US embassy cable - 05MADRID1585

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 001585 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/WE AND WHA/AND 
DEFENSE FOR OSD/ISP (P. GRAFF) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/22/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, SP 
SUBJECT: SPANISH DEFENSE MINISTRY: "TRUST US ON VENEZUELA 
SALE" 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires J. Robert Manzanares, 
reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
 1.  (C) Summary:  Secretary of State for Defense (deputy 
minister equivalent) Francisco Pardo called a meeting with 
Charge April 20 to discuss Spain's plan to sell ships and 
planes to Venezuela.  Pardo said the Zapatero government 
wanted to be as transparent as possible on the sale but was 
frustrated that "third parties" were using the sale to drive 
the U.S. and Spain apart.  Spain is not selling corvette 
class vessels to Venezuela and none of the ships Spain sells 
will have offensive capabilities, declared Pardo.  Although 
admitting the ships' configuration has not yet been 
determined, Pardo said the Spanish government deserves the 
United States' trust that Spain "will do the right thing." 
Pardo hoped the Venezuela issue would not be the focus of 
Defense Mininster Bono's May 3 meeting with Secretary 
Rumsfeld, and would not overshadow areas of strong U.S.-Spain 
cooperation, such as Afghanistan.  End summary. 
 
2.  (C) Pardo told Charge (who was joined by defense attache 
and pol-miloff) he called the meeting "in the interest of 
transparency" and to avoid "manipulations" of information 
about the Venezuela sale by third parties.  The Zapatero 
government and the defense ministry wanted to be "as clear as 
possible" with the U.S. on what the Venezuela sale involved 
and did not involve, because others, such as the opposition 
Popular Party, were using the Venezuela sale to "drive a 
wedge" between the Zapatero government and the U.S. 
government.  Pardo said he was "very bothered" that third 
parties have created a problem where there shouldn't be one." 
 
3.  (C) Pardo then complained that Minister of Defense Bono 
had no sooner ended his appearance in Congress the day before 
when the Popular Party started spreading claims in the press 
that some of the ships Spain would be selling Venezuela would 
have offensive capabilities.  "This would be difficult for 
the Popular Party to know," quipped Pardo, "since the 
configuration of the ships hasn't even been determined yet." 
In Pardo's view this illustrated how the Popular Party was 
using the Venezuela sale and Spain-U.S. relations for its own 
political purposes.  Pardo said he had instructed the 
Navantia shipyard not do include anything in the ships' 
configuration that would go against the memorandum of 
agreement between Spain and Venezuela, including anything 
that could constitute offensive capability. 
 
4.  (C) Pardo then showed Charge a copy of the memorandum of 
agreement signed between Spain and Venezuela, pointed to the 
portion describing the types of ships that would be sold, and 
emphasized that nowhere did it mention "corvettes" as some in 
the Popular Party and press had claimed Spain planned to sell 
Venezuela.  "I do not have to show you this classified 
document," said Pardo, "but I want us both to be absolutely 
clear on what we are and are not selling here."  Pardo said 
he wanted to be clear: Spain is only contemplating selling 
Venezuela coastal patrol ships and oceanic patrol ships, the 
latter needed to patrol Venezuela's free economic zone. 
Spain will not be selling Venezuela corvettes. 
 
5.  (C) When asked what tonnage the ships would have, Pardo 
said those specifications had also not yet been determined, 
but the displacement would likely be between 1,200 and 1,700 
tons.  Defense attache noted that ships in that displacement 
range could be outfitted to carry missiles, regardless of 
whether they're called corvettes or patrol boats.  Noticeably 
bothered, Pardo replied emphatically, "The ships will not 
carry missiles -- that's what I'm trying to explain.  Please 
trust us."  Pardo insisted that the Zapatero government and 
the defense ministry are "responsible" and will not permit 
the ships to carry offensive weapons.  "We believe we deserve 
your trust," said Pardo, adding "you should listen to what we 
at the ministry tell you before you believe what a Spanish 
congressman says (referring to Popular Party critics)." 
 
6.  (C) Pardo then pointed out that "something the opposition 
and the press are missing" is that the industrial portion of 
the deal, including transport planes and ships to carry 
petroleum and asphalt, is worth much more than the military 
portion.  When asked how much the military and industrial 
portions of the sale would be worth, Pardo demurred, saying 
he could not give us numbers because the have not been worked 
out yet, but he assured us the non-military portion was more 
significant than the military. 
7.  (C) Pardo restated his concern that third parties were 
succeeding in making this a bigger issue than it should be, 
and said he was "very frustrated" by that.  Pardo claimed 
that many other European countries "with good relations with 
the U.S." were selling equipment with much more offensive 
capability to the Chavez government than Spain.  He then 
said he hoped the issue would not come up in Minister Bono's 
May 3 meeting with SecDef Rumsfeld because "we (Spain and the 
U.S.) have already gotten beyond it." 
 
8.  (C) Charge explained to Pardo that the U.S. is concerned 
about the Venezuela sale not because "third parties" such as 
the Popular Party had made an issue of it, but because the 
U.S. believes the sale could add to Venezuela's ability to 
cause destabilization in the region.  In addition, Spain's 
engagement with Venezuela, including by virtue of the sale, 
could also lend Chavez political visibility and legitimacy he 
otherwise would not have.  Charge made clear the U.S. is very 
concerned about Chavez's non-democratic moves in his own 
country and his destabilizing activities in other countries 
of Latin America.  The last thing anyone needs to do right 
now, explained Charge, is do something to give Chavez more 
political and military muscle, which seems to us exactly what 
Spain is doing.  Charge also told Pardo it was not realistic 
to think the Venezuela sale would not come up in the 
Bono-Rumsfeld meeting.  It was bound to be raised because it 
remains an important issue for the U.S. 
 
9.  (C) Pardo replied that although he understood the topic 
would come up in the meeting, he hoped it would not be main 
subject discussed and "the only thing the newspapers talk 
about afterward."  The Zapatero government, he said, has made 
numerous gestures to show the U.S. Spain wants to improve 
relations, and will continue to do so, and does not feel the 
focus should always be on the negative aspects of the 
relationship, such as the Venezuela sale.  "Our decisions to 
increase our troop presence in Afghanistan last fall, and to 
lead a PRT this year in western Afghanistan, were taken 
because we are a loyal ally of the U.S.," said Pardo.  The 
Spanish government believes it should get some degree of 
recognition for such moves and hopes that the focus of the 
Bono-Rumsfeld meeting can be areas in which Spain and the 
U.S. cooperate, such as Afghanistan, and not only on problem 
areas like Venezuela.  Pardo then said the Ministry of 
Defense is probably the most supportive ministry in the 
Spanish government of positive U.S.-Spain relations. 
 
10.  (C) Comment:  Pardo made every effort to show that he 
was very irritated that the Venezuela sale had become such a 
big issue in the Spanish press, in internal Spanish politics, 
and in U.S.-Spain relations.  The purpose of the meeting 
appeared to be to demonstrate this irritation and to press 
Charge to do what he could to exclude the Venezuela sale from 
the Bono-Rumsfeld agenda.  Charge made clear the U.S. was 
troubled by the matter exclusive of the interests of any 
third parties, the issue would very likely come up during 
Bono's meeting with Rumsfeld, and the U.S. remained concerned 
about the sale's ability to bolster Chavez politically and 
militarily. 
 
MANZANARES