US embassy cable - 05BANGKOK2749

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BANGKOK 002749 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PACOM FOR ADM FALLON, FPA HUSO 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/BCLTV 
OSD/ISA FOR POWERS AND STERN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 18APRIL2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MARR, MASS, TH, Scenesetter 
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF PACOM CDR ADM FALLON 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce.  Reason 1.4 (a and d) 
 
SUMMARY 
 
1.  (C)  Admiral Fallon, your visit to Bangkok to meet with 
Thai leaders and Chiang Mai to open this year's Cobra Gold 
exercise will allow you an opportunity to push forward a 
number of key U.S. foreign policy objectives.  We have 
requested meetings for you with Prime Minister Thaksin 
Shinawatra (Prime Minister TOCK-SIN), Foreign Minister 
Kantathi Suphamongkhon (Minister KAN-THA-TEE), Defense 
Minister Gen. Thamarak Isarangura Na Ayutthaya (Minister 
TA-MA-ROCK), Royal Thai Supreme Commander Gen. Chaisit 
Shinawatra (General CHAI-SIT) and the Secretary General of 
the National Security Council General Winai Phattiyakhul 
(General WEE-NAI).  In these meetings, you can point to the 
critical U.S. military role in providing assistance to 
Thailand and the other tsunami-hit nations in the region as 
evidence that the United States remains engaged in Southeast 
Asia and is committed to our treaty obligations here.  Since 
Cobra Gold this year will focus on lessons learned from our 
recent experience mitigating the impact of the tsunami, it 
will be appropriate for you to drive home a key lesson 
learned:  the quick ramping up of our regional hub at Utapao 
Royal Thai Navy Air Base and our military's ability to 
interact rapidly with Thai counterparts is a direct result of 
decades of joint combined exercises, training and cooperation 
between Thailand and the United States.  The largest domestic 
challenge facing the Royal Thai Government remains unrest in 
the predominantly Muslim provinces of southernmost Thailand. 
While emphasizing the U.S. assessment that the violence there 
remains in internal matter for the Thais to resolve, you can 
quietly underscore our willingness to help by improving the 
human rights training of Thai soldiers rotating into the 
south and offering other assistance to Thai troops. 
 
2.  (C)  CJCS Myers recently sent General Chaisit a letter 
urging Thailand to send officers to the OIF Multinational 
Headquarters.  It would be helpful for you to ask your 
interlocutors how Thailand intends to answer General Myers' 
request and to ask whether Thailand intends to commit another 
deployment of troops to the Iraq region.  Our bilateral 
mil-mil dialogue with Thailand, Thai-Tac, should be enhanced. 
 Your visit can drive home points made by the PACOM J-5 
recently by asking Thai military leaders to revitalize 
Thai-Tac and make it more strategically focused on key issues 
such as Regional Maritime Security, the growing role of China 
and India in the region, defense modernization and other 
issues.  For the first time since the Asian financial crisis 
of 1997, Thailand is considering a big-ticket military 
hardware purchase.  In the coming months, Thailand will 
likely announce its intention to select from 18 Saab Gripens, 
SU-30's or F-16's to replace aging F-5s in its fighter 
aircraft inventory.  It would be extremely helpful to 
Lockheed Martin's bid for the fighter contract if you were to 
note the clear advantage F-16 has over the competition from 
an interoperability standpoint and mention our desire that 
F-16 receives a fair assessment from the Thai Air Force.  End 
Summary 
 
THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP 
 
3.  (C)  Bilateral relations with Thailand are very good. 
The goodwill generated by America's quick and massive 
response to the December 26 tsunami is palpable.  Thailand is 
a Treaty Ally and has been firmly supportive of the 
International War on Terror and has participated in Operation 
Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). 
American businesses have over $20 billion in direct 
investment in Thailand.  The United States is Thailand's 
largest export market and its second-largest foreign 
investor. 
 
4.  (C)  Nonetheless, there are several points of friction. 
Human rights remain a key concern.  On October 25, 2004, 
poorly trained Thai military and civilian security forces 
forced nearly 1,300 Thai Muslim protesters into trucks to be 
transported to a military base nearly three hours away.  78 
protesters died en route.  The State Department's annual 
human rights report (HRR), which in 2004 voiced concern over 
the lack of accountability for approximately 1,300 
extrajudicial killings in the initial 2003 phase of a Thai 
"war on drugs" promoted by the Prime Minister, rankles the 
Thai Government. 
 
5.  (C)  Thailand's policy of "constructive engagement" with 
the military junta in Burma and provision of economic 
assistance to Rangoon is a source of continuing frustration 
for us.  The Thai government supports democracy in Burma but 
maintains, not altogether convincingly, that engagement with 
the SPDC is the only realistic approach it has to make 
progress on the major cross-border flows of refugees, illegal 
economic migrants, and methamphetamines it faces from Burma. 
 
6.  (C)  It surprises many visitors from Washington to learn 
that the Thai military has a number of Chinese weapons 
systems in its arsenal.  While Thai military links with the 
United States are deeper and far more apparent than Sino-Thai 
links, China's growing influence in Thailand and Southeast 
Asia is evident in business, the arts, the media and the 
military. 
 
PM THAKSIN 
 
7.  (SBU) In 2001, Thaksin became the first democratically 
elected civilian Prime Minister to win an outright majority 
in the Thai Parliament. His Thai Rak Thai (Thais Love Thais) 
political party dominates domestic politics and controls 377 
of the 500 seats in Parliament.  Thaksin won reelection in a 
landslide victory on February 6th.  Thaksin comes from a 
prosperous Sino-Thai family in Thailand's second largest 
city, Chiang Mai, and placed first in his class at the 
National Police Academy.  He spent several years studying in 
the United States, earning a master's degree in Criminal 
Justice from Eastern Kentucky University and a Doctorate in 
Criminology from Sam Houston State University.  After a few 
years with the police, he left government service to run the 
family business (Shinawatra Corporation, or Shin Corp), which 
he turned into Thailand's largest telecom company, making 
himself a multi-billionaire (in US dollars). 
 
8.  (C)  Thaksin considers himself a personal friend of the 
President, drawing on their common Texas connections.  He 
characterizes himself as a "CEO Prime Minister" and likes to 
be known for being decisive.  He is also impulsive.  His 
critics accuse him of authoritarian tendencies, of staffing 
the major institutions of the country with his family members 
or classmates, and of reinforcing the business interests of 
family and political allies through government policies.  Of 
note, Chaisit Shinawatra, the Royal Thai Supreme Commander, 
is Thaksin's cousin; Chaisit was previously leapfrogged by 
the Prime Minister into the Army Commander position. 
 
MILITARY COOPERATION 
 
9.  (C)  We conduct a wide range of major exercises and 
training programs with Thailand each year, including Cobra 
Gold, the annual exercise which in 2004 involved 
approximately 13,500 U.S. service members and 6,000 Thais. 
Cobra Gold 2005 will be smaller than last year, primarily due 
to U.S. commitments elsewhere and the large number of U.S. 
forces sent to the region for tsunami relief.  Utapao, the 
Thai Navy Air Base used as the primary staging area for U.S. 
disaster relief efforts in the region, has long been a 
critical support hub for U.S. aircraft transiting the region. 
 Over 420 DoD aircraft use it each year.  From January 25 
until February 4, we conducted our largest air exercise with 
the Thai, Cope Tiger.  This year, F-18's from the USS Abraham 
Lincoln participated.  Our largest naval exercise is the 
Combined Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) series which 
will take place again in June.  Recently, a number of senior 
U.S. military officials have visited Thailand -- then-Deputy 
Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz visited in January, Seventh 
 
SIPDIS 
Fleet Commander VADM Greenert came in February and March, 
SOCPAC Commander BG Fridovich was in Thailand April 17-20, 
13th AF Maj.Gen. Rice came to Bangkok April 20-22, and 
JIATF-West Commander Admiral Rear Admiral Kelly visited April 
20-24.  USARPAC CG, LTG Brown, plans to visit the week after 
your trip to Thailand. 
 
A NOTE ON THAI MILITARY STRUCTURE 
 
10.  (C)  The relative power and influence of the Royal Thai 
Army (RTA) dwarfs the other services.  As such, the Royal 
Thai Army Commander traditionally wields more real power than 
the Supreme Commander.  General Chaisit was the head of the 
RTA until the military reshuffle last October. His 
"promotion" to head Supreme Command is viewed by many as the 
result of Thaksin's displeasure with Chaisit's inability to 
quickly control the unrest in the southern part of the 
country.  In October, Thaksin named Deputy Supreme Commander 
Sirichai Thanyasiri (General SUR-A-CHAI) to take over 
strategic planning for the south.  Thailand's armed forces, 
which had a history of interfering in the country's politics, 
have not emerged from the barracks since 1992 and appear to 
be fully reconciled to constitutional roles of defense and 
security.  Their exposure to US civil-military values through 
their extensive participation in IMET training deserves some 
credit for this transformation of their attitude towards 
democracy. 
 
THE TSUNAMI AFTERMATH AND COBRA GOLD 
 
11.  (U)  The massive rescue and recovery operation 
undertaken by the U.S. military as a result of the December 
26 tsunami was historic.  Mercifully, U.S. casualties were 
much lighter (about two dozen confirmed or presumed dead) 
than those suffered by other countries.  Thousands of Thai, 
Europeans and other Asians were killed in the Phuket area -- 
a haven for vacationers during the holiday season.  Total 
fatalities will likely never be known; the official number is 
about 5,400 but Thai officials privately say they expect the 
final death toll to top 8,000.  One of the most devastated 
areas in Thailand was the Phang Nga Naval Base.  Phang Nga 
represents the only strategic naval facility on Thailand's 
Andaman Sea west coast.  Pier facilities, the water treatment 
plant, barracks and communications capabilities were badly 
damaged by the tsunami. 
 
12.  (C)  U.S. disaster relief efforts, led by the U.S. 
military, had an immediate impact on affected areas in 
Thailand.  III MEF Commander, Lt. Gen. Robert Blackman, was 
the commanding general of Combined Support Force 536 (CSF 
536), which was based out of Utapao.  CSF 536 worked closely 
with the Embassy and JUSMAGTHAI to ensure that requests for 
assistance were promptly addressed and to assist coordination 
of relief from civilian agencies, NGOs and corporate donors. 
The Royal Thai Armed Forces granted the U.S. military blanket 
overflight clearances for relief operations in the region, 
including for aircraft from the USS Abraham Lincoln Battle 
Group which operated off Sumatra.  In addition to permitting 
our use of Utapao, the Royal Thai Government integrated Thai 
officers into the CSF staff where needed.  During the height 
of operations, over 1800 USG personnel operated out of 
Utapao. We distributed over 660,000 pounds of supplies within 
Thailand including medicine, food, dry ice and body bags. 
USAF C-130s made regular delivery runs from Utapao and 
Bangkok to affected areas for time sensitive supplies while 
bulk shipments tended to go overland.  USN P-3s positioned at 
Utapao conducted search and rescue missions in the vicinity 
of Thailand and in the region.  Teams made up of medical 
specialists from the CDC, the Armed Forces Research Institute 
of Medical Science and the Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command 
in Hawaii were also deployed to Thailand to assist with 
victim identification.  U.S. Navy SEALS and a representative 
from the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance worked closely 
with Thai military units to search for the remains of 
American and other victims of the disaster. From the 
beginning of the disaster, the Defense Attache Office painted 
the intel picture for commanders, forces, planners, and 
national decision makers.  Embassy Bangkok provided 24-hour 
American Citizens Services for weeks after the crisis to 
assist Americans, claim Amcit remains and coordinate USG 
relief efforts. 
 
13.  (C)  CSF 536's concept of operations set up Utapao as 
the hub for U.S. relief efforts bound for Sri Lanka, and 
Indonesia in addition to Thailand.  In each of those 
countries, Combined Support Groups (CSG) were established to 
interact with the local government, the U.S. Embassies and 
the NGO community.  CSG-Thailand was based in Phuket and 
redeployed on January 22.  Since that time, ongoing 
reconstruction efforts in Thailand are being managed by the 
Embassy, JUSMAGTHAI, and USAID.  A key part of those efforts 
is to focus civil affairs projects carried out under our 
military exercise authority in Thailand to assist Thais 
rebuilding in the devastated areas around Phuket.  At least 
one COMREL project conducted as part of Cobra Gold 05 will 
take place in the tsunami-devastated region. 
 
14.  (C)  Cobra Gold 2005 will consist of a one week disaster 
relief seminar for military, government civilians and NGOs, 
aimed at capturing some lessons learned from the tsunami 
mitigation effort followed by a one-week staff exercise in 
Chiang Mai focused on a disaster relief scenario.  In your 
discussions with Thai officials, it will be appropriate for 
you to underscore the fact that our successes in mitigating 
the damage caused by the tsunami were due in no small part to 
the decades of military cooperation between our two 
countries, cooperation that is perhaps best symbolized by the 
annual Cobra Gold exercise.  By focusing Cobra Gold 05 on 
disaster relief, we hope to capture the lessons learned by 
U.S., Thai, Japanese and Singaporean units who participated 
in Operation Unified Assistance and improve our ability to 
respond to future disasters. 
VIOLENCE IN THE SOUTH 
15.  (C)  Besides dealing with the tsunami aftermath, Prime 
Minister Thaksin's biggest domestic challenge is the 
unsettled security situation in the far southern part of the 
country.  Southern Thailand, in particular the southernmost 
Muslim majority provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat, 
has experienced episodic violence since it was incorporated 
into the Siamese Kingdom in 1902.  However, 2004 witnessed a 
dramatic increase in the level of violence, with over 500 
people killed either by militants or by security forces. 
Local Muslim separatist militants have attacked symbols of 
Thai and Buddhist authority, and there continue to be almost 
daily incidents of violence, notably even after the tsunami 
disaster of December 26.  Attacks most often involve isolated 
shootings of local officials, although increasingly 
sophisticated bombing attacks have become more common.  While 
there is no credible evidence of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) or 
al-Qaeda direction of the violence, there is concern that 
they might attempt to exploit the local violence for their 
own purposes. 
 
16.  (C)  Thaksin has recently acknowledged that the problem 
in Thailand's south is not simply the work of criminal gangs 
as he once declared, and is an issue that potentially reaches 
beyond Thailand's borders.  Last December, Thaksin claimed 
publicly during a radio address that Thai militants are 
training in Malaysia and that Indonesian extremists are 
instigating some of the violence.  This rather clumsy public 
assertion offended the two fellow ASEAN governments.  Thaksin 
is not likely to ask for direct U.S. assistance as the RTG 
maintains -- as do we -- that the southern situation is 
primarily a domestic issue.  Until recently, this violence 
was directed primarily at RTG institutions with no evidence 
of attacks directed towards foreign interests.  On April 3, 
however, simultaneous bombs exploded outside a French-owned 
Carrefour supermarket in Songkla's Hat Yai City and at the 
Hat Yai airport, killing two persons.   Thai officials may 
ask you for U.S. equipment and technology such as UAVs to 
support efforts to monitor militant movements in the south. 
We recommend you be receptive but noncommittal, and suggest 
that technical experts follow up.  You may also wish to point 
to our plans to improve human rights training for Thai 
soldiers and officers who will rotate to the south.  We are 
working with U.S. experts to develop a multi-faceted training 
program to educate enlisted soldiers, mid-level officers and 
senior Thai leadership.  It would be prudent to keep in mind 
that Thaksin -- and most Thais -- are sensitive about any 
perception that the U.S. wants to establish a security 
presence in the south.  Outrageous but widely circulated 
rumors that the U.S. has fomented violence in the South also 
need to be considered when discussing offers of possible U.S. 
assistance.  In your meetings, you may wish to: 
 
--Seek your interlocutor's assessment of the situation in the 
south and to ask what the Thai strategy is to bring the 
situation under control; 
--Point out our desire that any Thai security response be 
conducted while respecting international human rights norms 
and explain the negative consequences associated with 
incidents like Tak Bai. 
 
THAILAND AND IRAQ 
 
17.  (C)  Thailand dispatched two deployments to Iraq as part 
of OIF.  In December 2003, two Thai soldiers were killed by a 
car bomb while on duty in Karbala.  Thailand's second 
six-month deployment of 443 medics and engineers to Iraq 
ended on September 20, 2004.  While participation in OIF has 
not caused the domestic furor in Thailand that it has in 
other countries, Thaksin's critics have used Thailand's 
deployments to Iraq against him.  Several RTG officials have 
told us that Thailand's deployments have been used by 
militants to stir up dissent in the Muslim south.  Recently, 
CJCS General Myers sent a letter to General Chaisit asking 
Thailand to consider sending staff officers to man the OIF 
Multinational Headquarters.  It would be appropriate for you 
to ask your interlocutors how they intend to answer General 
Myers' request.  Similarly, during your meetings with senior 
Thai officials, you may wish to: 
 
--Express appreciation for Thailand's previous deployments to 
Afghanistan and Iraq; 
--Explain that the Administration hopes Thailand will 
consider a follow-on deployment in support of OIF; 
--Assure RTG leaders that U.S. military experts will help 
them shape the deployment. 
STRATEGIC TALKS 
18.  (C)  PACOM J-5 led our delegation during the week of 
October 18 in our annual mil-mil strategic talks with 
Thailand, Thai-Tac.  It became clear over the course of those 
talks that they could be improved by focusing less on arcane 
details or minor disagreements between staff officers and 
more on strategic issues.  Both sides agreed that Thai-Tac 
2005, scheduled to be held in Honolulu this fall, should 
focus more on strategic issues --leaving tactical issues for 
staff officers to resolve.  During you conversations at Royal 
Thai Supreme Command, you may wish to: 
 
--Express our hopes that Thai-Tac in the future focuses on 
key strategic issues such as RMSI, the rise of China and 
India, force modernization and other issues. 
 
INTEL COOPERATION 
 
19.  (C)  Your J2 valiantly tried to implement an 
Intelligence Modernization Program with the Royal Thai Armed 
Forces during the past year.  However, the Thai military 
intelligence community stiff-armed the offer, primarily on 
the questionable grounds that the individual services do not 
want or need to be part of the joint approach offered by 
USPACOM.  This helps illustrate a problem the Thai military 
-- and the Thai Government -- has in dealing with the 
southern insurgency, i.e., excessive stovepiping of 
information and insufficient sharing within the Armed Forces 
or with other agencies.  While our bilateral intel 
relationship is good, it can be improved, especially at the 
military-to-military level.  In discussing intelligence 
matters with your interlocutors, it may be useful to remember 
that Defense Minister Thamarak has a strong intelligence 
background.  In your meetings with the Supreme Commander and 
the Minister of Defense you may wish to: 
 
--Underscore lessons the U.S. Government has learned about 
intelligence cooperation and the necessity to link 
intelligence together from the military services, Joint 
Commands, and other Agencies; 
--Offer for your J2 to re-engage with the Thai J2 and service 
intelligence chiefs to raise the mil-mil intel relationship 
to a more mature level. 
 
 
F-16 SALE 
 
20.  (C)  Thailand recently announced its plans to purchase 
18 fighter aircraft to replace aging F-5s in the RTAF fleet. 
Although the RTAF presently has 59 F-16s in its inventory, 
press reports indicate that the RTG is leaning towards 
purchasing Saab Gripens or SU-30s because of a belief (which 
we have worked to overcome) that Saab or Sukhoi can offer a 
better business deal to Thailand.  Recently, Lockheed Martin 
executives have made it clear to Thai decision makers that 
their company will put together a countertrade package equal 
to up to 100 percent of the purchase price of any aircraft. 
This promise has allowed RTAF officers -- who generally 
support the F-16 Block 52 in the competition -- to start 
putting together a package outlining options for the purchase 
for the RTAF commander's approval.  While rumors are rife 
that some senior Thai Air Force officers may be receiving 
compensation from one of the other two competitors to support 
their bids, the Embassy believes that pressure from senior 
U.S. officials like yourself can improve Lockheed Martin's 
prospects.  It is our belief that a transparent competition 
that takes into consideration capability of the aircraft, 
interoperability with U.S. forces and cost would result in 
F-16 winning the contract.  It would be extremely helpful in 
this effort if you would: 
 
--Point out the interoperability advantages F-16 has over 
SU-30 or Gripen and how it is the best choice to defend 
Thailand. 
 
IN CLOSING 
 
21.  (SBU)  Thank you for seeing me in Honolulu. 
Congratulations again on assuming your new command, and I 
look forward to welcoming you to Thailand. 
BOYCE