US embassy cable - 05TELAVIV2479

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 002479 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/20/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, KWBG, IS, ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS 
SUBJECT: SIKSEK ON SECURITY STAFFING, PROGRESS 
 
Classified By: Political Counslor Norman H. Olsen for Reasons 1.4 (B) a 
nd (D). 
 
1.  (C) ConGen Jerusalem cleared this message. 
 
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Summary 
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2.  (C) In conversations over several days in early April, 
Brigadier General Samir Siksek told Pol/C and poloff that the 
U.S. should keep steady pressure on Minister of Interior 
Nasir Yusif to carry out reforms, but that the U.S. should 
also take steps to loosen Finance Minister Salam Fayyad's 
tight grip on funds that are urgently required if the men in 
uniform on the ground are to acquire the tools to do their 
jobs.  Siksek said that Yusif has thus far been lucky and 
able to capitalize on events -- such as the recent riots at 
the Muqatta'a to force President Abbas into supporting his 
reform efforts.  This does not, however, make up for a lack 
of administrative skills and planning staff.  "Everything is 
in his (Yusif's) head," according to Siksek.  Siksek said he 
expects more personnel changes like the replacement of WB NSF 
commander Haj Isma'il Jabr with Nidal al-Asuli, adding that 
the Mukhabarrat will also be brought under Yusif's authority 
with or without its current head, Amin al-Hindi.  Calling 
Preventive Security (PSO) head Rashid Abu Shbak "a system" 
rather than a person, Siksek predicted that integrating the 
PSO into Yusif's overall security portfolio will take much 
more time.  End Summary. 
 
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New WB NSF Commander an Improvement 
----------------------------------- 
 
3.  (C) Brigadier General Samir Siksek told Pol/C and poloff 
over the course of several conversations in early April that 
PA President Abbas and Interior Minister Nasir Yusif were 
correct to replace Haj Isma,il Jabr as head of the WB 
National Security Forces (NSF), as there was "no hope for 
him" as a commander.  Siksek characterized Isma,il's 
replacement, Nidal al-Asuli, as "not the best", but wryly 
added that he would be an improvement over Jabr as commander. 
 Siksek said that al-Asuli was born in Khan Yunis in 1946 and 
has a degree in mechanical engineering.  He joined Fatah in 
1966, and the Palestinian military in 1968, living in Jordan, 
Syria, and Lebanon for the next two years.  Al-Asuli 
completed unspecified military training in China in 1971, 
commando and infantry training in the then-USSR in 1982, and 
additional Soviet training in Yemen in 1983.  A graduate of 
the Iraqi Command and Staff College, al-Assouli also 
completed anti-riot training in the Netherlands in 1994, and 
a course in advanced strategic studies in the UK in 2002. 
 
4.  (C) Siksek said that the attack on the Muqatta'a by armed 
elements seeking to disrupt a Fatah meeting there March 30-31 
worked to Yusif's advantage, as it forced Yusif and President 
Abbas to act.  Siksek called the subsequent firings in the 
West Bank a "big breakthrough," that helped push back against 
what he termed an "overdose of Israeli influence" there.  He 
termed Jabr,s ouster a sign that President Abbas intends to 
back Nasir Yusif, and claimed that he (Siksek) told the 
president that he needs to confirm Yusif's authority in 
writing.  Yusif, if he is smart, will not accept being merely 
a figurehead, Siksek said.  Yusif would not accept it from 
Prime Minister Quraya' previously, and should not accept it 
from the president now, Siksek said.  (Comment:  Curiously, 
Haj Isma,il Jaber was one of the few veteran security chiefs 
who was actively cooperating with Nasir Yusif.  It is 
difficult to see how his ouster indicates any incremental 
increase in support for Yusif from Abu Mazen.  End Comment) 
 
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Yusif a "Lousy Administrator" 
------------------------------------- 
 
5.  (C) Continuing with his theme that Nasir Yusif is playing 
on lucky breaks on the ground, rather than any sort of 
coherent planning, Siksek called Yusif a "lousy 
administrator."  Yusif has no chief of staff, Siksek claimed, 
and no team with planning capability: "Everything is in his 
head."  He added, however, that he is hopeful that Yusif's 
contacts with General Ward will motivate him to get his 
ministerial house in order.  Asked who could be tapped to 
provide the necessary administrative skills, Siksek said that 
former chief of the uniformed police in Gaza, Ghazi Jabali, 
is capable, but lamented that Yusif will not take him because 
of his reputation for corruption, legendary throughout both 
the West Bank and Gaza.  Siksek laughingly added, however, 
that Jabali is "an angel" compared to many others.  He 
suggested that Presidential Security Advisor Jibril Rajoub, 
although very much "inferior even to Dahlan," could still end 
up with the  some authority on security at Yusif's expense, 
if Yusif does not begin to act. 
 
6.  (C) President Abbas, in Siksek's view, has, in the 
aftermath of the Ramallah incidents, at last begun to talk 
tough about law and order, and Siksek advised the USG to keep 
up the pressure on both Yusif and Abbas to perform.  Weekly 
meetings with the Ward team to track progress on reforms are 
a good place to start, Siksek said, further recommending that 
interlocutors stay focused on the mission rather than letting 
Yusif digress into politics.  Siksek estimated that Yusif has 
until PLC elections in July to produce results.  Failure 
could cost Yusif not only his job, he added, but also his 
position on the Central Committee of Fatah, whose party 
congress is scheduled for August. 
 
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Where Does This Leave Musa? 
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7.  (C) Putting the conversation into a Gaza context, Siksek 
said that he had advised Nasir Yusif to "promote" Gaza 
strongman and current overall head of security operations 
there, Musa Arafat out of the picture, giving him some 
position in the Palestinian Ministry of Interior, such as 
undersecretary for Public Security ) a grand title with 
little substance.  Whether Arafat accepts the promotion or 
refuses, he will effectively be out of the way, Siksek said, 
stressing that President Abbas does not support Arafat. 
Arafat is so unpopular, Siksek said, that even arresting him 
would not arouse popular unrest, beyond a few small groups of 
Arafat loyalists who might seize a moment offered by his 
downfall to cause trouble.  Siksek predicted, however, that 
most would-be troublemakers would be wise enough to see their 
own self-interest in refraining to act on Arafat's behalf. 
In a subsequent conversation, Siksek suggested that Arafat 
would be made subject to the mandatory retirement age of 60, 
thereby both forcing his departure and giving him a form of 
"cover" for leaving the service.  Siksek speculated that 
estwhile chief of liaison activities with the IDF Ribhi 
Arafat would be tapped to take over Musa Arafat's role as the 
head of Public Security in Gaza. 
 
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Subordinating All Security Agencies 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
8.  (C) Siksek predicted that Preventive Security (PSO) head 
Rashid Abu Shbak will retain his position, but that 
Mukhabarrat Chief Amin al-Hindi "cannot continue" in his 
current position.  Al-Hindi "does nothing," Siksek lamented. 
"Anyone (else) would do better."  Although he thought that 
Mukhabarrat staff might try to fight the placement of the 
Mukhabarrat under Minister Yusif's control, Siksek 
confidently predicted that the subordination will occur, 
"with or without al-Hindi."  He later suggested that 
al-Hindi, whom he characterized as interested in turning his 
hand to private business, would, like Arafat, depart his post 
under the cover of the mandatory age-60 retirement rule. 
Returning to his assessment of Rashid Abu Shbak, Siksek said 
the PSO is another story, adding that "Abu Shbak is not a 
person, he is a system," making him far more difficult to 
remove.  Abu Shbak hopes to add the title of West Bank PSO 
chief to his current Gaza credentials, and believes this is 
possible now that the GOI is allowing him to travel between 
Gaza and the West Bank, Siksek said. 
 
9.  (C) Siksek concluded that President Abbas will eventually 
subordinate the PSO under the Ministry of Interior as well, 
but that it will take more time.  Siksek said that, at a 
recent meeting with Nasir Yusif, Abu Shbak was almost rude, 
refusing to rise from his chair to greet the minister. 
Siksek predicted that Yusif would ignore the insult for the 
short term, but will deal with Abu Shbak later, reflecting 
Yusif's approach of biding his time until he can work his way 
step by step through the tangle of loyalties and power in the 
PA security bodies. 
 
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Unhappy with Fayyad 
-------------------------- 
 
10.  (C) Siksek complained that PA Minister of Finance Salam 
Fayyad has "too tight a hold on the money" that Nasir Yusif 
needs to run the security services, and accused Fayyad of 
funneling money to Muhammad Dahlan under the table.  The 
police, in particular, need resources to rebuild and 
refurbish work space, he said.  Calling the recently-created 
inter-service units jointly patrolling  in Ramallah a farce 
) the PA police have few weapons and almost no ammunition ) 
Siksek said that Yusif has no choice but to use NSF forces to 
support him "for the first few months" in the Ramallah area. 
Stressing again that the needs of the police can't wait, 
Siksek urged the U.S. to "rein in Fayyad." 
 
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Abu Ala'a: Help or Hindrance? 
-------------------------------------- 
 
11.  (C) Although Yusif reportedly expresses the view that PM 
Quraya' is supporting him, Siksek said he and many others 
believe that the PM is undermining Yusif's authority.  Siksek 
said he believes that President Abbas will stay the course 
with Yusif, "at least for now," adding that PM Quraya' is 
also likely to remain in his position, since Quraya, "needs 
the protection his position offers from corruption scandals." 
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Hamas and Hizballah 
-------------------------- 
 
12.  (C) Siksek said that, given the United States' tough 
stance against terrorism, Palestinians are uneasy that the 
U.S. is reportedly talking to Hamas and Hizballah in Lebanon. 
 In Gaza, Siksek said, the Hamas training camps are full and 
the organization is still importing arms.  He claimed to not 
know whether recent IDF reports that militants had imported 
surface-to-air missiles into Gaza are true, but claimed that, 
to his knowledge, for the past year there have been at least 
eight of what he termed "eagle eye" rockets in Gaza ) plus 
another four that are located in Dahlan's personal compound. 
 
13.  (C) Comment: West Bank sources speculate that Rashid Abu 
Shbak, who openly flouts Nasir Yusif's authority, will be 
promoted to a powerless position, if not immediately, then 
soon.  They also doubt that Abu Shbak could possibly unseat 
incumbent West Bank PSO head Ziad Hib al-Rih.   Speculation 
remains open as to whether Sliman Hillis or Ribhi Arafat 
replaces Musa Arafat as the head of Public Security in Gaza. 
 
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