US embassy cable - 05QUITO878

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ECUADOR: THE WAY FORWARD

Identifier: 05QUITO878
Wikileaks: View 05QUITO878 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Quito
Created: 2005-04-21 16:52:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV PREL ASEC EC
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 QUITO 000878 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/19/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ASEC, EC 
SUBJECT: ECUADOR: THE WAY FORWARD 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Kristie A. Kenney.  Reasons 1.4 (b&d) 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  The dismissal by Congress of President 
Lucio Gutierrez on April 20 and the swearing in of President 
Alfredo Palacio has shifted the political landscape.  Palacio 
took office sounding notes of contrast with his predecessor, 
including respect for the constitution and the letter of 
Ecuador's international commitments, greater responsiveness 
to the will of the people, and a vow to end impunity and 
restore rule of law.  With the situation still fluid, we are 
taking action on several fronts.  First, we will reach out 
immediately to the new government privately, while 
maintaining public reserve on the legitimacy of the new 
government, to open channels to the new government.  We will 
also maintain close contact with the security forces to 
encourage professionalism and restraint, and conduct outreach 
to monitor reaction to the new government by the public, 
media and elites here and in Guayaquil.  This will include 
outreach to Congress, Guayaquil political and economic elite, 
private sector leaders, media leaders, senior statesmen, 
indigenous and groups.  In the medium term, and assuming the 
Palacio government consolidates itself, we will need to 
revisit strategies to support democratic institutions and 
advance other USG interests.  End Summary. 
 
Dealing with Palacio 
-------------------- 
 
2.  (C) Gutierrez was dismissed under Art. 167, section 6 of 
the Ecuadorian constitution, which permits dismissal of the 
president for "abandonment of duties, declared by the 
National Congress."  Dismissal was chosen over impeachment 
because the former requires a simple majority of 51 and 
impeachment 67.  The vote in favor was 60-0, with two 
abstentions.  The constitutionality of the dismissal of 
Gutierrez is open to question, but ample precedent exists 
here of irregular interpretations of the constitution which 
are later legalized to permit government continuity.  We have 
resisted interpreting the constitution and do not believe the 
USG has an interest in judging this issue. 
 
3.  (C) Palacio took office contrasting himself with 
Gutierrez' discredited actions, swearing fealty to the 
constitution and expressing respect for rule of law and 
existing GOE commitments, responsiveness to public opinion, 
and some concern with aspects of ongoing free trade 
negotiations (especially intellectual property issues). 
 
Action Plan: Short Term by Quito and Guayaquil 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
4.  (C) Government:  With protests still possible which could 
disrupt Palacio's hold over the presidency, we should not 
rush to publicly legitimize the Palacio government. 
Privately, however, it is urgent and beneficial to open 
channels to the new government.  We will do so by calling on 
the three ministers already named, on the pretext of 
fact-finding, and will use the calls to begin a dialogue 
including key U.S. interests.  We will do this outreach with 
POL/ECON officers, not at higher levels.  If requested by the 
new president, the Ambassador will engage directly with 
Palacio, without pronouncing or endorsing the legitimacy of 
the government. 
 
5.  (C) Security Forces:  The police and military high 
command played a role the downfall of the Gutierrez 
government, and has pledged fealty to the new government. 
Police authorities have made a similar commitment.  It is 
essential, however, to continue to engage with the military 
and police to keep the pressure on for professionalism and 
restraint in dealing with the security situation, and to 
monitor military intentions and internal tensions.  We will 
continue to do so. 
 
6.  (C) Outreach to Third Parties:  In addition, we will 
canvass contacts in key sectors:  the media, the indigenous 
movement, the private sector, selected members of the 
dipcorps, senior statesmen and former ministers we respect. 
 
7.  (C) Congress:  Is cowed by public protests calling for 
their ouster, and keeping a low profile.  We will monitor 
them closely for actions which would affect the stability of 
the new government.  Palacio has already signaled that he 
will not move to dissolve Congress or call early elections, 
but has called on them to conduct a process of 
self-examination and criticism. 
 
Medium Term 
----------- 
 
8.  (C) Once the situation stabilizes, we will need to 
revisit the question of how the USG can best assist Ecuador 
to strengthen its democratic institutions and culture. 
 
KENNEY 

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