US embassy cable - 05TAIPEI1892

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 001892 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PASS AIT/W 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/22/2015 
TAGS: MARR, MASS, PGOV, PINR, PREL, TW 
SUBJECT: KMT MAINLAND AFFAIRS CHIEF ON LIEN'S PRC TRIP 
 
REF: TAIPEI 01872 
 
Classified By: AIT Director Douglas Paal, Reason(s): 1.4 (B/D) 
 
1. (C) Summary:  KMT Mainland Affairs Director Chang 
Jung-kung told AIT on April 21 that the primary purpose of 
KMT Chairman Lien Chan's upcoming PRC visit was to reach a 
cross-Strait peace consensus rather than to talk about trade 
liberalization.  Chang pointed out that economic issues had 
already been adequately addressed during KMT Vice Chairman 
P.K. Chiang's late March visit.  Chang stressed, however, 
that the KMT's desire to reach a "consensus for peace" with 
the PRC does not mean that Lien will sell-out Taiwan.  Chang 
assured AIT that there is agreement between the PRC and KMT 
not to raise Taiwan's arms procurement issue.  Chang told AIT 
that Lien will not urge the Beijing government to talk to the 
Chen administration.  End Summary. 
 
Political Focus 
--------------- 
 
2. (C) KMT Mainland Affairs Director Chang Jung-kung, who 
doubles as party spokesman, told AIT on April 21 that he and 
two working-level officials accompanied KMT Secretary General 
Lin Fong-cheng to Beijing earlier this week to negotiate the 
details of KMT Chairman Lien Chan's April 26 to May 3 PRC 
visit.  Chang offered a very different outlook on the Lien 
visit than Lien personally outlined to the AIT Director on 
April 20 (Reftel).  While Lien focused on economics and 
trade, Chang said that economic issues had already been 
discussed sufficiently during KMT Vice Chairman P.K. Chiang's 
late March visit.  Instead of trade, Chang said Lien had a 
"higher goal" -- to reach a consensus on cross-Strait peace. 
 
3. (C) Chang said that the two sides have agreed to discuss 
the idea of "separated rule" and the "1992 Consensus" (the 
KMT formula of "One China" with different interpretations) 
during the scheduled Lien-Hu meeting.  He said they might 
mention "One China" but they will remain vague about its 
definition and instead focus on the existence of the two 
different interpretations.  He acknowledged that Lien will, 
of course, call for direct links, economic cooperation, and 
exchange of technology and information.  However, Chang 
asserted that major cross-Strait economic initiatives will be 
possible only after the establishment of a cross-Strait 
political consensus and set of confidence building mechanisms. 
 
"Lien will not sell-out Taiwan" 
------------------------------- 
 
4. (C) Chang stressed, however, that the KMT's desire to 
reach a "consensus for peace" with the PRC does not mean that 
Lien will sell-out Taiwan.  As a private citizen with no 
official powers or resources, Chang pointed out, Lien is not 
capable of selling out Taiwan.  He said that current 
cross-Strait tensions are the result of Chen Shui-bian's poor 
leadership.  With the PRC refusing to talk to the ruling 
party, Chang argued, the KMT wished to let Beijing know that 
there is still some group in Taiwan that can serve as a 
dialogue partner.  Continuing, Chang asked rhetorically, "why 
should the KMT be faulted for being able to achieve what the 
DPP could not?" 
 
5. (C) Moreover, Chang asserted that cross-Strait tensions 
have been at such a high level since last year that Lien's 
trip will not only ease confrontation but also usher in a new 
era of tolerance on the part of the PRC government.  Chang 
claimed that if the Pan-Blue had failed to win a legislative 
majority the "PRC might have been prepared to use force to 
resolve the Taiwan problem."  He said that Lien's meeting 
with Hu will reassure the PRC that there is still a force in 
Taiwan that opposes independence.  Once PRC officials are 
convinced of this, Chang said,  Beijing will tolerate even 
the most provocative rhetoric from Chen Shui-bian. 
 
6. (C) When asked how Lien would respond if the PRC asked the 
KMT to retract its support for the Special Defense 
Procurement Budget, Chang told AIT that there is a tacit 
agreement between the two sides not to touch on the arms 
procurement issue during Lien's trip.  Chang indicated that 
Beijing told Taipei in 1992 that it holds the USG, not 
Taipei, accountable for major defense transfers. 
 
Limits of Constructiveness 
-------------------------- 
 
7. (C) Responding to AIT's suggestion that the KMT play a 
bridging role between Beijing and the Chen administration, 
Chang said that, as much as the KMT wanted to ease 
cross-Strait tensions, the KMT would not urge the Beijing 
government to talk to the Taipei government.  Chang explained 
that the PRC had made it clear that it welcomes any party and 
individual that recognizes the "1992 Consensus."  Chang said 
that he could not see a way for the PRC to consent to an 
official dialogue since Chen Shui-bian refuses to accept the 
"1992 Consensus."  He said that any attempt by the KMT to 
advocate for dialogue under these circumstances would be in 
vain.  Chang claimed that former KMT Vice Chairman Vincent 
Siew had urged the Mainland to talk to the DPP government 
during his 2001 PRC visit, and was punished by having all of 
his subsequent meetings canceled.  Lien does not intend to 
make the same mistake. 
 
Paving the Road to Beijing 
-------------------------- 
 
8. (C) Chang repeated details of the upcoming PRC visit, 
tracking the public announcement made at the party's April 20 
Central Standing Committee meeting.  Lien will depart April 
26, visit the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum in Nanjing, travel to 
Beijing for meetings with Hu Jintao, Jia Qinglin, and members 
of China's Politburo, deliver a speech to Beijing University 
students, visit his ancestral home in X'ian, meet with the 
Taiwan business community in Shanghai, and return to Taiwan 
on May 3. 
 
9. (C) Regarding his own recent visit, Chang told AIT that 
they arrived in Beijing on 1700 April 18, had a formal 
dinner, then talked with PRC counterparts, including Taiwan 
Affairs Office Director Chen Yunlin, from 1900 to 0300 in the 
morning.  The talks continued the morning of April 19 
straight through until the KMT delegation departed for Taipei 
that afternoon.  In addition to substantive issues, the two 
sides hammered out logistical details, such as flight routes, 
receptions and social events, and security measures.  Lien's 
delegation will fly from Taipei to Hong Kong where they will 
board a PRC plane that will transport them between PRC 
cities.  Lien's security detail will be permitted to carry 
fire arms.  There is a possibility Lien will also meet ARATS 
Chairman Wang Daohan in Shanghai if Wang's health permits 
meeting. 
 
Comment: A Hard-Line Operator 
----------------------------- 
 
10. (C) Chang has taken the lead on both the March P.K. 
Chiang visit and the upcoming Lien trip, serving as the PRC's 
primary interlocutor on both substance and logistics.  In his 
spokesman's capacity, Chang has also been the main public 
defender of the KMT-CCP rapprochement.  In both public and 
private, Chang has consistently taken a more confrontational 
stance than Lien and other more senior KMT officials.  During 
his tenure in the Presidential Office during the Lee Teng-hui 
administration, Chang was viewed as a pro-unification 
hard-liner.  While this background may make him more 
attractive as an interlocutor to Beijing, it has hurt his 
credibility as a spokesman for the KMT. 
PAAL