US embassy cable - 05ANKARA2314

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 ANKARA 002314 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2025 
TAGS: PTER, PREL, MOPS, PREF, TU, IZ, IR, SY 
SUBJECT: TURKS PREPARING FOR PKK SPRING OFFENSIVE 
 
REF: ANKARA 1484 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Eric S. Edelman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (U) This is an action request.  Please see para. 17. 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
2. (S) The GOT appears to be convinced that the PKK is going 
to carry out its first "spring offensive" in southeast Turkey 
since 1999.  Press and intel reporting indicate the Turks 
have moved two commando brigades toward the Iraq border in 
order to hunt PKK terrorists and deter attacks.  MFA and TGS 
contacts have--to a degree--been forthright in expressing 
their concern to us about the offensive.  Should the Turks 
take more than minimal casualties, we will again feel strong 
public and political pressure to address the PKK's continuing 
presence in northern Iraq, and the issue will again dominate 
the agenda here when we have other crucial matters to pursue. 
 We recommend Washington address this issue with the ITG, at 
the very least by urging the new government to resume 
trilateral talks as soon as possible.  End summary. 
 
Spring Offensive on the Way? 
---------------------------- 
 
3. (S) Until it had declared a unilateral cease fire in 1999, 
the PKK had traditionally carried out a "spring offensive" in 
Turkey every year.  The PKK revoked the cease fire in June 
2004; according to GOT figures about 100 soldiers and 
civilians and another 100 PKK terrorists were killed last 
year.  We evaluate that the GOT--including the 
military--believes the PKK is gearing up for a spring 
offensive in southeast Turkey.  It appears that the Turks are 
taking a proactive approach (with some help from us) and 
hunting for insurgents, especially in areas along the Iraqi 
border. 
 
4. (S) As the mountain snows melt, it becomes easier for PKK 
terrorists to infiltrate across the Turkish border and 
execute attacks.  Press and intel reporting indicates that 
the Turks have moved two commando brigades to the Sirnak and 
Hakkari provinces close to the Iraqi border.  According to 
these reports, the Turks are concerned that a number of PKK 
terrorists have infiltrated from Iran and (especially) Iraq 
to carry out attacks in southeast Turkey.  According to press 
reports, there has been "heavy" fighting in the Cudi 
Mountains area as the Turkish security forces have sought to 
find PKK terrorists before they can carry out attacks. 
 
5. (SBU) The press is also reporting on a "major" battle with 
PKK terrorists on April 14 in Siirt province.  According to 
these reports, the fighting involved two brigades and 2,000 
local village guards.  A Turkish first lieutenant, two 
Turkish senior sergeants, a village guard, and 21 alleged PKK 
members were killed.  The Turkish forces reportedly destroyed 
five terrorist shelters and captured 19 Kalashnikov rifles, 1 
sniper rifle, 2 Bixi machine guns, 54 hand grenades, over 
4,400 rounds of ammunition, 12 anti-personnel mines, 5 
anti-tank missiles, 4 KG of C-4, 3 KG of TNT, first aid 
equipment, documents, 3 tons of foodstuffs, and other 
materials. 
 
SE Turkey Officials: We're Dealing with Mosquitoes, 
the Swamp is in Northern Iraq 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
6. (C) Amid press reports of security operations against PKK 
terrorists in southeastern Turkey, Adana consulate's poloff 
visited government security officials in Mardin and Sirnak 
provinces April 13-14.  Meetings were cordial, but yielded 
few details about official views on the magnitude of the PKK 
threat in the region.  The Sirnak Security Director, when 
queried about what his office is up against, focused instead 
on the need for action against the PKK in Iraq. "We're 
dealing with mosquitoes here," he said, "but the swamp is in 
northern Iraq."  He stated that in addition to dealing with 
the terrorists in the Qandil Mountains, the Makhmour camp 
should be shut down, too.  When poloff pointed out the 
cooperation that had taken place to date between the U.S. and 
GOT on combating the PKK, he did acknowledge that he had 
followed those developments "with great pleasure." 
7. (C) Sirnak's security director reported 14 PKK attacks in 
towns around Sirnak province during the last year and did not 
seem inclined to accept that only now in spring were attacks 
getting worse.  Sharing a border with Iraq, Sirnak is one of 
the provinces most seriously affected by PKK terrorism, he 
said.  He claimed that PKK members are crossing back and 
forth across the border, implying that approximating their 
numbers in Turkey is futile. 
 
8. (C) Mardin's Security Director, however, estimates 48-50 
PKK terrorists are active in Mardin province, and claims 
numbers increase as one heads east.  Despite having an idea 
about PKK numbers and locations in Mardin, apprehending them 
is challenging, he said, due to their "guerrilla warfare" 
tactics.  He did expect an uptick in PKK attacks with the 
arrival of spring. 
 
Mountain Operation vs. Mountain Festival 
---------------------------------------- 
 
9. (C) Security officials were at pains to assure us that 
traveling in the region presented no danger to us and indeed, 
the atmosphere in Mardin and Sirnak's city centers seemed 
quite normal on the surface. Occasional signs of increased 
military activity in the region did manifest themselves, 
however.  For reportedly the first time, armed personnel 
carriers and security forces were prominently stationed at 
the turn-off from the main Gaziantep-Urfa road to Halfeti on 
the left bank of the Euphrates, the home district of Abdullah 
Ocalan.  A security checkpoint between Cizre and Sirnak had 
appeared since poloff last visited the region several months 
ago and while departing Sirnak town, we saw a military 
helicopter overhead.  For part of poloff's trip, the police 
"follow car" we are accustomed to seeing during travel in the 
provinces was armored. 
 
10. (C) The population is definitely noticing the change in 
atmosphere, according to contacts in Silopi on the Iraqi 
border.  A UNHCR staffer stationed there told us tension in 
the area has been growing since March 21, when security 
operations began.  In the past two weeks alone, he said, the 
press had reported one mine attack and three skirmishes 
between the PKK and security forces in the Sirnak/Mardin 
area.  "Four incidents in ten days: that is not 
insignificant," he said.  Additionally, he said, pro-PKK Roj 
TV is full of PKK commanders promising the organization will 
be active, using primarily ambushes and IEDs.  With the start 
of operations, UNHCR had hoped to monitor the condition of 
families in the area that had returned voluntarily to Turkey 
from the Makhmour camp, but last week's planned monitoring 
trip was canceled as the security situation in the mountains 
outside of Sirnak continued to decline.  (NOTE: Despite the 
talk of tension and reports of a major security operation on 
Sirnak's Cudi Mountain, reportedly up to 15,000 people 
attended a first-ever, DEHAP-organized Cudi Mountain Festival 
outside of Silopi o/a April 9-10. Contacts stated that it was 
a peaceful event, with no interference by security forces. 
END NOTE.) 
 
Buyukanit Grabs the Spotlight... 
-------------------------------- 
 
11. (SBU) Thus far Turkish political and military leaders 
have not commented much on the record on the spring offensive 
issue, with one notable exception.  Land Forces Commander GEN 
Yasar Buyukanit (who will likely become CHOD in 2006) told 
the press in March that the PKK's strength within Turkey had 
reached the same level as in 1999, when Abdullah Ocalan was 
captured.  Likely seizing on the opportunity to needle the 
government for failing to persuade the U.S. to take military 
action against the PKK in northern Iraq, Buyukanit said "Now 
Iraq is being restructured.  Do we have any say?  No.  Do we 
have an Iraq policy?  No."  Both PM Erdogan and FonMin Gul 
reacted defensively to Buyukanit's comments; they essentially 
responded that Turkey indeed has an Iraq policy, but gave few 
specifics.  Gul took a formalistic approach, saying that only 
the CHOD and DCHOD had the right to speak for the Turkish 
military. 
 
...But Turks Tight-lipped on Plans 
---------------------------------- 
12. (S) While embassy contacts acknowledge to us that a 
spring offensive concerns them, they are also tight-lipped 
about specific steps the Turkish military is taking to combat 
the threat.  The Turks are typically unwilling--some have 
said to the point of paranoia--to discuss with us military 
activity within Turkish territory.  Indeed, the Chief of the 
Intelligence Department of the TGS J-2, RADM Ergun Mengi, 
called in the DATT on April 14 to accuse the ARMA of asking 
"inappropriate" questions at an April 8 discussion with J-2's 
COL Mohamed Karazdiken.  In fact, the ARMA had asked nothing 
about Turkish troop movements in Turkey, and only asked for 
the Turks' evaluation of the likelihood of a spring 
offensive.  Karazdiken replied that TGS is concerned about a 
spring offensive, but also that the PKK's increased activity 
was a normal occurrence.  (COMMENT: We find this statement 
somewhat at odds with the limited activity last year.  END 
COMMENT.) 
 
13. (C) On April 11, PolOff and PolMilOff called on Ali 
Findik of MFA's Intelligence Directorate to discuss the PKK. 
New to his portfolio (and visibly nervous), Findik gave few 
specifics except to state his concern that recent discoveries 
of high explosives in southeast Turkey may indicate that the 
PKK is planning "unconventional" attacks in Turkey.  The 
targets of such attacks might include tourist centers or even 
the Straits, but Findik also noted that attacks against 
European tourists in Turkey would be against the PKK's 
interests, since it would turn European popular opinion 
against the Kurdish cause.  Findik handed us a GOT non-paper 
on the PKK (text in para. 18). 
 
14. (S) Both the GOT non-paper and J-2's Karazdiken 
emphasized the importance of the PKK conference which took 
place in early April in northern Iraq; they believe the PKK 
will plan the outlines of its campaign there.  We assume 
normal liaison as well as EUCOM's intelligence fusion cell 
with the Turks here in Ankara will serve as a useful venue to 
pass on intelligence we gather from the conference. 
 
Comment: PKK Can Threaten to Our Priorities with Turkey 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
15. (C) We cannot assess the reality of a PKK offensive, but 
we are convinced that the Turks have concluded that an 
offensive is underway and, moreover, that it is facilitated 
and directed out of Iraq.  Although most senior Turkish MFA 
officials and senior military officers have a realistic 
understanding of why the USG has not taken action so far 
against PKK elements in northern Iraq, the proliferation of 
conspiracy theories means many attach other motives to their 
perception.  We often hear allegations that the USG is 
supporting the PKK, laying the foundations for the creation 
of an independent Kurdistan, and trying to dismember Turkey. 
 
17. (C) If anti-PKK activity or a spectacular attack results 
in significant Turkish casualties--and especially if there 
are terrorist attacks on civilian targets in urban or western 
Turkey--we should expect an increase in anti-American finger 
pointing, a further decline in cooperation with the USG, and 
additional pressure on the U.S. to take direct action against 
the PKK in northern Iraq, or to let the Turks do so 
themselves.  This would be further accentuated by the 
increased PKK presence along the Turkish border in northern 
Iraq. 
 
Action Request: Renew the Trilateral Process, Request 
Action of ITG 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
17. (C) Therefore, once there is an ITG in place, we 
recommend pressing them to agree quickly to resume trilateral 
talks on the PKK, and pursuing the following additional items 
with the ITG and KRG to increase pressure on the PKK: 
 
--Declare the PKK officially a terrorist organization; 
--Declare the Kurdistan Democratic Solution Party a PKK front 
party and close down its offices in Iraqi cities; 
 
--Issue Iraqi arrest warrants for PKK leaders known to be in 
Iraq (the leaders have already been listed in MNF-I 
lookouts); 
--When ISF manpower levels permit, work with UNHCR and Turkey 
to secure Makhmour refugee camp and pursue an orderly process 
for durable solutions, including repatriation; 
 
--Shut off PKK supply lines and secure the Iraqi border in 
areas where the PKK/Kongra-Gel is present; 
 
--Work with the ITG and KRG to encourage the KDP and the PUK 
to make statements condemning the PKK and to take steps to 
limit the movement and resupply of PKK cadres and camps; 
 
--Initiate with Turkey a joint information operation designed 
to take advantage of the splits within the PKK and to further 
weaken the organization. 
 
18. (C) Text of MFA paper on the PKK 
 
BEGIN TEXT (Note internal paragraph numbering) 
 
CONFIDENTIAL 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PKK/KONGRA-GEL ACTIVITIES 
 
1. The threat of the PKK/KONGRA-GEL still remains a reality 
for Turkey.  Despite a number of structural changes within 
the organization, the PKK continues to follow instructions 
issued by Abdullah Ocalan. 
 
2. To date, the terrorist organization numbers some 
5,800-6,000 armed militants.  These militants can be divided 
according to their geographical locations: Iraq 
(2,900-3,200), Turkey (1,700-1,800), Iran (400), Syria and 
Lebanon (80-100). 
 
3. Although the organization has transferred some of its 
militants to the Hakurk, Haftanin and Kunera regions (of 
Iraq), Qandil Mountain still remains its main base and serves 
as the headquarters of the organization.  The PKK/KONGRA-GEL 
retains all kinds of infrastructures and logistical support 
in this part of Iraq. 
 
4. The PKK/KONGRA-GEL is increasing its activities in Iraq: 
its affiliates, the Democratic Solution Party and the 
Democratic Construction Party participated in the Iraqi 
elections.  Such participation is important to legitimize the 
PKK/KONGRA-GEL's position.  As the organization is 
experiencing difficulties in recruiting new members, it has 
started to recruit new cadres from the Makhmour Camp in Iraq. 
 
5. The PKK/KONGRA-GEL has recently intensified its armed 
activities.  The organization possesses around hundred 
land-to-air missiles (SA-7B).  The organization has stored 
significant amounts of explosives (C-3, C-4 etc.), of which 
the Turkish security forces seized 300-400 kilograms in 2004. 
 
6. The PKK/KONGRA-GEL has accumulated an annual sum of 16 
million euros over the last 2-3 years.  This amount has 
recently decreased.  The main two sources of the 
organization's revenues are commission (on drug and human 
trafficking) and extortion.  The expenditures of ROJ TV 
amount to 12 million euros per year.  It is thought that 
recent financial problems  may push the organization to 
resort to organized crime. 
 
7. The PKK/KONGRA-GEL has adopted harsh measures in order to 
deal with those who have left the organization.  As such, the 
head of the Democratic Unity Party, Kemal Sor, was executed 
in northern Iraq.  Following the departure of his moderate 
cadres, hardliners such as Murat Karayilan and Cemil Bayik 
have gained influence within the organization. 
 
8. The PKK/KONGRA-GEL has orchestrated over 200 attacks since 
it gave up its so-called cease-fire of 1 June 2004.  In this 
period, the number of attacks increased two or threefold in 
comparison with figures predating 1 June 2004.  The 
organization chooses mainly economic targets.  There has been 
an increase of 120% in the number of armed attacks.  The 
organization has started to use remote controlled bombs, 
especially with the aim of hindering the transfer of security 
forces in eastern and south-eastern Anatolia. 
 
9.  The PKK/KONGRA-GEL is holding its third congress (general 
assembly) in early April in Kunera of the Mt. Qandil in 
northern Iraq.  The organization is expected to reach a 
subsequent decision on increasing its attacks and activities, 
a proposal which was forwarded during the conference of the 
HPG (People's Defense Forces).  A decision will also be taken 
on the "Democratic Confederalism Protocol Draft."  It is 
possible that the president of KONGRA-GEL, Zubeyir Aydar, 
will not participate in the congress. 
 
10.  The PKK/KONGRA-GEL's most recent affiliate, "New PKK", 
held its first congress in the Kunera region of Iraq between 
28 March and 4 April 2005.  This shows that the terrorist 
organization not only has the ability to hold congresses 
freely, but also enjoys the support of certain elements in 
Iraq. 
 
11.  Although the Turkish military authorities have informed 
the US authorities about the presence and activities of the 
PKK/KONGRA-GEL in Iraq since September 2002, the US 
authorities have not taken any steps to counter these 
activities (sic). 
 
END TEXT 
 
19. (U) Iraq posts minimize considered. 
EDELMAN