US embassy cable - 05TAIPEI1893

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 001893 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PASS AIT/W 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINR, CH, TW, Cross Strait Politics 
SUBJECT: CHEN ENDORSES KMT VISIT, LIEN TO CALL CHEN BEFORE 
DEPARTURE 
 
REF: A. TAIPEI 1872 
     B. TAIPEI 1849 
     C. TAIPEI 1871 
     D. TAIPEI 1867 
 
Classified By: AIT Director Douglas Paal, Reason: 1.4 (B/D) 
 
1. (C) Summary: The Presidential Office Spokesman announced 
on April 21 that President Chen Shui-bian endorses KMT 
Chairman Lien Chan's upcoming visit to Mainland China.  The 
statement came hours after Presidential Office Secretary 
General Yu Shyi-kun and his KMT counterpart, Lin Fong-cheng, 
agreed that Lien would call the President shortly before he 
departs for Beijing.  While bitter partisan infighting on the 
floor of the Legislation Yuan (LY) continued after the April 
21 announcements, the agreement for an April 25 phone call 
between Lien and Chen could help resolve the current deadlock 
between the KMT and ruling Democratic Progressive Party 
(DPP).  Public and private USG/AIT interventions over the 
past two weeks appear to have helped created conditions for 
both camps to back down from their previous confrontational 
stance.  The PRC's April 18 invitation to People First Party 
(PFP) Chairman James Soong also provided the government cover 
to endorse opposition political party contacts.  If the two 
upcoming visits proceed without major incident, there may be 
an opening to resume both cross-Strait economic 
liberalization initiatives and rational legislative 
deliberations over the Special Defense Procurement Budget and 
other major political initiatives.  End Summary. 
 
Face-Saving Compromise 
---------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) President Chen Shui-bian's spokesman announced April 
21 that the government welcomes KMT Chairman Lien Chan's plan 
to visit Beijing on April 26 as long as Lien engaged Beijing 
for the "purpose of defending the supreme interests of the 
people and nation."  The President's endorsement came just 
hours after Presidential Office Secretary General Yu Shyi-kun 
and his KMT counterpart, Lin Fong-cheng, agreed on a plan 
that would have Lien place a telephone call to President Chen 
on the afternoon of April 25.  The Presidential Office 
spokesman cited Lien's tight schedule to explain why the two 
leaders would not meet face-to-face. 
 
3. (SBU) While spokesmen for the two camps continued to put a 
positive spin on the compromise plan, the April 21 evening 
announcements did not prevent Blue and Green legislators from 
trading another round of bitter recriminations in the LY on 
April 22.  Responding to questioning from Pan-Green 
legislators, Premier Frank Hsieh rejected demands that the 
government block Lien's departure.  The government's moves 
towards reconciliation coincided with stepped-up rhetoric 
from Pan-Green fundamentalists.  Former President Lee 
Teng-hui lashed out at the Pan-Blue leaders on April 21, 
condemning them as traitors.  Lee's Taiwan Solidarity Union 
(TSU) called on April 22 for crowds to "bring eggs and water 
bottles" to the Chiang Kai-shek Airport on April 26 to see 
Lien off on his trip. 
 
USG Role 
-------- 
 
4. (C) The Taiwan media gave prominent coverage to recent 
actions on the part of the USG and AIT over the Lien/Soong 
visit.  The China Times lead story on April 22 was the 
"s-e-c-r-e-t meeting" between the AIT Director and Lien Chen 
on April 20 (Ref A) over the upcoming KMT visit.  KMT 
Spokesman and Mainland Affairs Director Chang Jung-kung 
"welcomed Washington's endorsement" of Lien's visit to the 
Mainland, citing comments by the State Department spokesman 
on April 20.  PFP officials also told reporters that the AIT 
Director met with James Soong on April 19 (Ref B) to discuss 
the PFP's plans for an early May visit to the Mainland.  In 
private, officials from the Presidential Office and National 
Security Council (NSC) have praised recent public USG 
statements, particularly those by EAP DAS Randy Schriver, as 
helpful in creating common ground between the government and 
KMT.  Officials also expressed appreciation for AIT efforts 
to broker communications between the KMT and the Chen 
government ahead of Lien's visit. 
 
Comment: A Little Help from the Outside 
--------------------------------------- 
 
5. (C) Deep Green anger notwithstanding, the April 21 
announcements appear to signal an attempt by both the Chen 
and Lien camps to prevent recent public recriminations from 
spiraling out of control.  Public and private messages from 
Washington appear to have played a critical role in giving 
both sides an excuse to back away from the extremes.  USG 
statements urging Beijing to work with Taiwan's elected 
government gave the Chen administration more flexibility to 
endorse the KMT's initiatives.  The Director's April 20 
meeting with Lien appeared to also tip the balance within the 
KMT away from hard-liners like Chang Jung-kung, who had 
privately dismissed prospects for reaching out to the Chen 
government until hours before the announcement was made. 
Ironically, it was Chang who was tasked on April 21 with 
informing the press of Lien's decision to call the President, 
reinforcing our assessment that the decision was made by Lien 
himself. 
 
6. (C) Beijing's April 18 invitation to James Soong was 
likely another major factor in reducing DPP-KMT friction. 
KMT officials were clearly dismayed with the Soong invite, 
since it dashed hopes among party hard-liners that Beijing 
planned to give the KMT a monopoly on cross-Strait relations. 
 At the same time, the Soong invitation gave the Chen 
government an excuse to claim that Beijing had signaled its 
intention to work, perhaps indirectly at first, with the DPP 
government (Ref C).  Whether this shift towards 
cross-partisan reconciliation can last long enough to resume 
rational deliberations in LY over the Special Defense 
Procurement Budget may depend on how Beijing and the KMT play 
Lien's visit next week and whether Lee Teng-hui's renewed 
offensive may pull Chen back towards confrontation.  AIT will 
continue to seek channels to reinforce recent positive trends 
during and after the opposition trips. 
PAAL