US embassy cable - 05ROME1392

S E C R E T  ROME 001392 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2015 
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, KJUS, IT, IZ, IRAQI FREEDOM 
SUBJECT: IRAQ/ITALY: CALIPARI INVESTIGATION AND THE VIEW 
FROM ROME - LITTLE PROSPECT FOR A JOINT REPORT, GOI ASKS NO 
PRESS BEFORE APRIL 26 
 
Classified By: DCM Emil Skodon, reasons 1.4 b and d. 
 
1. (S) Summary:  Based on what senior GOI officials have told 
us in the past 48 hours, we believe there is little chance 
that we can achieve a joint report in Baghdad on the March 4 
Calipari shooting.  We should prepare a public affairs 
strategy for that outcome now.  The GOI's national security 
advisor has asked that we not speak to the press about this 
possibility until after the April 25 national holiday, even 
if it materializes, so as not to give the Italian opposition 
additional fodder on what is traditionally a left-wing 
oriented public occasion.  We recommend that we keep our 
powder dry until April 26, even if stories appear in the 
Italian press, and work for a well-prepared and coherent 
public line to accompany the release of the AR 15-6 report. 
End Summary. 
 
2. (S) Given the juncture at which we have arrived in the 
Calipari investigation, we believe it would be useful to 
review the situation from the Rome perspective.  We believe 
there are four key points to keep in mind in order to 
understand the Italian approach. 
 
3. (S) First, for the Italians, there is no independent 
investigation in Baghdad.  Both Italian Government 
representatives in Baghdad are well known to this Embassy as 
smart and responsible public servants.  Unfortunately, in 
this case they are only mouthpieces restricted to saying 
nothing but what Rome tells them to say.  All the shots on 
the Italian side are being called by two people:  SISMI 
(External Intelligence Service) Head Pollari and 
Undersecretary to the Prime Minister Gianni Letta, Pollari,s 
unofficial boss and an extremely powerful individual who 
undertakes all of Berlusconi,s toughest assignments. 
 
4. (S) Second, the Italians have fundamentally different 
motivations than the USG.  Our goals are to have an objective 
investigation of the facts, preempt call for some type of 
more elaborate joint commission to look into the killing, 
reach common conclusions in order to defuse political outrage 
about Calipari,s death, and reduce pressure on the 
Berlusconi government to withdraw Italian troops from Iraq. 
Letta,s and Pollari,s primary goals are to save their 
political skins.  It is widely known that they designed and 
directed the intel op in which Calipari was engaged when he 
was killed.  If it appears that American forces acted 
correctly and thus it was poor execution of the Italian 
operation that was at fault,  criticism will eventually be 
focused on Letta and Pollari. 
 
5. (S) Third, the two Italians refuse to accept that the U.S. 
approach to the investigation does not mirror theirs.  Just 
as their center of gravity is in Rome, they assume that ours 
is in Washington, or perhaps in Rome, despite our repeated 
assertions that the details of the joint report must be 
negotiated in Baghdad by the investigators.  As a result, 
they continue to try and press upon us examples of the report 
language yet to be agreed, along with excruciatingly detailed 
explanations of why it is or is not acceptable to them. 
Their assumption appears to be that we are feeding this info 
to Washington, which then instructs U.S. investigators in 
Baghdad the same way and in the same detail that Italian 
investigators are being instructed from Rome.  When they 
later hear reports from Baghdad that our investigators have 
not caved into their demands, they mistakenly assume it is 
because there is a lack of political will or understanding by 
the U.S., leading them to dig in their heels deeper. If the 
issues around the report are sufficiently sensitive to them, 
their logic goes, it is inconceivable that Principals in 
Washington are unengaged and cannot influence it. 
 
6. (S) Fourth, we need to recognize that U.S. military 
investigators have done their job and done it well.  They 
have finished the substantive investigation, and, like it or 
not, we are now in what the Italians view as a political 
discussion.  The facts have been established and almost 
completely accepted by the Italians.  What remains is 
disagreement about how to present those facts, particularly 
the characterization of adherence to ROE by U.S. forces at 
the checkpoint. 
 
7. (S) We understand that the US investigating officer has 
virtually finished a draft of the AR 15-6 report which, if 
there is no agreement on a US-Italian joint report, will go 
forward as a US-only document in fulfillment of his mandate. 
 
Given this, and the above four points, from our perspective 
it appears there are only two likely outcomes: 
 
A. The negotiators somehow find mutually acceptable language 
that allows them to reach agreement on a joint statement of 
facts and (if possible) recommendations that constitutes a 
joint report; in addition the US side the complete AR 15-6 
report up the usual chain as a U.S.-only report. This would 
require finding a political compromise with the Italians on 
how ROE is described in the joint report, but would NOT 
require changing the language on ROE in the separate 15-6 
report.  (Of course, we would need to preare guidance 
explaining the difference in treatment of ROE between the two 
reports). 
 
B. No bilateral agreement on any joint report.  The 
investigators announce the joint investigation in completed 
and the US side sends up the AR 15-6 as a normal USA 
investigation. Far from ideal, but still manageable in terms 
of preserving our military/intelligence/political 
relationship.  It would allow Berlusconi to say he stood up 
to the US and refused to sign a report he couldn't agree 
with.  As long as his people (and ours) don't go overboard in 
spinning to the press that it's all the other side's fault, 
we could ride out a stormy period and preserve the Italian 
government's political capacity to remain in the coalition in 
Iraq. 
 
-------------------------- 
WHAT EMBASSY ROME HAS DONE 
-------------------------- 
 
8. (S) Amb. Sembler took advantage of Gen. Pollari's presence 
at the Ambassador's farewell reception April 20 to work him 
over for an hour on the need to come to closure.  Through a 
smoke screen of inaccurate statements, Pollari did make one 
or two cogent arguments and finally produced a couple of ways 
in which the one outstanding issue (rules of engagement) 
could be addressed (or, more accurately, avoided) in a joint 
statement.  They were (as far as we knew) new formulations 
from the Italian side and, since they were new, the Amb. 
encouraged Pollari to present them in Baghdad, but cautioned 
that they did not sound new enough to be very promising. 
(NOTE: From what we can reconstruct here, Pollari's bottom 
line is that the phrase "rules of engagement" NOT appear in 
any joint report, whereas the US investigator requires 
inclusion of that phrase, even if it's only to say "we did 
not reach common conclusions on ROE".  END NOTE) 
Potentially the most beneficial outcome of this discussion 
was that Pollari is fully aware that we are very close (a day 
or two) to the point where both sides need to say "a joint 
report is not possible; let's now figure out together how to 
manage publicly our divergence."  He did not seem intimidated 
by that prospect, just as we should not be. 
 
9. (S) On April 22, following a meeting on another topic, DCM 
updated Berlusconi,s NSA-equivalent (and 
Ambassador-Designate to Washington) Giovanni Castellaneta on 
the joint investigation.  DCM emphasized that our offer to 
coordinate our respective press strategies is still on the 
table, but needs to be picked up by the Italian side soon if 
it is to be effective.  Castalenetta noted that Letta/Pollari 
were controlling this issue, but said he would discuss it 
with Letta.  He urged, even if the discussions in Baghdad 
terminate today, that the US side avoid telling the press in 
any way that the work is over and issuing the AR 15-6  report 
until after the Italian holiday April 25.  He noted that this 
holiday, the Anniversary of Italy,s Liberation in World War 
II, has been increasingly politicized by the opposition in 
recent years as a celebration of the Communist-led partisan 
movement during the war.  Many speeches and public 
appearances by leaders of Italy,s left were already 
scheduled for that day, and we should avoid giving them the 
opportunity to use these appearances to lash out at the U.S. 
about its conduct of the Calipari investigation. 
 
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COMMENT 
------- 
 
10. (S) We see little prospect that Letta/Pollari will give 
their investigators enough flexibility to enable a joint 
report to be concluded.  Outcome &B8 above - no joint 
report at all - thus appears to us to be the likely result. 
We should prepare for that eventuality with our own public 
 
release strategy along lines already discussed in Washington, 
with particular attention to the following: 
 
The timeline for the USG internal review of the AR 15-6 
report. 
 
Avoiding (as Castellaneta requested) any indication to the 
press that the joint investigation process is over, until 
Tuesday, April 26. 
 
Being prepared to emphasize that the joint investigation 
reached common conclusions on nearly every issue covered, and 
to address the one area where they did not: ROE. 
 
Keeping our powder dry.  Even if Pollari jumps the gun and 
starts spinning the Italian press before our AR 15-6 is 
released, we should focus our preparation on a coherent and 
well-prepared public release of our report, and not respond 
to various outrageous Italian stories until after the public 
rollout of the AR 15-6, when we will have the definitive USA 
investigation results. 
 
Understanding the reasons for the likely weakness of the 
GOI,s public communication on this topic until a new 
government is formed. The past two days, which followed 
Berlusconi,s resignation, have been marked by ringing 
silence on the Calipari case, after weeks of daily leaking 
and spinning. SISMI may have rested its preemptive public 
defense. But it is more likely that the attentions of this 
media-addicted government are being exhausted elsewhere. 
 End Comment. 
 
SEMBLER 
 
 
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	2005ROME01392 - Classification: SECRET