US embassy cable - 05COLOMBO741

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 000741 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/20/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PTER, EAID, PGOV, CE, NO, LTTE - Peace Process, Tsunami 
SUBJECT: NORWEGIAN FACILITATOR SOLHEIM THINKS JOINT RELIEF 
MECHANISM IS IMMINENT, SEEKS LATE MAY CO-CHAIRS MEETING 
 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR JEFFREY J. LUNSTEAD FOR REASON 1.4 (D). 
 
 1.   (C)  Summary.  Solheim is optimistic that a joint 
GSL/LTTE/Muslim mechanism for tsunami relief in the north 
and east will be signed soon but quite emphatic that, 
absent the mechanism, there will be no progress on peace 
for a long time.  How the mechanism, if signed, would play 
out on the ground and how it would be linked to the mid-May 
Development Forum in Kandy remain vague.  Colombo co-chairs 
representatives agreed a mechanism signing should be 
followed by a supportive co-chair statement.  Solheim and 
A/S Rocca agreed to pursue the possibility of a late 
May/early June co-chairs meeting in Washington.  End 
Summary 
 
2.  (C)  Norwegian peace facilitator Eric Solheim reviewed 
the status of his efforts with Colombo co-chair 
representatives (DCM represented the U.S.) over dinner at 
Norwegian Ambassador Brattskar's residence April 19. 
Solheim and Brattskar also met with visiting A/S for South 
Asian Affairs Christina Rocca April 20.  Key points from 
the two meetings follow. 
 
Making the Rounds 
----------------- 
 
3.  (C) Solheim met with the GSL Peace Secretariat, FM 
Kadirgamar, PM Rajapakse, Opposition leader Wickremesinghe, 
Muslim leaders Rauff Hakeem and Ferial Ashraff, as well as 
senior police and military leaders.  He will not meet with 
President Kumaratunga since she has postponed her return to 
Sri Lanka until April 26 or 27.  On the LTTE side, Solheim 
and Brattskar met political chief Thamilchelvan at Colombo 
airport April 20 upon his return from the LTTE jaunt to 
Europe and South Africa.  They also met LTTE officials in 
the east, including eastern military commander Bhanu, 
during an April 19 trip to the Batticaloa area.  Solheim 
did not go to Kilinocchi this time. 
 
Agreement on Interim Mechanism Imminent (Maybe) 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
4.  (C) Solheim said the GSL and the LTTE are very close to 
agreement on a joint tsunami relief mechanism.  The 
remaining stumbling block is the "off shore provision" and 
even on that the "differences are very small."  "It will be 
unbelievable if they don't agree," Solheim concluded. 
Solheim confirmed press reports, however, that the GSL 
almost certainly will not agree to a signing until after 
May 1 to avoid giving their JVP coalition "partner" a 
football to kick around during May Day celebrations. 
Solheim said he had noted with interest that Foreign 
Minister Kadirgamar had been more "mechanism friendly" of 
late. 
 
5.  (C)  (Note:  In a separate April 19 discussion with A/S 
Rocca and the Ambassador, GSL Peace Secretariat head 
Jayantha Dhanapala confided that a mutually satisfactory, 
feasible agreement on the joint mechanism had been reached 
at the working level.  It is now up to President 
Kumaratunga to make "the political decision" to sell it to 
others--including her coalition partner.  He indicated that 
he was not entirely sure that she had made that decision 
yet, but suggested that the President's political savvy 
will likely guide her in the right direction.  A joint 
mechanism is not needed to facilitate relief efforts at the 
working level, Dhanapala said; the GSL and LTTE are already 
cooperating at the local level.  The real value of the 
joint mechanism would be political.  The two sides have 
"painted ourselves into corners," he acknowledged; the 
joint mechanism provides a fresh opportunity, outside the 
boundaries of the politically-charged ISGA controversy, for 
dialogue and confidence building.  The LTTE wants the joint 
mechanism for two reasons, Dhanapala said: money (e.g., 
increased access to aid) and legitimacy.  End Note) 
 
6.  (C) On the LTTE side, Solheim said he and assistant 
Lisa Golden (also present at both Colombo meetings) had 
presented Thamilchelvan with some new ideas on the 
mechanism in a Dublin meeting (after his return to Europe 
from South Africa) last week.  Solheim and Brattskar 
reinforced this effort in their April 20 "very brief" 
airport chat with Thamilchelvan.  Moreover, Norwegian FM 
Peterson had called both Thamilchelvan and London-based 
LTTE luminary Balasingham April 18 to urge that the LTTE 
not drag its heels on the mechanism.  Solheim said he was 
confident that, as a result of these Norwegian efforts, 
both Balasingham and Thamilchelvan would push LTTE leader 
Prabhakaran to sign.  "We hope to have further news from 
the LTTE in a few days," Solheim commented. 
 
7.  (C) Solheim reiterated that there is agreement on 
almost all of the "slightly less than eight page" 
document.  Solheim noted (and co-chairs representatives, 
especially Dutch ambassador Blankhart, agreed) that 
ideally the mechanism should ideally be signed well 
before the May 16-17 Development Forum in Kandy. 
Brattskar joked that he would make sure it was 
signed on May 2.  Solheim said the implications 
of the LTTE signing the mechanism were very 
significant since it would be the first time the 
group had "committed to something at the national 
level" and they would be conceding that "the center 
must be worked with."  Brattskar emphasized that 
the mechanism would be positive for Muslims, since 
they would participate as a separate entity rather 
than being represented by the GSL as was the 
case in the peace talks. 
 
8.  (C)  Solheim and the co-chair representatives then had 
a detailed exchange on exactly how a signed mechanism would 
be implemented and what it would mean on the ground. 
Solheim said the mechanism was needed if there is to be any 
tsunami relief in the north and east.  Japanese Ambassador 
 
SIPDIS 
Suda demurred sharply, commenting that extensive relief is 
already being carried out.  While the mechanism would help 
on that front, Suda stated, the Japanese view is that the 
main value of a signed joint mechanism would be as a way to 
maintain some semblance of an ongoing peace process. 
Solheim said he didn't disagree with the Japanese view but 
that the mechanism would help on the tsunami front, 
especially during the transition into reconstruction.  In 
particular it would make life easier for GSL officials in 
the North and East, who are appointed by the GSL but in 
fact must clear everything they do with local LTTE 
representatives.  "This will give them cover," Solheim 
said. 
 
Next Steps/Co-Chair Statement on Joint Mechanism 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
9.  (C)  DCM asked what the first steps  in the field would 
be when/if the mechanism is signed.  Solheim said "joint 
bodies" would have to be set up (GSL, LTTE, Muslims) at the 
local level with a central policy organ in Colombo. Solheim 
said the LTTE was "smart enough" not to appoint "hard 
liners" or military figures to these bodies and might 
appoint Tamils who were not LTTE members.  According to the 
terms of the mechanism, "international observers" would be 
present at every level to make sure the mechanism was 
working, although Solheim admitted that details on the 
international observer issue (and many other provisions) 
were purposely left vague to increase the chances of 
agreement.  Blankhart opined that perhaps the co-chairs 
should take the lead on the "international observer" 
question.  Others said it should be a broader donor effort. 
No conclusions were reached.  Co-chair representatives 
agreed that there probably should be either a joint co- 
chair statement or individual statements from co-chairs 
once the mechanism is signed.  Any statement(s) should 
congratulate both sides but also lay down a marker that 
implementation would be followed closely. 
 
Donor Forum 
----------- 
 
10.  (C) Co-chair conversation then turned to the 
relationship between the joint mechanism process and the 
mid-May Donor Forum in Kandy, with it quickly becoming 
clear that questions outnumbered answers.  Assuming the 
mechanism is signed beforehand, should the GSL officially 
present it at the forum?  Should the other two mechanism 
partners (LTTE and Muslims) be present at the Kandy event? 
If not, should there be a separate meeting with them before 
or after the forum?  Co-chairs agreed that further 
discussion on these issues was necessary.  DCM noted that 
the U.S. would have to carefully examine potential 
participation in any meetings that might include the LTTE, 
in either the context of the development forum or 
implementation of the joint mechanism. 
 
Beyond the Mechanism 
-------------------- 
 
11.  (C)  Asked for his perspective on the broader peace 
process, beyond the immediate effort to get both sides to 
ink the joint mechanism, Solheim said he was pessimistic. 
"There is no chance of a return to the table unless there 
is a change in government, either as the result of an 
election or as the result of President Kumaratunga feeling 
stronger in her political position," the Norwegian stated. 
Therefore, he continued, the focus must be on "securing the 
peace process" until this happens.  "It is important that 
the peace boat keeps floating."  Brattskar observed that, 
absent the joint mechanism or other significant 
developments, it will be very difficult to keep the peace 
process "limping along" under the end of the President's 
tenure at the end of 2006.  A/S Rocca, the Ambassador and 
Solheim all agreed that if President Kumaratunga were to 
announce a bold initiative to move the peace process 
forward, most of the Sinhalese polity would follow her. 
But, beyond periodic speeches, she seems uninterested in or 
oblivious to the need to do so. 
 
12.  (C)  Solheim told A/S Rocca and the co-chair 
representatives that he was trying to implement a "track 
two" of "significant personalities" from both sides that 
would meet periodically to discuss broader issues, a "talk 
fest" that would at least keep some sort of discussion 
going while the leadership on both sides "wandered back" to 
the table.  FM Kadirgamar and LTTE political chief 
Thamilchelvan both are enthusiastic.  Solheim asked that 
this possible initiative be kept strictly confidential for 
the moment. 
 
13.  (C)  Solheim said it is essential that both sides 
avoid provocative acts that would lead to retaliation and a 
cycle of violence.  He had told the LTTE that killings must 
stop.  He also planned to tell the GSL that support for the 
Karuna faction also must stop.  Solheim said the recent 
"discovery" of a Karuna camp near a GSL army camp left "no 
doubt" that such support was taking place (in obvious 
contradiction of President Kumaratunga's repeated 
assurances to him on previous visits that such support had 
not and would not occur).  Brattskar commented that some in 
the Peace Secretariat were taking the "lawyerly" position 
that such support to Karuna  did not violate the cease-fire 
agreement, completely missing the broader political and 
peace process implications of such support. 
 
14.  (C)  On the brighter side, Solheim said it is clear 
that neither the GSL nor the LTTE wants to return to the 
battlefield.  He noted that there have been plenty of 
"excuses for fighting," like the recent LTTE firing on a 
GSL naval vessel but it is encouraging that both sides are 
bending over backwards to prevent such incidents from 
setting off "something much bigger." 
 
Co-Chairs Meeting 
----------------- 
 
15.  (C)  During dinner with Solheim, Colombo co-chairs 
representatives agreed that a "capitals" co-chair meeting 
would be useful not too long after the mid-May Development 
Forum (assuming that the joint mechanism is signed) and 
that this should be passed back to capitals.  Suda said he 
would discuss this with Japanese envoy Akashi (who, 
according to Suda, might visit Sri Lanka in the first half 
of May but would not stay for the Development Forum). 
Solheim said he thought it might be useful for the next co- 
chairs meeting to be in Washington and that this idea was 
behind FM Peterson's recent discussions with the Deputy 
Secretary in Oslo and recent efforts by the Norwegian 
 
SIPDIS 
ambassador in Washington to seek a meeting with 
UnderSecretary Burns. 
 
16.  (C)  Following up on co-chairs meeting scenarios April 
20, Solheim and A/S Rocca agreed to pursue a late May/early 
June meeting in Washington.  Both agreed that a co-chairs 
meeting in that timeframe would send a useful message in 
the wake of a joint mechanism signing (or be an opportunity 
for essential coordination on the future of the peace 
process if the mechanism is not signed).  A/S Rocca 
undertook to look at dates and then get in touch with the 
other co-chairs once she was back in Washington early next 
week. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
17.  (C)  There seem to be grounds for cautious optimism 
that the joint tsunami relief mechanism for the north and 
the east will be signed in early May.   The primary benefit 
would be to the ailing peace process rather than a marked 
improvement in tsunami coordination.  Solheim and Brattskar 
are quite eloquent, however, that if the parties do not 
find the political courage to sign, it will make progress 
on the peace process even less likely than it is now and 
that the co-chairs need to be thinking about that scenario. 
End Comment 
 
18.  (U)  A/S Rocca cleared this cable. 
LUNSTEAD