US embassy cable - 05TAIPEI1871

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 001871 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PASS AIT/W 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINR, CH, TW, Cross Strait Politics 
SUBJECT: CHEN ADMINISTRATION LOOKS TO PFP TO STEAL KMT 
CROSS-STRAIT THUNDER 
 
REF: A. TAIPEI 1827 
     B. TAIPEI 1437 
 
Classified By: AIT DIRECTOR Douglas Paal, Reason:  1.4 (B.D) 
 
1. (C) Summary:  Presidential advisors assert that Beijing's 
April 18 invitation to People First Party (PFP) Chairman 
James Soong was a vindication of the government's hard-line 
stance towards the KMT's attempts to open a separate dialogue 
with the PRC.  Presidential Office Deputy Secretary General 
James Huang told AIT that the government will consider giving 
"semi-authorization" to Soong so his upcoming Beijing trip 
can serve as an "ice-breaker" for future cross-Strait 
developments.  Huang said that President Chen Shui-bian's 
harsh April 16 attack on KMT Chairman Lien Chan was the 
result of Chen's anger over media reports that the KMT would 
sign a "cessation of hostilities" agreement with the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP).  While Presidential aides remain 
deeply suspicious of Lien's motives, they insists that the 
government will proceed with plans for cross-Strait openings 
after the dust settles from the Lien/Soong visits and May 14 
National Assembly (NA) elections.  AIT has cautioned all 
parties not to allow heated rhetoric over cross-Strait issues 
to undermine chances for future cooperation in the 
Legislative Yuan (LY).  End Summary. 
 
Derailing the KMT-CCP Accord? 
----------------------------- 
 
2. (C) Senior Chen administration officials tell AIT they are 
increasingly confident that they have thwarted PRC attempts 
to use the KMT to undermine the government's cross-Strait 
policy.  Presidential Office Deputy Secretary General James 
Huang assessed that the government's strong reaction to the 
KMT's unilateral attempts to negotiate cross-Strait 
agreements convinced leaders on the Mainland that their 
"united front" strategy was becoming counterproductive. 
Huang and other officials say that Beijing appears to be 
exploring avenues for talking to the Chen administration, 
perhaps using Soong as a preliminary bridge.  Huang credited 
President Chen's harsh condemnation of Lien Chan on April 16 
for Beijing's April 18 invitation to PFP Chairman James 
Soong.  Huang said the PFP's lack of advance knowledge of the 
April 18 invitation suggests that Beijing made the decision 
in haste. 
 
3. (C) National Security Council (NSC) Senior Advisor, and 
close Presidential confidante, Lin Jin-chang told AIT that 
President Chen remains committed to his policy of 
reconciliation with the Mainland.  Lin echoed Huang's 
assessment of Beijing's motives, adding that the President is 
increasingly confident that the PRC has stepped back from its 
aggressive attempt in the aftermath of the Anti-Secession Law 
to undermine the government via the KMT.  Lin said that the 
government will wait until the media circus surrounding the 
Lien/Soong visits and May 14 NA election tapers off before 
resuming the government's cross-Strait liberalization 
initiatives.  While condemning recent PRC and KMT actions in 
highly emotional terms, Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) 
Chairman Joseph Wu confirmed to the Director on April 18 that 
the government will restart liberalization initiatives, 
likely in June.  When pressed whether the government may 
endorse any of the items included in the  KMT-CCP "Ten 
Points," Presidential Office SecGen Huang replied that Taipei 
has a list of initiatives much longer than that, and is 
willing to engage on a range of issues as long as Beijing 
agrees to talk to the Chen administration. 
 
Soong:  Loyal Opposition 
------------------------ 
 
4. (C)  The NSC's Lin told AIT that the President hopes James 
Soong's visit will set a positive atmosphere for future 
cross-Strait interactions.  Lin noted that the KMT played 
such a role in the lead up to the historical Lunar New Year 
charter flights earlier this year by creating a positive 
atmosphere and then letting the government talk details. 
Presidential Office Deputy SecGen Huang said that the 
President would consider giving Soong "semi-authorization" 
for his upcoming talks in Beijing.  However, NSC Senior 
Advisor for cross-Strait policy Chen Chung-hsin told AIT he 
has counseled against another meeting between Chen and Soong 
for fear that at this stage in the relationship Beijing would 
not welcome Soong if he were seen as an "envoy" from Chen. 
PFP Policy Chief Vincent Chang (Hsien-yao) expressed similar 
concerns.  Chang told AIT that the PFP  will keep in close 
"under-the-table" contact with the Presidential Office, but 
will likely avoid any public contacts between Soong and the 
President before the Beijing trip.  He added, however, that 
Soong will definitely raise Chen and Soong's February 24 "10 
Points" during his Beijing meetings.  Chang said that Soong 
will characterize the Chen-Soong agreements as the "basic 
consensus" cross-Strait policy within Taiwan society.  Chang 
and the Presidential SecGen Huang have consulted at least 
twice in private since the PRC's public invitation to Soong. 
 
Lien:  Disloyal Opposition 
-------------------------- 
 
5. (C) Presidential aides continue to characterize KMT 
Chairman Lien Chan's efforts in scathing terms, ruling out 
the possibility that Lien's visit could add any positive 
momentum to the cross-Strait relationship given the KMT 
Chairman's perceived hatred for the Chen government.  The 
Presidential Office's Huang told AIT that Chen's harsh 
denunciation of Lien during his April 16 Rotary Speech 
stemmed from anger over reports in the local media that 
morning suggesting that Lien would sign a "cessation of 
hostilities" agreement with Hu Jintao during his upcoming 
visit.  Huang said the President "felt it was his 
responsibility as the Head of State" to lay down a marker 
against what he perceived as an usurpation of governmental 
authority.  Presidential aides say they believe that 
prospects for Lien to contact Chen before Lien's departure 
appear to be fading and blame Lien's personal anger over the 
March 20, 2004 election results for his obstinance.  They 
show no sense that Chen's intemperate rhetoric may be part of 
the problem. 
 
Cooling Tempers 
--------------- 
 
6. (C) AIT has urged both parties to maintain restraint in 
public in order to create conditions for the Legislative Yuan 
(LY) to resume deliberations over the Special Defense 
Procurement Budget and other major bills.  The NSC's Lin 
assured AIT that the government's "bottom line" is to avoid 
repeating the gridlock of the past four years.  However, Lin 
and other senior Presidential aides acknowledge that Chen 
Shui-bian continues to perceive Lien and the KMT as complicit 
in Beijing's campaign to undermine his authority and Taiwan 
solidarity in the wake of the Anti-Secession Law. 
Presidential Office Deputy SecGen Huang said the President 
believes that Taiwan can only effectively engage with Beijing 
if there is a domestic consensus over Taiwan's interests.  He 
added that, in Chen's view, the KMT's unilateral overtures 
will cause lasting harm to Taiwan's fundamental interests. 
Chen administration officials continue to dismiss the 
possibility that the KMT will cooperate on the Special 
Defense Procurement Budget and say that their strategy will 
continue to focus on cooperation with the PFP. 
 
Comment: Perceptions and Reality 
-------------------------------- 
 
7. (C) We are skeptical that Beijing has decided to retreat 
from its "united front" campaign and deal with the government 
in Taipei as a result of Chen's hard-line rhetoric.  However, 
this perception appears to be easing fears of isolation with 
the Chen administration that existed in the immediate 
aftermath of the P.K. Chiang visit to Beijing.  This changed 
assessment, and Beijing's April 18 invitation to James Soong, 
appears to be giving the Chen government more confidence to 
reopen planning for resumed cross-Strait economic 
liberalization.  While MAC and other agencies continue to 
tout the "effective management" theme in the current period, 
we do not hear for the moment the kinds of warnings over a 
long-term freeze in cross-Strait interactions that surfaced 
as a result of a perceived PRC "united front" offensive in 
late March/early April (Ref B). 
 
8. (C) The thornier problem is domestic.  Many in the Chen 
administration are convinced that it is impossible to deal 
with Lien Chan on any issue, and they suggest that the 
government may simply have to wait out Lien's term before 
seeking dialogue with a presumably more rational successor. 
The fact that Chen publicly reacted on April 16 to what 
turned out to erroneous media reports based on unnamed KMT 
sources suggests that the President personally assumes the 
darkest motives behind recent KMT actions.  Similarly, the 
KMT claims to be basing its actions on the belief that the 
Chen administration is intent on blocking all cross-Strait 
economic openings.  This lack of communication and mutual 
understanding continues to pose the greatest hurdle to making 
progress on all major policies, domestic and with the PRC. 
AIT will continue to press the government and KMT to exercise 
restraint and seek communication channels to separate facts 
from rumors. 
PAAL