US embassy cable - 05NASSAU775

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POSSIBLE EXPLOSIVES DETECTED IN NASSAU

Identifier: 05NASSAU775
Wikileaks: View 05NASSAU775 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Nassau
Created: 2005-04-22 18:28:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: ASEC PTER Security
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L NASSAU 000775 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DS/ICI/PII, DS/IP/ITA, DS/IP/WHA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/22/2015 
TAGS: ASEC, PTER, Security 
SUBJECT: POSSIBLE EXPLOSIVES DETECTED IN NASSAU 
 
REF: TELCON BETWEEN ACTING RSO DAVID J. HAZARIAN AND 
     DS/IP/WHA SA BRIAN COOK 
 
Classified By: ACTING RSO DAVID J. HAZARIAN 1.5 (G) 
 
1. (U) On April 22, 2005 at 0515 hours, Embassy/Nassau local 
guard conducted three random swipes of two trailers parked 
outside the McDonalds Restaurant, located approximately 45 
feet from the entrance to Embassy. The trailers are utilized 
by McDonalds Restaurant to store food and supplies and are 
routinely swiped by local guards. The swab samples from the 
trailers were entered into the Itemiser, indicating positive 
readings for TNT, HMX and NITRO. The Itemiser was 
re-calibrated and a second set of swipes was conducted, 
again, indicating positive readings for TNT, HMX and NITRO. 
At this time the Marine Security Guard on duty in Post One 
was notified. Post One immediately contacted Acting RSO David 
J. Hazarian, who instructed Post One to react the Marine 
Security Detachment, clear the Embassy of all personnel and 
contact Deputy Chief of Mission Robert Witajewski and the 
Royal Bahamian Police Force. These actions were taken to as 
part of the investigative process to determine if there was a 
credible threat. At the conclusion of the investigation it 
was determined there was no threat. 
 
2.  (U) At 0530 hours, Acting RSO and the Marine Security 
Guard Detachment arrived on the scene and cleared the Embassy 
of all personnel. 
 
3.  (U) At 0600 hours, the Royal Bahamian Police Force and 
Bomb Squad responded and the Acting RSO instructed them to 
establish a perimeter and begin conducting a search of the 
trailers. Upon guidance the Police established a perimeter, 
which entailed shutting down a street  containing high 
volumes of traffic. Acting RSO instructed Bomb Technicians to 
conduct interior swipes of the trailers which were negative. 
Additionally, random boxes contained inside the trailers were 
opened and searched with negative results. 
 
4.  (U) At 0720 hours, a bomb dog arrived on scene and 
another sweep of the trailers both inside and out was 
conducted with negative results. 
 
5.  (U) At 0750 hours, an all clear was sounded. 
 
6.  (U) It was later determined the trailers used to 
transport food to McDonalds are used indiscriminately for 
other purposes including the possible transportation of 
explosives. 
 
7. (SBU) It should be noted in dealing with this situation 
the Royal Bahamas Police Force was very responsive however, 
they lacked necessary personnel, knowledge, training and 
equipment. 
 
8. (SBU) The Embassy is currently located in a highly 
concentrated area with little to no set back. Having two 
trailers constantly stationed in the McDonalds parking lot 
within 45 feet to the entrance of the Embassy is a constant 
issue. 
 
9.  (U) If there are any questions please contact ARSO David 
J. Hazarian at (242) 322-1181 x4125. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WITAJEWSKI 

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