US embassy cable - 05SANTODOMINGO2209

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 SANTO DOMINGO 002209 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR WHA, WHA/AND, WHA/CAR, WHA/PPC, INR, PM; SOUTHCOM 
ALSO FOR POLAD; NSC FOR SHANNON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/20/2020 
TAGS: MARR, PINR, PREL, DR 
SUBJECT: THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND HUGO CHAVEZ OF VENEZUELA 
 
REF: A. A. STATE 43965 
     B. B.2004 SANTO DOMINGO 6240 
     C. C. SANTO DOMINGO 1801 
     D. D. SANTO DOMINGO 542 
     E. E. 04 SANTO DOMINGO 6119 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Hertell for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY.  Venezuela and the Dominican Republic have 
close historical ties; during Trujillo's dictatorship, many 
Dominicans got help from Venezuela or lived there in 
political exile.  Hugo Chavez has been in active contact with 
the Dominican Republic, agreeing to concessional financing 
for oil, providing disaster relief assistance and asking 
little tangible in return.  There is an umimpressive 
"Bolivarian Society of the Dominican Republic," and the 
Dominican military has close ties to the Venezuelan military. 
 Relations between Venezuela and the Dominican Republic are 
cordial. President Fernandez has praised Chavez publicly 
several times; in private, Fernandez has commented to the 
Ambassador that Chavez and his politics are mistaken.  It 
appears that Fernandez and Chavez are happy to continue using 
one another: Fernandez in hopes of obtaining concessional 
financing for oil imports and other benefits for his 
cash-strapped nation, and Chavez to demonstrate magnanimity 
and create a claim for Bolivarian solidarity.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (C) Following are Embassy's responses to questions in 
reftel A: 
 
A. The GOV's ties to radical groups, anti-systemic parties, 
extreme leftist organizations, and/or terrorists -- 
especially US-designated FTOs. 
 
- - (C) The government of Venezuela does not appear to have 
ties to any radical, left-wing or terrorist groups in the 
Dominican Republic.  Despite this, President Fernandez,s 
special ambassador Jose Miguel Mejia Abreu is a regular 
intermediary with Chavez and the Venezuelan authorities. 
Mejia was Secretary General of the radical Movement of the 
United Left (Movimiento de Izquierda Unida) in the mid-1990s 
- - the group is now inactive.  Mejia has had extensive 
contacts with Cuba, North Korea, Vietnam and China.  In the 
first Fernandez administration Mejia was Foreign Ministry 
coordinator for Caribbean affairs with rank of ambassador. 
Mejia has promoted visits to the Dominican Republic by PRC 
and North Korean officials since the Fernandez administration 
took office in August 2005. 
 
B. Activities hosted by Bolivarian groups and/or the 
Venezuelan embassy. 
 
- - (C) The one known and relatively obscure "Bolivarian 
group" here calls itself the "Bolivarian Society of the 
Dominican Republic."  According to the only document we have 
of the group, it was founded in Santo Domingo in 2001 and 
elected a board of directors in June 2004.  The board 
president, retired Dominican Army Major General Hector 
Lachapelle Diaz, fought on the constitutionalist side in the 
1965 civil war, had a long military career after returning 
from exile in early 1970s, and in retirement has become 
prominent via participation in televised debates on 
historical topics  (He is not the former National Drug 
Control Director, of the same paternal family name.)  Two 
other board members, Victor Villegas and Mariano Lebron, are 
prominent intellectuals and writers.  Villegas fought against 
the Trujillo dictatorship as a member of the 14th of June 
Movement.  The "Bolivarian Society" has among its stated 
objectives to study and spread the ideas of the South 
American liberator Simon Bolivar and to establish other such 
groups around the country. 
 
C. Host government's reaction to the presence of domestic 
Bolivarian groups. 
 
- - (SBU) There appears to have been no Dominican government 
reaction. 
 
D. Host government's opinion of Chavez and its thoughts on 
how to deal with the Bolivarian Revolution. 
 
- - (U) Venezuela and the Dominican Republic have close 
historical ties. During Trujillo's dictatorship, ended by 
assassination in 1961, many Dominicans got help from 
Venezuela or lived there in political exile. 
 
(SBU) Leonel Fernandez received Chavez during the first 
Fernandez administration (1996-2000), while Chavez was in the 
early stages of his own presidential campaign.  After 
Fernandez left office in 2000, in response to a request from 
Chavez, he called upon contacts in the Carter Center in the 
United States to help arrange mediation between Chavez and 
the Venezuelan opposition. 
 
(C) Chavez's most significant effort in the Dominican 
Republic has been his "oil diplomacy," providing financing 
for oil on concessional terms.  Although Fernandez told the 
Ambassador that there was no quid pro quo, the deal stands as 
an admonition to the Dominicans of the importance of Latin 
American solidarity.  Chavez came to the Dominican Republic 
in November 2004 for an eight-hour visit (reftel B) during 
which he signed a bilateral oil financing agreement when the 
new Fernandez government faced an energy crisis and severe 
financial pressures as it was negotiating an IMF agreement. 
In public comments, Chavez explicitly tied oil to populist 
politics, saying that cheap oil would help the poor.  Chavez 
told Fernandez to invest the savings in social causes to 
improve the lot of the poorest Dominicans. 
 
(SBU) During their joint press conference, Chavez again 
alleged that the United States was behind the attempted coup 
against him in April 2002.  Fernandez balanced his own reply, 
comparing Chavez to Colonel Francisco Caamano, the 
"constitutionalist" military leader/"president" who led the 
popular uprising against Balaguer in 1965 (and was killed in 
1973 seeking in Che Guevara style to spark a revolution from 
the mountains).  Fernandez congratulated President Bush for 
his re-relection and offered to serve as go-between to help 
resolve any outstanding issues between Venezuela and the 
United States. 
 
(SBU) In March 2005, the Venezuelan military loaned two Puma 
helicopters and 8 pilots to the Dominican Republic at no cost 
to help fight forest fires in the central mountains (retel 
C). The Dominicans paid for fuel. The United States was 
unable to provide similar assistance, because President 
Fernandez declined to declare the forest fires a national 
emergency.  The bucket-carrying helicopters made no great 
impact on the fires, but the gesture was well covered in the 
press and well received by the administration, other 
government officials, and the press.  The Dominican Congress 
issued a statement "thanking eternally the sister Bolivarian 
republic of Venezuela personified by President Hugo Chvez, 
for the selfless solidarity for our people, providing 
equipment for a more efficient solution of the problem." 
 
(C) Fernandez has commented to the Ambassador in private 
about the "mistaken approach" of Chavez, but is consistently 
positive about Chavez in public. In meetings with U.S. 
officials after Chavez's November 2004 visit, Fernandez and 
key members of his staff indicated that the Dominican 
Republic wanted to keep cordial relations with Chavez in part 
to secure oil financing, but they were not falling for his 
rhetoric or under his spell.  Comments by close associates of 
the President suggest that many in the administration dislike 
Chavez.  In private comments to the Ambassador Foreign 
Minister Carlos Morales Troncoso (from the conservative 
Social Christian Reformist Party) called Chavez a "madman." 
In comments to WHA DAS Shapiro in January, Fernandez 
criticized Chavez's policies, particularly the call for land 
redistribution, as "obsolete."  Fernandez has joked to the 
Ambassador that Chavez is "Castro, but with oil." 
 
(C) On the other hand, Fernandez publicly expresses 
admiration for Chavez.  This dates back to Fernandez's first 
term (1996-2000), when then-candidate Chavez called on 
Fernandez and discussed a shared interest in social policy. 
Fernandez stopped in Caracas during his pre-inaugural swing 
through South America and during Chavez's November 2004 visit 
the two appeared together at public events, including the 
dedication of a small, centrally-located park with a statue 
of Bolivar paid for by Venezuela.  When Chavez loaned the 
helicopters to help fight forest fires, Fernandez was quoted 
in the press as having said in a Cabinet meeting, "President 
Chavez showed solid support by sending this military 
mission."  Fernandez has willing tried to moderate for 
Chavez, for example by mediating in a dispute between 
Venezuela and Colombia over the arrest of a FARC leader in 
Venezuela (reftel D). 
 
E. The country's commercial ties with Venezuela and any new 
business or trade agreements in the works, especially in the 
energy and military sectors. 
- - (U) The two nations signed a Comprehensive Energy 
Cooperation Agreement that features plans for joint projects 
related to petroleum and established an annual "mixed 
commission" to discuss social development in Venezuela and 
the Dominican Republic (reftel E). The associated oil 
arrangement authorizes concessional financing for 25 percent 
of the value of crude oil imports from Venezuela, for up to 
50,000 barrels per day.  Terms are two years grace and then 
two percent per annum for a period of 15 years.  The 
Dominican Republic does not have adequate refining capacity 
to use all of this facility and currently is importing only 
30,000 barrels of Venezulan crude per day for the national 
refinery.  Industry sources believe that the oil is coming in 
under terms of earlier long-term contracts.  In an April 7 
interview with the online publication "diario a diario" 
(www.diarioadiario.com), Fernandez's special ambassador 
Miguel Mejia, who helped broker the deal, asserted there was 
a "conspiracy" of Dominican party leaders and businessmen 
blocking the operation of the financing agreement. 
 
F. Mainstream media - major dailies from both the left and 
right - views of Chavez and his role in region. 
 
- - (SBU) Media coverage of Chavez in the Dominican Republic 
is generally balanced.  Chavez is given roughly the same 
treatment as other heads of state, and articles involving 
Venezuela appear in the international section.  There have 
been some editorials and opinion pieces that favor Chavez. 
For example, editorials in daily sensationalist tabloid El 
Nacional are frequently critical of the United States and 
generally supportive of the Venezuelan government. 
 
- - (U) During coverage of Chavez's November 2004 visit to 
the Dominican Republic, a left of center paper reported 
favorably on the visit, including an opinion piece strongly 
supporting Chavez's allegations of U.S. interference in Latin 
American affairs.  Venezuela received considerable positive 
press coverage from some newspapers after donating the 
services of helicopters to fight forest fires. 
 
G. Assessment of academic elites, opinion leaders, etc. of 
how Chavez figures in the rise of the so-called Latin 
American new left.  Is he viewed as a democrat?  An 
authoritarian militaristic leader trying to export his brand 
of revolution?  A populist? 
 
- - (SBU) Dominican opinion-makers are divided on Chavez. 
Some editorialists worry that the election of Chavez was 
symptomatic of Latin Americans' disillusionment with corrupt 
politics and could prompt other countries -- perhaps even 
including the Dominican Republic -- to seek authoritarian or 
populist solutions to intractable socio-economic problems. 
Others see him as part of a trend of left-leaning governments 
in Latin America, sympathetic to Castro's Cuba, that are 
challenging U.S. influence in the region.  Conservative 
political contacts warn us privately that Chavez exerts 
undesirable influence om President Fernandez and will damage 
U.S. interests in the Dominican Republic.  Others see 
relations with Chavez more positively as a means of 
diversifying the country's foreign ties while managing the 
top priority, the United States.  Most believe that the 
Dominican Republic needs to stay in good graces with 
Venezuela, a main source of fossil fuels. 
 
H. Host government's visa and immigration requirements for 
Venezuelan passport holders. 
 
- - (U) To visit the Dominican Republic, a Venezuelan holding 
a valid passport needs only to purchase a Dominican tourist 
card on the airplane or in the airport upon arrival. 
 
I.  Border security agreements (as appropriate) - existing 
and being planned - between host government and the GOV. 
 
- - (U) Not applicable. 
 
J. Information-sharing agreements (intel, law enforcement) 
existing and being planned - between host government and 
the GOV. 
 
- - (SBU) There are no known formal information-sharing 
agreements between the Dominican Republic and Venezuela. 
However, the Dominican and Venezuelan military are close (see 
para. K, below), and there are probably informal channels for 
sharing information of mutual interest. 
 
K. Mil-Mil cooperation - existing and being planned - between 
host government and the GOV. 
 
- - (C) The Dominican and Venezuelan militaries have close 
ties at senior levels.  The current commander of the 
Dominican elite military anti-terrorism has had training in 
Venezuela.  In December 2004, Venezuelan General Lucas Rincon 
Romero (the second highest-ranking military official in 
Venezuela) came to the Dominican Republic for a 2-3 week 
visit.  (Rincon's sister-in-law is reportedly married to the 
Venezuelan ambassador to the Dominican Republic.)  Both the 
current and former J-3 Operations Directors have trained in 
Venezuela and served as guest instructors there.  In 
addition, Venezuela is one of only four countries to post a 
resident foreign defense attache to the Dominican Republic 
(the others being the United States, Taiwan, and Colombia). 
The Dominican attache to Venezuela, Brigadier General Eufemio 
Torres Mejia, has been assigned to that post since the first 
Fernandez administration (1996-2000).  Sources indicate that 
Torres has gained the trust of Chavez, to the extent that the 
Dominican ambassadors to Venezuela have had to rely on Torres 
in order to gain an audience with Chavez.  In addition, 
Torres does not socialize with other foreign country attaches 
in Venezuela, preferring to associate almost exclusively with 
Venezuelan military. 
 
(C) Chavez's November 2004 visit included at least 65 
Venezuelan military and security personnel flown directly to 
the San Isidro Air Force Base. Chavez received security from 
the Dominican counter-terrorism unit and socialized with its 
members.  Dominican military officials regularly attend 
command and staff level courses in Venezuela offered by the 
Venezuelan military, and the Venezuelans also provide 
technical training for Dominican officers and enlisted 
personnel.  Dominican field grade officers have been guest 
instructors at the Venezuelan command and staff college up 
until 2004, although the Dominicans do not currently have any 
trainers resident in Venezuela. 
 
(C) In contrast to political relations, which have improved 
since Fernandez took office, military exchanges have 
decreased in the first year of the Fernandez administration. 
This decrease can be attributed partially to financial 
constraints on the part of the Dominican military.  Even so, 
considering Venezuela's efforts to help the Dominicans in 
other areas, the Venezuelan military could just as easily 
have used some of its own funding to sponsor the Dominicans. 
Possibly in response to this, Colombia has expressed a desire 
to increase its mil-mil exchanges with the Dominican military 
to counter Venezuelan influence in the Dominican Republic. 
 
- - - - 
Comment 
- - - - 
 
3. (C)  Fernandez may be one of the few leaders in the region 
who can have an impact on Chavez's behavior, because of his 
personal acquaintance with Chavez, his understanding of 
regional politics, his desire to be a regional player, and 
his strong credentials on economic and social issues.  He 
does not present a threat to Chavez. Fernandez can persuade 
by example on economic policies and on support for democracy. 
 Furthermore, Fernandez has been friendly to the United 
States without appearing servile.  As long as Fernndez is 
not forced to make a choice between supporting Venezuela or 
the United States,the odds favor his continuing to play both 
sides. 
HERTELL