US embassy cable - 05BRUSSELS1556

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRUSSELS 001556 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/18/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, FR, TU, EUN, USEU BRUSSELS 
SUBJECT: WHAT A FRENCH "NON" ON THE EU CONSTITUTION COULD 
MEAN FOR THE EU 
 
REF: A. PARIS 2663 
 
     B. PARIS 2604 AND PREVIOUS 
     C. STATE 69923 
     D. USEU TODAY 4/20/2005 
 
Classified By: Rick Holtzapple, PolOff, Reasons 1.4 (B/D) 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1. (C)  No one can be sure of all the political consequences 
of a French rejection of the EU Constitution, but it would 
almost certainly end the document's chances of ever entering 
into force.  While forty days remain before the vote, Embassy 
Paris (refs A and B) has described the challenges facing the 
"yes" campaign.  Rejection of the treaty by the French (on 
May 29) or the Dutch (June 1)  -- or both -- will be blow to 
Europe's self-confidence and force the Luxembourg and British 
Presidencies to spend time on damage control for an issue 
they hoped they could ignore.  We do not believe it will 
throw the EU into crisis, however, or cause paralysis in EU 
decision-making.  The EU will carry on under the current 
treaties.  Enlargement may be marginally more complicated for 
the EU, but the impact of "enlargement fatigue" on the EU 
will not be determined by the fate of the Constitution.  Over 
time, many, if not all, of the changes to the EU proposed in 
the Constitutional Treaty will likely reappear, perhaps with 
some modification, in future EU efforts. (Septel provides 
more detailed analysis of the specific changes the 
Constitution would make to the EU.) 
 
2. (C/NF) In fact, rejection of the Constitution by the 
French now may be less politically risky for the EU than 
eventual rejection of the document by the British in 2006. 
For the U.S., we may face a somewhat distracted and less 
confident EU in the near term.  A French "no" may also reduce 
talk of multipolarity and building the EU as a counterweight 
to the U.S. But it would be wrong to interpret the 
Constitution's demise as the beginning of the end for the EU. 
 As the Europeans have shown in the past, regrouping is 
likely to ensure continuity on foreign policy 
decision-making, with member state governments continuing to 
see the EU as the venue for reaching common policies.  For 
our part, we should note that we do not see the treaty's 
fate, one way or the other, as prompting a crisis in Europe, 
and we continue to look to a strong and effective EU as a 
partner in facing global challenges.  END SUMMARY. 
 
NO ONE KNOWS ANYTHING FOR SURE, EXCEPT... 
----------------------------------------- 
 
3. (C) EU officials in Brussels, following the same events 
reported in Refs A and B, are increasingly of the view that 
French voters will reject the EU's proposed Constitution in a 
referendum on May 29.  What would rejection of the 
Constitution mean for the EU?  The most honest answer is the 
one Italian FM Fini gave the Secretary on April 13 (Ref C): 
No one knows for sure. 
 
4. (SBU) Legally, even after a French no, other member states 
should continue their ratification procedures. The theory is 
that EU leaders will need a full picture of how the 
Constitution fared across the EU's membership prior to taking 
precise decisions on how to proceed.  (At least for now, both 
the Dutch and UK Prime Ministers have indicated they would go 
ahead with referenda in their countries.)  In October 2006, 
EU leaders should gather to discuss what to do.  Expectations 
among Brussels officials, however, are that a French no would 
prompt such a summit much earlier, perhaps even in June or 
July of this year. 
 
5. (SBU) Rejection of the Constitution will not cause 
institutional paralysis.  The EU will continue to function on 
the basis of the current treaties up through the Nice treaty, 
which entered into force in February 2003.  These treaties, 
complemented by subsequent accession treaties for 
enlargement, already spell out all of the necessary technical 
requirements (number of votes in the Council, number of seats 
in the European Parliament) to allow the EU to function at 
25, or even after Bulgaria and Romania join in 2007 or 2008. 
 
...THIS CONSTITUTION WILL BE DEAD 
--------------------------------- 
 
6. (C) According to most Brussels observers, if France 
rejects the Constitution, it will be dead.  Some member 
states might well cancel their referendum plans, particularly 
as it could be hard to generate respectable voter turnout on 
what would appear to be a lost cause.  Even if other member 
states continue with ratification procedures, a French 
rejection of the Constitution means it cannot enter into 
force.  While smaller member states (Denmark, Ireland) have 
been asked to vote again after rejecting earlier treaties, it 
seems unlikely with France, especially since no one is 
offering a workable plan on how to make ratification more 
appealing to the French public.  Furthermore, our expectation 
is that, if all of the EU member states planning referenda 
did in fact hold them, France would hardly be the lone 
country to have said no.  The Dutch could well follow them 
just three days later.  In short, if the French say no, the 
Constitution is dead. 
7. (C/NF) So then what?  The death of the Constitution will 
surely provoke considerable angst-ridden navel gazing within 
the EU's political elites and spark endless commentary about 
whether the "European project" can carry on.  But we already 
detect a counter sentiment developing as people come to grips 
with the likelihood that the Constitution will not enter into 
force.  Luxembourg's EU PermRep Martine Schommer recently 
told the Ambassador she expected relatively little fall-out 
from the Constitution's failure, noting that the EU would 
continue to function on the basis of the current treaties. 
The EU will still have some major decisions on its agenda for 
the rest of 2005: agreeing on its 2007-2013 budgetary 
framework, opening accession negotiations with Turkey and 
Croatia, ratifying the accession treaty for Romania and 
Bulgaria, and continuing to pursue the holy grail: economic 
reforms to promote growth.  The mechanisms needed for the EU 
to pursue these goals are already in place, and are not 
dependent on getting the Constitution ratified. 
 
8. (C) The Luxembourg and subsequent UK Presidencies will 
need to show political skill in managing this agenda, 
however.  We believe their overriding objective will be to 
downplay as much as possible the political consequences of a 
No.  The issue would likely be added to the agenda of the 
June 16 EU Summit (European Council) in Brussels, where the 
other major debate will be on the budget.  But we doubt EU 
leaders will be able to provide a clear picture of how they 
will proceed so soon after the French and Dutch referenda. 
 
ENLARGEMENT FATIGUE? NOT BECAUSE OF CONSTITUTION 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
9. (C) Nonetheless, a political "crisis" over the 
Constitution could make these issues more difficult to move 
forward, largely because for a while at least, European 
self-confidence will have taken a knock.  After having spent 
three years work on developing the Constitution, only to see 
it fail to generate much public support, Europeans may 
question whether the EU can see ambitious projects through to 
fruition.  It is ironic that such doubts would arise just a 
year after the successful conclusion of the EU's largest-ever 
enlargement of ten new members and just a few years after the 
creation of a single currency, but such questions will be 
heard. 
 
10. (C) One area where many suggest these political 
uncertainties could have the greatest impact is on the EU's 
further enlargement.  The rejection of the Constitution 
should not have any direct impact on the accession of Romania 
or Bulgaria.  Accession negotiations with Turkey, the Balkan 
states, and such potential candidates as Ukraine could be 
somewhat more complicated, however.  The technical reason is 
that, without the Constitution's new formulas for Council 
voting and European Parliament seats, these issues will now 
need to be specifically negotiated with each new candidate. 
The political reason is that skepticism about Turkish 
membership is one factor "no" campaigners are capitalizing 
on, and a second referendum in France (perhaps in 2015) 
eventually looms on Ankara's candidacy as a result of the 
French decision on February 28 to change its own constitutionand require that 
accession to the EU by countries that begin 
negotiations after June 1, 2005, must be approved by public 
referendum.  On balance, however, a French "no" on the 
Constitution is unlikely to have any direct short-term impact 
on Turkish accession talks due to begin with the EU on 
October 3. 
 
MULTI-SPEED EUROPE? ALREADY EXISTS, AND WE'LL SEE MORE 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
11. (C) Other commentators have also speculated that 
frustration over the Constitution's failure could also prompt 
subsets of EU member states to press ahead with common 
projects, using the existing "enhanced cooperation" 
mechanisms in the current treaties to pursue projects even if 
some member states refuse to join in.  This is a more likely 
outcome of a British no than a French one, since the French 
are seen as prime advocates of resort to "enhanced 
cooperation."  But it could still happen, perhaps in areas 
such as tax harmonization, police cooperation, or combination 
of diplomatic representation abroad.  One area in which it 
could not legally happen is in military and defense, where 
the current treaties explicitly prohibit resort to "enhanced 
cooperation."  (NOTE:  This does not mean small sets of EU 
states cannot undertake military projects together; it just 
means they either have to be approved by all 25, or the 
project cannot have an EU label or receive support from EU 
institutions.  END NOTE.)  Such a development would make the 
EU even more complicated than today.  But "variable geometry" 
already exists in the EU (the euro, the Schengen common 
border area, and ESDP all include less than all 25 members), 
and this does not have to cause huge political problems for 
the EU. 
 
EUROPEAN PROJECTS NEVER DIE, THEY JUST GET RELABELLED 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
12. (C) While the EU Constitution as such would be dead after 
a French no, we would stress that this does not mean the 
specific provisions included in the text will necessarily 
remain so.  As we have reported, several items that are 
enshrined in the document, do not need changes to the current 
treaties to be realized.  Thus, the European Defense Agency, 
efforts to improve EU defense capabilities, invocation of 
"solidarity" in the case of terrorist attack, and moves away 
from unanimity requirements on asylum and immigration matters 
are all already underway even in advance of the Constitution. 
 
13. (C) Other provisions of the Constitution (creation of an 
EU Foreign Minister with a combined EU foreign service, a 
longer-term President of the European Council, expanded 
legislative powers for the EP, or further moves away from 
unanimous decision-making by member states) would all be much 
more difficult to achieve without treaty revision.  But that 
does not mean these or other ideas would disappear.  European 
Political Cooperation sputtered and eventually fizzled out 
during the 1970's, but was reborn as CFSP in the early 
1990's; European Defense Cooperation was rejected -- by the 
French parliament, no less -- in the 1950's, but reemerged 
forty years later in the shape of ESDP. 
 
14. (C) The Constitution exercise has already seen this 
dynamic at work:  Part II of the Constitution is the EU's 
Charter of Fundamental Rights that was negotiated in 1999, 
but which member states could not agree to make a legally 
binding document at the time.  After spending five years as a 
"political" document, it was simply incorporated verbatim 
into the Constitution.  As these examples demonstrate, the 
lag times can be considerable, but memories of those building 
Europe are long.  Member state negotiators should store their 
briefing papers on different aspects of the Constitution in 
the archives, not shred them. 
 
15. (C) It is difficult to predict which provisions of the 
Constitution would be resurrected when, or precisely how the 
EU would choose to pursue them.  Some EU officials suggest 
some measures, such as creation of an EU Foreign Minister or 
combined foreign service could be possible without treaty 
changes, or only minor ones.  Member states could also agree 
to a much reduced treaty revision exercise in a couple of 
years to implement some of the institutional provisions 
(simplification of the legislative procedure, or a new 
formula for voting).  Most governments would then try to 
ratify this new treaty via parliamentary procedures rather 
than the more unpredictable referendum.  This could pose 
political problems, but governments might argue that they had 
listened to voters who objected to the massive and 
complicated Constitution, and responded by taking a 
minimalist approach that therefore was not substantive enough 
to require another referendum.  A politically lower-profile 
strategy would be to write some of these changes into the 
next Accession Treaty that comes along (for example, with 
Croatia around 2009).  We'd pencil in such a 
"mini-intergovernmental conference" for late 2006 or early 
2007. 
 
A FRENCH "NON" IS BETTER FOR THE EU THAN A BRITISH "NO" 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
16. (C/NF) This cable has focused on the consequences of 
possible French rejection of the Constitution for the EU as a 
whole.  Of course, even if the French say yes, there is a 
real risk of one or more other member states rejecting the 
text.  Before poll numbers in France took a dive, most 
experts would have predicted 24 ratifications and one 
(British) rejection.  But other countries such as the 
Netherlands, Denmark, the Czech Republic, Poland and even 
Ireland, might have difficulty ratifying the document, 
especially after the dispirited conduct of the French 
campaign.  The legal and technical implications of a no from 
any of these would be the same as those discussed above.  But 
the politics would be very different.  While we believe a 
lone French no will be enough to kill the proposed 
Constitution, that would not be the case for a lone rejection 
by almost any other member state.  In that case, we could 
envision a real political crisis for the EU as it considers 
how to work around or work over the lone hold-out.  In the 
most extreme scenario, the rest of the EU could consider how 
to leave behind the reluctant member, probably keeping them 
within the common market, but excluding them from much else. 
This would launch a bigger crisis in the EU than a French 
rejection. 
 
AND FOR THE U.S.?  NO GLOATING, PLEASE 
-------------------------------------- 
 
17. (C/NF) As President Chirac's comments during his April 14 
television appearance (ref B) and Luxembourg PM Juncker's 
reported comments to French radio on April 19 (ref D) 
highlight, as the "yes" campaign gets desperate, some will be 
tempted to "play the American card", claiming that what 
Washington really wants is for the Constitution to fail and 
the EU be weakened.  We may indeed face a somewhat distracted 
and less confident EU in the near term.  But it would be 
wrong to interpret the Constitution's demise as the beginning 
of the end for the EU.  A French "no" may reduce talk of 
multipolarity and building the EU as a counterweight to the 
U.S.  But as the Europeans have shown in the past, regrouping 
is likely to ensure continuity on foreign policy 
decision-making, with member state governments continuing to 
see the EU as the venue for reaching common policies. 
Conversely, French approval would not mean changes were 
coming soon, with the British referendum awaiting in 2006, 
and any implementation only beginning in 2007 at the 
earliest.  Rejection of the document will slow down adoption 
of these ideas, but it is unlikely to reverse the overall 
trend of European integration.  And so, for our part, we 
should simply note that the U.S. does do not see the treaty's 
fate, one way or the other, as prompting a crisis in Europe, 
and we should continue to stress how we look to a strong and 
effective EU as a partner in facing global challenges. 
 
SCHNABEL 
.