-STOCKED AT THIS TIME OF YEAR. 17. AT ONE CATCHMENT WITH A SMALL POOL OF WATER, THE TEAM MET AFAR HERDERS WATERING THEIR CAMELS AND GOATS IN 'IISE TERRITORY BECAUSE WATER WAS NOT AVAILABLE IN THEIR OWN AREAS. THEY HAD COME FROM ETHIOPIA SEARCHING FOR BETTER PASTURE, AND WERE UNCERTAIN WHERE THEY WOULD GO NEXT. WHILE SOME OF THEIR ANIMALS HAD REPORTEDLY DIED, THOSE REMAINING DID NOT APPEAR IN ESPECIALLY DIRE CONDITION. THE SITUATION WAS NOT CATASTROPHIC, BUT WAS CERTAINLY VERY POOR, AND SEEMED LIKELY TO WORSEN IN THE COMING MONTHS. 18. THE LIFE OF A PASTORALIST IS CERTAINLY NOT EASY IN THE BEST OF TIMES, WITH TENUOUS FOOD SECURITY, AND INTAKE RARELY REACHING 2,100 KCAL DAILY. INTRODUCE A RELATIVELY SMALL SHOCK TO THIS, AND THE ALREADY FRAGILE COPING MECHANISMS CAN BE SHATTERED. THE POOR SITUATION NOW IS CURRENTLY MAINLY A PROBLEM OF WATER - PASTORALISTS NOTED THAT IT ALREADY FELT LIKE THE END OF THE DRY SEASON THOUGH THERE SHOULD HAVE BEEN PLENTY OF WATER AND PASTURE AT THIS TIME. HOWEVER, IF THERE IS NO RAIN IN APRIL, PASTORALISTS WILL BE EXTREMELY VULNERABLE AS THE SCORCHING SUMMER MONTHS KILL WEAKENED ANIMALS AND FURTHER REDUCE THEIR OWNERS' FOOD SECURITY. 19. WFP AND FEWSNET WILL UNDERTAKE A JOINT FOOD SECURITY ASSESSMENT COUNTRYWIDE IN LATE APRIL, WHICH WILL LIKELY BOTH JUSTIFY AND QUANTIFY A SMALL WFP EMOP, POSSIBLY FOR SIX MONTHS SUPPORTING UP TO 50,000 PEOPLE. ----------------------------- NEW WFP PRRO: DJIBOUTIANS OUT ----------------------------- 20. UP UNTIL MARCH 2005, WFP'S PRRO TARGETED REFUGEES AS WELL AS VULNERABLE DJIBOUTIANS. HOWEVER, IN ITS NEW PRRO, WFP HAS NOW SEPARATED OUT THE DJIBOUTIANS, LEAVING ONLY REFUGEES. WHILE VULNERABLE DJIBOUTIANS ARE STILL SUPPORTED UNDER WFP'S COUNTRY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM - THROUGH FFW, SCHOOL FEEDING AND OTHER PROJECTS - FFP DOES NOT TYPICALLY SUPPORT INDIVIDUAL WFP COUNTRY PROGRAMS, INSTEAD CHANNELING THE BULK OF ITS DEVELOPMENTAL FOOD RESOURCES THROUGH NGO PARTNERS. 21. COMMENT: OUR TWIN DILEMMAS THEN ARE HOW TO ASSIST VULNERABLE DJIBOUTIANS (WHICH HAD BEEN DONE PREVIOUSLY THROUGH THE COMBINED PRRO) DESPITE NOT SUPPORTING THE WFP COUNTRY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, AND AT THE SAME TIME HOW TO MAINTAIN SUPPORT FOR WFP'S PRRO FOR REFUGEES DESPITE OUR STRONG DESIRE TO PROMOTE THEIR REPATRIATION TO SOMALILAND. END COMMENT ----------- UNHCR VIEWS ----------- 22. UNHCR/DJIBOUTI REPRESENTATIVE NOTED THAT UNHCR WAS TIRED OF BEING MANIPULATED BY THE REFUGEES AND OF BEING SEEN AS INEFFECTIVE. WITH THE GRD MINISTRY OF INTERIOR NOW FIRMLY SUPPORTING REPATRIATION, UNHCR WAS CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR RETURN. 23. UNHCR IS HOPEFUL THAT IT CAN STILL REPATRIATE CLOSE TO ITS TARGET OF 8,000 PEOPLE IN 2005, WITH UP TO NINE MORE CONVOYS TOTALING 5,400 PEOPLE IN THE SEPTEMBER-DECEMBER PERIOD. SOME PEOPLE CONJECTURE THAT THE SOMALILAND AUTHORITIES MAY WANT TO DELAY THE FINAL REFUGEE RETURN SOMEWHAT, BECAUSE WITH THEIR ETHIOPIAN AND DJIBOUTIAN CAMPS EMPTIED, ADDITIONAL REINTEGRATION ASSISTANCE WITHIN SOMALILAND WOULD DRY UP QUICKLY. THAT SAID, THE SOMALILAND AUTHORITIES HAVE COMMITTED TO ACCEPTING UNHCR'S TARGET IN CY2005. 24. UNHCR/DJIBOUTI EXPRESSED "FULL SUPPORT" FOR WFP'S CURRENT FOOD REDUCTION AND A DESIRE FOR IT TO BE MAINTAINED AT THE 50% LEVEL AT LEAST FOR THE NEXT FEW MONTHS, IF NOT LONGER. ANTICIPATING A POSSIBLE NEGATIVE REACTION TO THIS FROM GENEVA, UNHCR NOTED QUITE STRONGLY ITS POSITION THAT IF THE REFUGEES WANTED FULL RATIONS, THEY MUST THEN ALLOW THEMSELVES TO BE COUNTED. 25. WFP ALSO AGREED WITH THIS POSITION IN PRINCIPLE, BUT NOTED THAT IT COULD BE PERCEIVED POORLY IF IT CONTINUED REDUCED RATIONS WITH SUCH A BOUNTIFUL PIPELINE - THANKS TO THE LATEST FFP CONTRIBUTION. NOTE: FFPO EXPRESSED STRONG SUPPORT FOR UNHCR'S VIEWS TO WFP, AND WE WILL ENSURE THAT WFP MAINTAINS REDUCED REFUGEE RATIONS. SEE RECOMMENDATIONS SECTION BELOW. END NOTE 26. ONARS (GRD'S "OFFICE NATIONAL D'ASSISTANCE POUR LES REFUGIES ET SINISTRES"): ONARS' ENTIRE RAISON D'ETRE - AT LEAST IN TERMS OF CASH FLOW - IS THE REFUGEES, AND IT HAS THEREFORE NEVER FULLY SUPPORTED THEIR RETURN. UNHCR NOTED THAT ONARS ALSO MAINTAINED A BLOATED PERMANENT STAFF IT COULD NOT EASILY RETRENCH. HOWEVER, AS LONG AS THE GRD INTERIOR MINISTRY REMAINED FULLY INVOLVED AND SUPPORTIVE OF REPATRIATION AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS, UNHCR BELIEVED THAT ONARS COULD NOT DRAG ITS FEET QUITE SO OPENLY ANYMORE. 27. UNHCR NOTED THAT AOUR AOUSSA CAMP WOULD BE CLOSED IN MAY (AND CONSOLIDATED INTO ALI ADDE). IN ADDITION, THE NEARLY EQUAL-SIZED HOLL-HOLL AND ALI ADDE REFUGEE COMMUNITIES CURRENTLY HAD SHOWN SOME RELUCTANCE TO REPATRIATE, AS THEY PERCEIVED THAT THEIR CAMP WOULD THEN BECOME THE SMALLER AND BE CHOSEN NEXT FOR CLOSURE. TO COUNTER THIS, UNHCR WILL IN JUNE ANNOUNCE ITS INTENTION TO CLOSE HOLL-HOLL IN SEPTEMBER, AND NOT REQUEST ANY BUDGET FOR THE CAMP IN 2006. UNHCR WILL THEN TRY TO SORT OUT A BETTER POPULATION ESTIMATE ONCE ALL REFUGEES ARE IN A SINGLE CAMP: ALI ADDE. 28. UNHCR BELIEVES THAT EVEN IN THE BEST-CASE SCENARIO - WITH 8,000 PEOPLE RETURNING TO SOMALILAND AND TWO CAMPS CLOSED IN 2005 - THERE WILL REMAIN AROUND 5,000 REFUGEES MAINLY FROM SOUTHERN SOMALIA WHO WILL CONTINUE TO REQUIRE SUPPORT IN 2006 UNTIL A LONGER- TERM DURABLE SOLUTION IS FOUND. -------------------------- CONCLUSION/RECOMMENDATIONS -------------------------- 29. WE BELIEVE THAT UNHCR IS HEADED IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION BY CLOSING AOUR AOUSSA CAMP IN MAY AND HOLL- HOLL BY THE END OF THE YEAR. WE RECOMMEND THAT UNHCR CONTINUE ITS PUSH FOR ADDITIONAL RETURN CONVOYS IN MAY TO KEEP UP THE MOMENTUM, THOUGH REALISTICALLY WE RECOGNIZE THAT BUREAUCRATIC DELAYS BY THE SOMALILAND AUTHORITIES MAY NOT ALLOW THIS UNTIL SEPTEMBER. 30. REGARDING WFP, WE STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT IT MAINTAIN REDUCED REFUGEE RATION LEVELS IN ORDER TO ALLOW SOMALILANDERS TO REPATRIATE VOLUNTARILY WITHOUT SUCH STRONG INERTIA-INDUCING DRAGS TYING THEM TO THE CAMPS. 31. WE ADDITIONALLY BELIEVE THAT THE FOOD SECURITY PROBLEM IN DJIBOUTI IS SERIOUS, AND IF THERE IS NO RAIN IN APRIL, WFP IS JUSTIFIED IN DEVELOPING A SMALL EMOP TO SUPPORT VULNERABLE PASTORALISTS. 32. IN ORDER TO SUPPORT THESE LATTER TWO POINTS, WE RECOMMEND THAT ONCE THE EMOP IS APPROVED (LIKELY SOMETIME IN MAY), FFP TRANSFER ITS SECOND $500,000 TRANCHE FROM THE REFUGEE PRRO TO THE DJIBOUTIAN EMOP. FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW, THIS WOULD BE DOUBLY BENEFICIAL - ALLOWING WFP BOTH TO SUPPORT VULNERABLE DJIBOUTIANS AS WELL AS TO CONTINUE REDUCED REFUGEE RATIONS WITH A SOMEWHAT LESS-ROBUST PIPELINE. RAGSDALE
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