US embassy cable - 05MANILA1817

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MANILA 001817 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/19/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PTER, RP 
SUBJECT: GRP'S NSC GROPES FOR ANSWERS TO "ISLAMIST 
EXTREMISM" 
 
 
Classified By: Pol/C Scott Bellard for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1.  (C).  Summary and Comment:  National Security Adviser 
Norberto Gonzales provided Ambassador with a copy of a report 
he presented to the Philippine National Security Council on 
March 29 regarding Islamist extremism in the Philippines. 
Gonzales has asked us to treat it with due discretion but has 
encouraged us to "use it as we see fit with other allies," 
but we should not pass the text to third countries.  He said 
he has shared it with Singapore already.  He views the 
prognosis for the Philippines in particular as "bleak."  He 
highlights that Islamist extremism in the Philippines was no 
longer a reaction to domestic events and policies, but rather 
increasingly a reflection of a "global war internal to the 
Muslims against so-called 'Muslim infidels' and the powers 
and nations that support the latter," i.e. the U.S. and, by 
extension, the Philippines.  He expresses special concern 
that the eventual U.S. success in Iraq will lead to the 
dispersion of extremists to other part of the world, with the 
Philippines as an unfortunate "ideal host" due to the 
existence of Muslim insurgent groups and "conflicting Islamic 
denominations within Filipino Muslim communities.  He calls 
upon the Philippines to "act decisively and hastily" (sic -- 
a Filipino-ism for "urgently"), while offering concrete 
suggestions only to eliminate private armies at Mindanao 
State University, re-launch an Islamic bank, and support 
Arabic teaching.  He fails to raise more substantive goals of 
bringing economic development and better governance to Muslim 
Mindanao, meeting long-standing demands from local Muslims 
for more significant autonomy in the "Autonomous Region in 
Muslim Mindanao," improving counter-terrorism capabilities by 
Philippine security forces, and addressing the real factors 
that attract Christian converts and local Muslims to the more 
radical versions of Islam.  Gonzales' think piece shows that 
at least some in the GRP recognize and are trying to grapple 
seriously with existential challenges to Philippine democracy 
and security.  That so few plausible solutions apparently 
present themselves to GRP policy-makers underscores the 
importance of our intimate strategic and security engagement 
with the GRP.  End Summary and Comment. 
 
2.  (C)  Begin text of GRP National Security Adviser's 
document: 
 
ISLAMIST EXTREMISM IN THE PHILIPPINES 
 
OVERVIEW 
 
This report provides a description of the changing face of 
Islamist extremism in the Philippines.  These changes are 
still evolving in their incipient stages and are taking place 
against the backdrop of a resurgent threat of international 
terrorism. 
 
We are aware of earlier attempts by international terrorist 
groups to conduct operations here in the Philippines.  Our 
first real scare happened in 1995 when the government 
discovered and preempted a sinister plot, code named "Oplan 
Bojinka", to assassinate the Pope during his visit to Manila. 
 Prior to that, our intelligence operatives have already 
noted the increased presence and influx of foreign trainors 
in MILF camps. 
 
In recent time, the intelligence community has noted more 
such indications of international terrorist activities and 
infiltration works in the country.  If these trends are not 
given immediate and proper attention by the government, our 
own Mindanao problem could eventually be transformed and 
drawn into the larger and more violent form of religious 
conflict that is now spreading across the globe. 
 
ISLAMIST EXTREMISM 
 
The early episodes of Islamist extremism in the Philippines 
were generally in response to local undertakings.  The 
all-out military offensive of the Estrada administration 
against the MILF in 2002 became a justification for 
subsequent bombing attacks in various places in Mindanao and 
Metro Manila.  The attack on the Buliok Complex in 2003 led 
to the Davao Airport and Sasa Wharf bombings in the same 
year.  This was revealed by Mustaqim bin Abbas, the 
Indonesian JI leader who is now detained in Jakarta. 
 
However, there are now indications that Islamist extremism in 
the country is no longer a mere reaction to domestic events. 
The latest bombing attacks now appear to be 
religious-inspired - a seeming realization of a long-term 
agenda with religion becoming a central issue behind 
terrorist acts. 
 
Nonetheless, the conflict is not between two religions. 
While there are continuing attempts to push the conflict as a 
religious war between Christianity and Islam, what is 
evolving is not so. 
 
In the early nineties, the world began noticing a wave of 
Islamic revivalism which had an uncanny resemblance to the 
conflicts which occurred during the early years of Islam, 
sparked mainly by the death of the Prophet Mohammad.  Four 
successive caliphates after his death had splintered Islam 
into warring groups which, to this day, we have reasonable 
ground to believe have been revived recently.  This rivalry 
is now threatening to transform the global Islamic struggle 
into a more dangerous and violent race for supremacy among 
these competing factions. 
 
The Islamist extremism that we are witnessing in the 
Philippines today are proxies to a global war internal to the 
Muslims against so-called 'Muslim infidels' and the powers 
and nations that support the latter. 
 
The United States is considered as the foremost patron of 
major centers of political power in the Muslim world; 
defenders of an Islamic world that, to these fanatics, are 
governed by infidels to the faith and therefore deserving 
annihilation.  The Philippines has become a target of these 
terrorist agenda because it is known as a loyal ally of the 
United States. 
 
Given this framework, our current prognosis is bleak. 
 
Within the wave of mainstream Islamic revivalism happening 
around us today, there is a violent, dogmatic and fanatical 
parallel that is rising with it.  There is reason to predict 
that the threat of Islamist extremism will not wane but in 
fact swell, especially when a degree of political stability 
is obtained in Iraq. 
 
Hundreds of restless elements of the Islamic faith composed 
of nationals from the Middle East and other Muslim countries 
- hardened veterans of the war in Iraq who purposely trained 
in it - will soon become unwelcome there.  Once Iraq has 
become inhospitable for them, they will disperse to other 
parts of the world to spread their sinister misinterpretation 
of Islam and continue with their jihad of destruction and the 
irrational killing of innocents. 
 
Two conditions make the Philippines an ideal host for these 
terrorists: the presence of Muslim armed groups in the South, 
ranging from separatists to bandits, and the presence of 
conflicting Islamic denominations within Filipino Muslim 
communities. 
 
Although Professor Mur Misuari, detained MNLF leader, still 
remains to be an influential figure within the MNLF - 
especially among the Tausugs - it should be noted that in the 
Misuari wing of the MNLF, the religious leadership is gaining 
ascendancy. 
 
As regards the MILF on the other hand, their lack of any 
political demand does not necessarily mean that peace 
negotiations with them will be any less difficult than what 
the GRP had experienced with the MNLF.  It could also mean 
that the MILF has yet to resolve the issue of whether to 
accept autonomy or continue with their original 
"Islamization" objective. 
 
"Islamization", as articulated by the late MILF Chairman 
Hashim Salamat in 1996, intended to influence how Islam 
should be practiced in Muslim Mindanao and how to purge the 
Muslim South of infidels through the creation of an Islamic 
enclave in Mindanao. 
 
It should be noted that the original intent of the MNLF was 
to cleanse Muslim Mindanao of Datoism and the corruption of 
its political leaders.  The MILF, on the other hand, was 
initiated to "cleanse" the Muslim South of its infidels. 
 
The intelligence community has noted the following key 
indications of increased infiltration effort by international 
terrorist network in the Philippines.  Two templates of 
Islamist extremism appear to be merging in the Philippines 
today: the direct Middle East (or Al Qaeda) template, and the 
Indonesian (Jemaah Islamiyah) template.  This merger is best 
manifested in the confluence of the Abu Sayyaf Group and the 
Rajah Solaiman Revolutionary Movement. 
 
The Abu Sayyaf Group, while notorious for their banditry, is 
introducing into the Philippines a fanatical folk religiosity 
that is suited to the needs of these international Islamist 
extremists. 
The Rajah Solaiman Revolutionary Movement, on the other hand 
is mostly composed of Christian converts who were directly 
indoctrinated and recruited by Middle Eastern missionaries; 
many of its members underwent JI training.  There are also 
intelligence reports that some 70 Rajah Solaiman members have 
already joined the ASG.  This reported connection with the 
Abu Sayyaf underscores this Mid-East attempt to directly 
import their brand of Islamist extremism to the Philippines. 
 
It appears that the Abu Sayyaf and the Rajah Solaiman Group 
are the main organizations tapped by both the JI and the 
Al-Qaeda for their operations.  However, trends indicate that 
for other armed Islamic organizations, these international 
terrorists prefer to tap, train and recruit their individual 
members. 
 
As far back as 2000, after the launching of the deadly Rizal 
Day LRT bombings, investigations and interrogation of 
suspects revealed that there are some 30 JI members in 
Southern Philippines with 10-20 other Indonesian jihadists 
working closely together.  The LRT attack was a 
JI-coordinated and sponsored plot executed by members of the 
MILF-Special Operations Group (SOG) operatives led by Moklis 
Yunos. 
 
The launching of joint terrorist ventures between local 
Islamist extremists and the JI was further reinforced by the 
arrest of MILF-SOG member Sammy Abdulgani on April 2004.  He 
admitted to authorities that he, together with JI leader 
Sulkipli, staged the Awang Airport bombing on 23 February 
2003 as diversionary ploy to then ongoing conflict in Buliok. 
 He further revealed that among those involved in the said 
bombing operation were detained JI leader Taufiq Rifqe and JI 
member who goes by the alias of Usman. 
 
Usman is to later on take over as JI leader in the 
Philippines after Zulkifli was arrested in Sabah on September 
2003.  Abdulgani further revealed that when he was arrested, 
he and a small group of MILF-SOG were about to execute a 
mission to bomb a passenger ferry in major Mindanao ports. 
He said that the group was acting on orders and instruction 
by Usman. 
 
Last year on October, another MILF-SOG member, Abdulmandap 
Mentang, was arrested.  He revealed that before Zulkifli was 
apprehended, Zulkifli financed and ordered the bombing of the 
Davao City International Airport on 4 March 2003 and the Sasa 
Wharf on 2 April of the same year, again to ease military 
pressure in the Buliok area.  When Mentang was arrested, he 
was conducting surveillance of the US Embassy in Manila. 
 
Investigation into the February 2004 Super Ferry bombing also 
revealed that was a JI-coordinated terrorist plot carried out 
by the ASG and the Rajah Solaiman Revolutionary Movement 
(RSRM). 
 
The government also foiled in 2003 a JI/ASG plot to attack 
various tourist destination resorts in the Visayas and 
maritime vessels plying the routes to and from Mindanao.  On 
the other hand, the arrest of a leading RSRM member Marianno 
Lumarda, uncovered and preempted a plot to bomb the US and 
Saudi embassies in Manila. 
 
A few days after last February 14's terrorist attacks in 
Metro Manila and Davao City, ASG member Gamal Baharan @ Tapat 
and Rajah Solaiman member Angelo Trinidad @ Abu Khalil 
Trinidad were nabbed as primary suspects.  Later on, a third 
suspect, Gappal Bannah y Sali @ Boy Negro, surrendered. 
 
Per testimony by Baharan, the JI and ASG cooperated in 
conducting seaborne training activities in preparation for a 
JI bombing plot on unspecified targets outside the 
Philippines.  Trinidad is also a suspect in the Super Ferry 
bombing.  Sali, on the other hand, also trained in a JI camp 
in Mindanao.  Many of the members of groups with which major 
Islamist terrorist groups have conducted joint operations, 
such as the Rajah Solaiman Revolutionary Movement were 
trained by the JI. 
 
This confirms intelligence reports that some 100 Islamist 
extremists have undergone training under the JI from the 
period 1996 to 1998 alone. 
 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The religious temperament of its communities will determine 
if Muslim Mindanao will remain fertile ground for terrorists 
or will become inhospitable to these Islamist extremists. 
 
Several factors are essential.  A strong, affirmative 
government presence is important, particularly through our 
local government officials there.  Learning institutions like 
the Mindanao State University must be rid of the presence of 
private armies and restore academic excellence.  The Muslim 
south must be linked to a Islamic financial system by 
re-launching the Al-Amanah Bank, allowing its ownership by 
wider, Muslim public.  Government must also support and 
supervise the teaching of the Arabic language because this is 
their gateway to a deeper, more moderate understanding of the 
Koran.  Establish cooperation and understanding with the 
Muslim South's religious leaders.  Their influence will 
determine to which direction the scale will tip for the 
Muslim South: 
 
We end this report with a reiteration of our major concern 
about the new challenges the Philippine government is 
confronting in the wake of the resurgence of global Islamist 
extremism. 
 
The real and potential danger or threat posed by 
international terrorist trends has become more complex and 
disturbing.  Old and bitter rivalries among warring Islamic 
factions are being revived, opening the stage for what 
appears geared towards a more violent struggle for supremacy 
through the conduct of terrorism all over the world. 
 
More so now than in the past, the Philippines could become a 
preferred destination for the launching of infiltration work 
and terrorist operations by international terrorist groups. 
This is because of the country's terrorism-enabling 
environment that makes it an ideal springboard for the spread 
of Islamist extremism in these parts of the globe.  If the 
trends we mentioned indicating increased linkages and 
cooperation between leading international terrorist groups 
and their local counterparts here would not be addressed 
immediately and properly, the risks would be unacceptably 
high.  Failure on the part of the government to act 
decisively and hastily on the matter could draw our own 
Mindanao problem into the larger, more violent Islamist 
extremism that is now unfolding in the Muslim world. 
End text 
Ricciardone