US embassy cable - 05NEWDELHI2992

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 002992 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/22/2015 
TAGS: PREL, EAID, ENRG, IZ, IN, India-Iraq 
SUBJECT: INDIA WAITING FOR NEW IRAQI GOVERNMENT BEFORE 
COMMITTING TO ACTION 
 
REF: NEW DELHI 2933 
 
Classified By: Charge Robert O. Blake, Jr., for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  Incoming MEA Joint Secretary (Gulf 
Division) Sanjay Singh reiterated GOI willingness to support 
Iraq's democratic transition, but is waiting for the new 
government in Baghdad to take its seat before committing to 
action.  In a conversation with PolCouns and PolMilOff on 
April 19, Singh said the GOI hopes to use its multi-sectoral 
engagement in Afghanistan as a model for Iraq, but is still 
stymied by lack of communication with Baghdad and poor 
security in the country.  Despite these obstacles, Indo-Iraqi 
trade continues to grow, and will be boosted by a contract 
for oil exploration by an Indian state-owned oil company. 
End Summary. 
 
2.  (SBU) Following on high-level discussions about GOI 
engagement in Iraq during Dr. Rice's visit to New Delhi in 
March and, more recently, during Indian Foreign Minister 
Natwar Singh's visit to Washington, and A/S Rocca's meetings 
in New Delhi on April 18, PolCouns queried the new Gulf J/S 
about GOI plans in Iraq.  Noting that Natwar had suggested 
that India might be most helpful in assisting Iraq draft a 
new Constitution and that the GOI has continued to express 
interest in police training (Reftel), PolCouns asked how the 
GOI will put these ideas into effect.  Singh responded that a 
recent UN Assistance Mission to Iraq (UNAMI) meeting in 
Baghdad had established a Parliamentary committee to oversee 
framing the constitution.  India will await the committee's 
plan for drafting the constitution before deciding what 
action to take. 
 
3.  (C) Singh went on to lament the lack of communication 
with the Iraqi government, both via the Iraqi Embassy in New 
Delhi and the Indian Embassy in Baghdad.  The J/S asked 
whether the current Baghdad government is still considered an 
interim authority.  He expressed hope that once the new Iraqi 
government was formally installed, communication between New 
Delhi and Baghdad would become more regular, but opined that 
with tight deadlines to draft the constitution and elect a 
permanent government later this year, Baghdad's focus will 
continue to be inward. 
 
4.  (C) Responding to PolCouns' question about the status of 
the Agrement for the Iraqi ambassador to India, which has 
been pending since September, Singh stated that it was still 
being processed.  He did not have an update on the selection 
of an Indian Ambassador to Iraq, but implied that the GOI 
would proceed in parallel with their diplomatic normalization 
(which press here have focused on as implicit GOI endorsement 
of the post-Saddam dispensation).  PolCouns noted that the 
Head of the Australasia Division in the Iraqi Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Ambassador al-Jawadi, may visit New Delhi 
before or after the Bandung Summit in Jakarta, April 20-22, 
and asked about MEA's meetings with him.  Admitting he had 
not been in contact with the Iraqi Embassy in New Delhi since 
becoming Gulf J/S, Singh said he had not heard about the 
visit.  PolCouns encouraged the J/S to make and maintain 
contact with the Iraqi Charge and approve the pending 
Agrement for the Iraqi Ambassador.  (Note:  Mission contacted 
Iraqi Charge to encourage a meeting between the Iraqi MFA 
visitor and MEA.  Iraqi Charge informed PolMilOff on April 20 
that Ambassador al-Jawadi would like to visit India as part 
of an "unofficial familiarization tour" of Asia after the 
Bandung Summit, including stops in several other countries, 
e.g., Vietnam.  The purpose of his visit to New Delhi would 
be "internal," i.e., to meet and brief Iraqi Embassy staff, 
but he may also seek meetings with MEA Secretary (East) Rajiv 
Sikri, Indian journalists, and US Embassy New Delhi, 
according to Iraqi Charge.  End Note.) 
 
5.  (C) Singh then turned the conversation to the security 
situation in the country and the recent kidnapping of a 
Pakistani diplomat in Baghdad.  Acknowledging that the 
insurgents were still an organized and lethal force, PolCouns 
highlighted that the January 30 elections undermined them 
politically.  Further, the Indian Shia community in Lucknow, 
Hyderabad and elsewhere seemed to buttress the stabilizing 
influence of Ayatollah Sistani, as evidenced during past 
crises in Karbala and during the January polls.  According to 
Singh, Indian Shias continue to go to Iraq on pilgrimages 
despite the travel ban, and many do not return. 
 
6.  (SBU) Asked about the status of India-Iraq economic 
relations, Singh responded that trade continues to grow.  He 
was hopeful that the reactivation of a pre-2001 contract for 
India's state-owned Oil and Natural Gas Corporation's (ONGC) 
to develop oil blocks in Iraq would help address India's 
growing energy needs and lessen its $20 million trade 
deficit, largely due to the rise in oil prices.  The GOI 
would like to use India's large-scale, multi-sectoral 
involvement in Afghanistan as a model for its engagement in 
Iraq, but Singh admitted that the only program the GOI has 
tried to replicate thus far is Indian assistance to produce 
high-energy biscuits for the World Food Program in Iraq. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
7.  (C) Comment:  The GOI remains hamstrung about engaging in 
Iraq, paralyzed by bureaucratic inertia, competing 
priorities, and an exaggerated fear of the domestically 
influential Left parties in the UPA coalition.  Natwar's 
public remarks with Dr. Rice about the formational government 
may have opened space for real GOI movement on this issue. 
Key to seeing action will be to encourage contacts between 
the GOI and the new Iraqi government as quickly as possible. 
End Comment. 
 
8.  (U) Baghdad minimize considered. 
BLAKE