US embassy cable - 02KATHMANDU1191

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SECURITY FORCES' PROGRESS AND PITFALLS EAST OF KATHMANDU

Identifier: 02KATHMANDU1191
Wikileaks: View 02KATHMANDU1191 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Kathmandu
Created: 2002-06-17 08:31:00
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Tags: PGOV PINS MOPS PHUM NP Maoist Insurgency
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KATHMANDU 001191 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR SA/INS (REF YOUR CABLE 5166) 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV, PINS, MOPS, PHUM, NP, Maoist Insurgency 
SUBJECT: SECURITY FORCES' PROGRESS AND PITFALLS EAST OF 
KATHMANDU 
 
-------- 
SUMMARY 
--------- 
 
1.  (SBU) Government of Nepal (GON) security forces have made 
progress against Maoist insurgents over the last few months 
in the district directly east of Kathmandu, according to the 
Chief District Officer (CDO) and head of the local police. 
Maoist excesses, along with better cooperation between the 
police and army, have helped turn the tide in favor of the 
Government.  Despite such progress, significant parts of the 
district remain under effective Maoist control, particularly 
at night, and more than half of the village-level leaders 
have fled their posts.  The ability of police and military to 
ensure security much beyond district headquarters remains 
severely constrained, calling into question the ability of 
local authorities to administer upcoming elections in 
November.  The security forces risk alienating the local 
population--and thus jeopardizing the gains made--by 
continued use of heavyhanded tactics.  End summary. 
 
---------------------------- 
SINDHUPALCHOWK IN A SNAPSHOT 
---------------------------- 
 
2.  (U)  On early June poloff and POL FSN traveled to the 
district headquarters for Sindhupalchowk, directly east of 
Kathmandu.  The district headquarters is 84 km from 
Kathmandu--about 25 km of which is over a winding, unpaved, 
one-lane road.  Although traveling during daylight hours on a 
regular workday, the Embassy vehicle encountered little 
traffic--no more than a handful of trucks and buses (and no 
private cars or motorcycles)--on the entire round trip. 
(Note:  The district headquarters lies away from  the one 
good road in Sindhupalchowk, the Chinese-built Arrniko 
Highway, which leads to the Chinese border.  End note.) 
 
3.  (U) Sindhupalchowk District has a population of 350,000 
and a per capita income of less than USD 100.  About half of 
the population are members of the majority Nepali-speaking 
group (Brahmins, Chhetri, and lower castes); about 30 percent 
are ethnic Tamang.  The principal occupation is farming, 
primarily maize, millet, and rice, on small holdings. 
Because of the hilly terrain, much of the cultivation is done 
by terracing.  The district boasts 235 km of road, only about 
25 percent of which is paved.  Total electricity consumption 
does not exceed 10 MW, and there are only 215 telephone 
numbers (more than half of which are in the district 
headquarters) in use.  There is one hospital and 54 higher 
secondary schools.  The district reported a moderate amount 
of Maoist activity over the past year, with the most 
significant incident being the March 13 ambush of a police 
vehicle that killed six policemen.  The insurgents have 
destroyed 70 local government offices in the district since 
the beginning of the insurgency, 28 of which were demolished 
in just the past two months. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
CDO CITES SECURITY GAINS IN DISTRICT CAPITAL 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
4.  (SBU)  CDO Kabiraj Khanal said that he and the current 
Deputy Superintendent of Police (DSP) had only been at their 
posts for two months.  Because the former CDO and former DSP 
did not like each other and could not work together, Khanal 
said, the security forces "were not moving around in the 
villages" on patrol, leaving the field clear for Maoist 
insurgents to operate unhindered.  The Maoists had used the 
four-month ceasefire (July-November 2001), moreover, to 
entrench themselves in the district, recruiting new followers 
and establishing  "jana sarkar" (people's governments) to 
replace nearly all Village Development Committees (VDC), the 
smallest unit of local government.  (Note:  Of 79 VDCs, 70 
had "jana sarkar" when the state of emergency began in 
November.  End note.)  The security situation has been 
improving steadily since his arrival and the arrival of the 
new DSP, Khanal claimed.  Aggressive joint patrolling by the 
Royal Nepal Army (RNA) and the police (albeit during daylight 
hours only) has helped reduce the Maoist grip on the 
district, Khanal said.  The insurgents now exercise control 
in only "small, remote villages" several days' walk from the 
district headquarters in good weather, are forced to move in 
STATE FOR SA/INS  (REF YOUR CABLE 5166) 
smaller groups of only three or four to avoid detection, and 
must rely on smaller, more easily concealed weapons. 
5.  (SBU)  Khanal noted proudly the surrender of about 800 
Maoists in the district, of whihc total 700 turned themselves 
in during the past month.  Nearly all such surrenders, he 
acknowledged, were of former "jana sarkar" officials (e.g., 
people's irrigation officer; people's forestry officer--"the 
Maoists have committees for everything")--rather than of 
hard-core fighters.  Of the 70 "jana sarkar" operating at the 
onset of the emergency, 15 had officially surrendered and 
been reclaimed by the Government.  He pointed to a group fo 
30-40 people milling about outside his office, identifying 
them as, for the most part, former Maoists who had 
surrendered and now must report on a regular basis to the 
CDO.  Former Maoists determined to have held a higher 
position, such as village chief, are kept in custody.  The 
district jail now houses 42 Maoist suspects, he reported, 
while "eight or nine" suspects had been killed in encounters 
with the security forces. 
 
--------------------------- 
AND WHAT ABOUT ELECTIONS? 
--------------------------- 
 
6.  (SBU)  Despite recent progress, security remains the 
greatest need in the district, Khanal said.  Less than half 
of the district's 79 VDC Chairmen actually live in their 
villages, Khanal admitted (and some of those that do are in 
"jana sarkar" VDCs).  Nonetheless, he said he did not 
anticipate significant difficulty in implementing the 
government's decision to hold elections November 13.  Even in 
areas still effectively under Maoist control?  poloff 
queried.  Khanal optimistically reiterated that the situation 
is steadily improving and he anticipates no major problems. 
 
----------------------- 
TO GET GUERRILLAS, 
ACT LIKE GUERRILLAS 
----------------------- 
 
7.  (SBU)  Poloff asked about a May 6 article in the 
vernacular press claiming the extrajudicial killing of six 
villagers in Thulo Sirubari, about 15 km from the district 
headquarters.  The six killed were "active supporters" of the 
Maoists, the CDO asserted.  Plainclothes RNA had moved into 
the village following an attempted ambush on a police vehicle 
in the area, he explained.  The plainclothes soldiers were 
dressed like Maoists and moved around greeting villagers with 
the Maoist salute.  One young man returned the greeting, and 
they struck up a conversation.  When uniformed RNA arrived on 
the scene, according to Khanal, the young man tried to flee 
and was shot.  The soldiers then surrounded the village and 
entered a house the dead man had earlier identified as 
pro-Maoist, killing five of the occupants. 
 
8.  (SBU)  Poloff asked why the soldiers had shot, rather 
than arrested, the villagers, including a 70-year-old man, 
especially since, according to the CDO's account, no one was 
shooting at them.  When you are fighting guerrillas, you must 
think like guerrillas, the CDO opined, adding that the 
soldiers could not have been sure that no one in the house 
had guns and whether they would be fired upon.  (Note: 
Poloff did not have the opportunity to call upon the local 
RNA commander to hear his account of events.  End note.) 
 
----------------------- 
POLICE POINT OF VIEW 
----------------------- 
 
9.  (SBU)  DSP Ganesh Ayer commands a force of 300 policemen. 
 Before the emergency, there were 21 different police posts 
in the district.  Because of the difficulty of defending 
isolated posts, however, that number has been cut back 
significantly.  In addition to the district headquarters, 
police now maintain posts only in three locations, two of 
them in proximity to an RNA outpost.  Despite this drawdown, 
Ayer corroborated the CDO's assertion that security has 
improved.  The Maoists are no longer as powerful as they 
were, he stated, adding that nearly 10 people a day come in 
to surrender.  People are beginning to trust the security 
forces now, especially since the Maoists "have shown their 
hand" by destroying village-level infrastructure and 
inflicting other atrocities on the local population.  (Note: 
Maoists murdered five civilians in different locations in 
Sindhupalchowk during the month of May alone.  End note.) 
Villagers are thus starting to volunteer good, solid 
information to the security forces.  Stiffer patrols are 
interrupting the Maoists' supply lines, he reported; they are 
experiencing food shortages.  Being so near the Chinese 
border--which is much more difficult to cross without proper 
documentation than the Indian border--is also helpful.  Like 
the CDO, he said he anticipates no problem in holding 
elections in the troubled district on schedule.  When asked 
why not--especially since most VDCs remain 
Maoist-affected--he responded, "Because the Prime Minister 
has directed us" to provide adequate security for the 
elections. 
 
------------------- 
OPPOSITION OUTLOOK 
------------------- 
 
10.  (SBU)  District Development Committee (DDC) Vice 
Chairman Dhambar Aryal, a member of the Communist Party of 
Nepal-United Marxist Leninist (the largest Opposition 
political party), complained that political activities have 
been stalled because of the emergency.  The emergency is "not 
good for politics," and will hinder the parties' ability to 
campaign, he predicted.  He expressed some doubt that polling 
will be able to take place in all 79 VDCs. 
 
11.  (SBU)  Since the beginning of emergency in November, he 
calculated that the Maoists had killed 11 civilians and the 
RNA 28, "some of whom may have been Maoists," concluding that 
"people have been doubly terrorized by the Maoists and the 
RNA."  The RNA's practice of moving in plainclothes has made 
it difficult for the numerous political "opportunists" and 
fair-weather Maoists who may have become nominal members of 
the movement because that is what everyone else in the 
vicinity was doing.  Those being apprehended are usually not 
hard-core Maoist strategists or fighters, he stressed, but 
rather village-level members of an erstwhile "jana sarkar." 
The DDC has a good relationship with the Army and police, 
however.  If a villager believes his family member is being 
unjustly detained by the security forces, the DDC can usually 
resolve the problem by talking to the local commanders.  The 
level of looting and extortion, so prevalent during the 
ceasefire, has declined during the emergency, he 
acknowledged.  At times, the people have even gained the 
confidence to confront the Maoists, in one instance forcing 
the release of a local UML worker abducted by the insurgents. 
 On the down side, the insurgency continues to stall 
development efforts in the area, he lamented.  Civil servants 
do not want to work in remote health posts or schools in the 
district.  A local road-building project has been put on hold 
after Maoists torched a bulldozer. 
 
12.  (SBU)  Of the 28 civilians killed so far by the security 
forces, Aryal claimed at least three had been killed in 
error:  one in a case of mistaken identity and two in 
crossfire.  The RNA had admitted wrongdoing in one of the 
cases and paid the family compensation.  Aryal corroborated 
most of what the CDO had reported about the young man 
attempting to flee the RNA and being killed in Thulo 
Sirubari.  His account of the fate of the other five 
villagers varied somewhat, however.  In Aryal's version, 
plainclothes RNA dressed like Maoists entered the village, 
carrying a uniformed policeman they had tied up.  Pretending 
to be Maoists, the soldiers told the assembled villagers they 
had captured a policeman, and asked for their suggestions on 
what to do with this enemy of the people.  The five who most 
enthusiastically volunteered such suggestions--and identified 
themselves as active Maoists in the process--were 
subsequently taken out to the jungle and shot, Aryal claimed. 
 
--------- 
COMMENT 
--------- 
 
13.  (SBU)  Although only a few hours away from Kathmandu, 
Sindhupalchowk seems far removed from the relative security, 
prosperity, and self-absorption of the capital.  The security 
forces have undeniably made some progress, but their grip on 
areas much more than a few kilometers outside the district 
headquarters remains fragile.  Much more will have to be done 
to bolster security not just in district headquarters, but 
also in more remote VDCs if credible elections are to be held 
in November. While the Army may have improved its ability to 
act on intelligence gleaned from local residents, the 
military risks alienating the population--and losing access 
to further intelligence--with its heavyhandedness.  The 
Embassy will raise with the military leadership the May 5 
events in Thulo Sirubari as part of our continuing human 
rights dialogue with the Royal Nepal Army. 
MALINOWSKI 

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