US embassy cable - 05NEWDELHI2964

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REGIONAL DIALOGUE WITH A/S ROCCA: BANGLADESH, SRI LANKA, AFGHANISTAN

Identifier: 05NEWDELHI2964
Wikileaks: View 05NEWDELHI2964 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy New Delhi
Created: 2005-04-20 12:07:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL KDEM BG CE AF IN Bangladesh
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 002964 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/19/2015 
TAGS: PREL, KDEM, BG, CE, AF, IN, Bangladesh 
SUBJECT: REGIONAL DIALOGUE WITH A/S ROCCA: BANGLADESH, SRI 
LANKA, AFGHANISTAN 
 
REF: NEW DELHI 2792 
 
Classified By: PolCouns Geoff Pyatt.  Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
1.  (C) Summary: During the April 18 Regional Dialogue 
meeting with SA Assistant Secretary Christina Rocca, Joint 
Secretary Neelam Deo (Bangladesh, Sri Lanka) expressed 
 
SIPDIS 
satisfaction that the USG's assessment of trends in 
Bangladesh had moved closer to New Delhi's.  Her comments 
focused more on the poor state of Bangladeshi democracy than 
on the Islamic extremism of past discussions.  Deo faulted 
LTTE "childishness" for the delayed Joint Mechanism for 
tsunami reconstruction and doubted that President Kumaratunga 
 
SIPDIS 
would attempt to amend the Sri Lankan constitution to extend 
her stay in office.  PolCouns raised India's reluctance to 
join the Afghanistan donors' Coordination Committee, and the 
MEA agreed to discuss it again with Ambassador Sood.  End 
Summary. 
 
Bad Politics in Bangladesh 
-------------------------- 
 
2.  (C) Opening the discussion, Deo asserted that the US 
assessment of Bangladesh now seemed more closely in line with 
New Delhi's.  "The trends are not running positive," she 
stated, highlighting the plight of the Awami League (AL). 
Describing the AL as "the sinned against party," she 
described how the August 2004 terrorist attack against Sheikh 
Hasina had impacted her ability to be politically active 
because of damage to her hearing and the restrictions the BDG 
has placed on her movements.  Deo emphasized that it was not 
India's place to choose favorites in Bangladesh, but 
underlined that democracy would not work without a 
functioning opposition.  She asserted that the Bangladeshi 
army had mostly stayed out of the political wrangling, 
although many top commanding officers were political 
appointees.  Part of the reason for the generally apolitical 
nature of the army, she explained, was its reliance on the 
revenue generated from participation in UN Peacekeeping 
Operations. 
 
3.  (C) Deo reiterated the concerns about democracy that she 
had expressed to DAS John Gastright on April 13 (reftel). 
She lamented the measures the BNP was taking to put in place 
a favorable electoral system and sympathetic officials, 
thereby corrupting the system.  While the AL had protested, 
Deo said, it was not clear whether the party would take part 
in the next election, which would be disappointing, since it 
would be the "AL's election to lose." 
 
Familiar Themes 
--------------- 
 
4.  (C) Deo pointed out that since the 2004 Chittagong arms 
haul, eight other caches had been found in the surrounding 
area, that the weapons used in attacks were increasingly more 
sophisticated, and that they remained unaccounted for after 
being confiscated.  The border had been criminalized, which 
the GOI sought to combat through a "series of proposals" to 
legitimize trade.  Disappointed with Dhaka's "lack of 
political will to engage" with India she said that the 
Bangladeshi business community wants liberalized trade, but 
the Working Group on a Free Trade Agreement had last met more 
than one year ago. 
 
Pressure Points 
--------------- 
 
5. (C) A/S Rocca told Deo that the February Washington 
Donor's Conference had considered whether international 
assistance should be restructured in a move to press Dhaka to 
fix chronic problems.  Deo responded that the US had some 
leverage with development assistance because the BDG would 
react to public pressure, but she emphasized the important 
work NGOs are doing and that support for them should not be 
disrupted.  She also noted the possible impact of A/S Rocca's 
public interventions regarding religious minorities, noting 
that the proportion of Hindus in Bangladesh had fallen from 
20 percent in 1971 to less than 10 percent today.  She 
suggested that more official international commentary on the 
political situation, minority rights, and the poor quality of 
investigations into political violence and other criminal 
activity would have an impact.  In this context, Deo was 
encouraged by the April 16 judgment against 22 accused in the 
killing of an AL MP.  A/S Rocca noted that we are also 
looking at the issue of money flows from the Gulf. 
 
Sri Lanka: Peace Process on Hold 
-------------------------------- 
 
6.  (C) Turning to Sri Lanka, Deo Blamed LTTE "childishness" 
for delaying agreement on the Tsunami Reconstruction Joint 
Mechanism, adding that while the Tigers should be eager to 
come to an agreement, they were making it difficult by 
rejecting all references to the GOSL.  During his February 
trip to New Delhi, Sri Lankan FM Laxman Kadirgamar had told 
the GOI that the peace process was on hold while the focus 
was on the Mechanism.  New Delhi continued its bilateral 
assistance through the GOSL, Deo noted, remarking that 
"nothing positive" could come of the Italian decision to 
provide aid to the LTTE directly. 
 
7.  (C) Deo dismissed the coalition partner JVP as 
"inexperienced" and thought it was unlikely that they would 
walk out on the government if the GOSL signed the Joint 
Mechanism as threatened, preferring instead to "save 
themselves for the peace process," which they oppose.  The 
party only knows how to issue ultimatums, she asserted, 
adding that the government suffered from "bad coalition 
handling."  The GOI message to Colombo was that the Sinhalese 
parties needed to come together because the LTTE was taking 
advantage of their differences, she stated. 
 
"Coy" Kumaratunga Might Let the Constitution Be 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
8.  (C) During a late March trip to New Delhi, UNP leader 
Ranil Wickremesinghe insisted that elections in Sri Lanka 
would take place in 2005, despite President Chandrika 
Kumaratunga's efforts to stay in power another year.  Deo 
expressed little concern that the President would be 
successful in effecting the constitutional reforms required 
to keep her in office, observing that she had little support 
among the smaller parties, and would have to call a 
referendum.  Describing Kumaratunga as "coy," Deo added that 
there was no indication she was making a major effort, and 
that if she were to do so, it would have to be in the next 
few months. 
 
Afghanistan Coordination 
------------------------ 
 
9.  (C) Noting that A/S Rocca would not have the opportunity 
to engage substantively on Afghanistan in the absence of 
Joint Secretary Dilip Sinha (Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran), 
PolCouns raised the issue of the donors' Coordination 
Committee with Joint Secretary S. Jaishankar (Americas). 
Expressing concern that the India did not want to join the 
committee because New Delhi sees its assistance as bilateral, 
PolCouns emphasized the importance of the donor community 
working together, especially on the Kabul to Pul-i-Khumri 
electric line, for which the GOI is the major donor. 
Jaishankar promised to discuss India's participation with 
Ambassador Rakesh Sood in Kabul.  We will follow-up. 
 
10.  (U) A/S Rocca has cleared this message. 
BLAKE 

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