US embassy cable - 05BRATISLAVA314

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SMER-SDL MERGER CONSOLIDATES LEFT, BUT DOES IT MATTER?

Identifier: 05BRATISLAVA314
Wikileaks: View 05BRATISLAVA314 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Bratislava
Created: 2005-04-20 08:26:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV PINR LO
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L  BRATISLAVA 000314 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, LO 
SUBJECT: SMER-SDL MERGER CONSOLIDATES LEFT, BUT DOES IT 
MATTER? 
 
 
Classified By: CDA Scott N. Thayer for reasons 1.34 (b) and (d) 
 
1. (C) Summary. In late 2004, the Party of the Democratic 
Left (SDL) and two other small, leftist parties merged with 
Smer ("Direction").  Smer leader Robert Fico has successfully 
consolidated the center-left, but a slight increase in votes 
in 2006 will not necessarily correspond to an increase in 
coalition potential.  Pollsters continue to interpret support 
for Smer as "soft." End Summary. 
 
Let's Make a Deal 
----------------- 
 
2. (U) On December 11, 2004, precisely five years after 
Robert Fico broke from the Party of the Democratic Left to 
form Smer, SDL merged with Smer.  The SDL ceased to exist as 
a legal entity on January 1, 2005, and began to transfer all 
its property to Smer.  The move followed the November 2004 
mergers of the Social Democratic Party of Slovakia (SDSS) and 
the Slovak Democratic Alternative (SDA) with Smer, and united 
all the remaining parties of the center left. 
 
3. (SBU) Based on the agreement it signed with Smer, SDL 
received one vice-chair post, two seats on the Smer Board of 
Directors, and vice-chair positions in all district and 
regional party organizations.  The total number of leadership 
positions reserved for SDL members throughout the country was 
nearly 300, and was guaranteed for two years.  In return, 
Smer acquired an active and experienced membership base, 
strong district organizations (aproximately 1,400 
institutions were affiliated with the SDL), and the right to 
use the label "Social Democrat."  Most importantly, Smer 
eliminated the competition. 
 
A Brief History Lesson 
---------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) In the first Dzurinda government (1998-2002), SDL 
was a coalition member and controlled five ministries and one 
Deputy Prime Minister post.  Fico broke with the party after 
disagreements over coalition partners and ministerial posts. 
SDL suffered a significant decline in support when several 
high-ranking members left to form SDA before the 2002 
parliamentary elections due to personality conflicts.  Smer 
was able to capitalize on the divisions within the left and 
its pre-election poll numbers soared.  SDL didn't obtain 
sufficient votes to enter parliament in 2002 (a party needs 
five percent of the vote).  Nonetheless, it maintained a 
small but loyal membership and a number of elected officials 
at the local level. 
 
5. (C) Former SDL Chairman Lubomir Petrak told emboffs in 
January that the party still possessed an active membership 
and strong regional organizations, but lacked national 
personalities that could raise its standing in the polls.  He 
saw no alternative to the merger.  He said Smer secured a 
good deal, considering SDL's experience as a former coalition 
partner and the number of locally-elected officials 
representing SDL.  Petrak believed that the disciplined SDL 
party members would re-register with Smer, and stated the 
reactions were still entirely positive a month after the 
merger.  He pointed to recent polls showing an increase in 
Smer's popularity as proof that SDL's loyal members supported 
the merger. 
 
The Other Side of the Coin 
-------------------------- 
 
6. (C) The December 11 Smer party congress featured countless 
speeches about all the benefits of the merger.  However, in 
the eyes of some Smer members, SDL may do more harm than good 
to the party image.  Peter Pelligrini, the head of Smer's 
Banska Bystrica district office, told poloff that by 
integrating unpopular elected officials and people connected 
to the former communist regime, Smer politicians will lose 
their image as the fresh faces on the political scene.  For 
example, Banska Bystrica'S SDL Mayor Jan Kralik will join 
Smer, but his economic development program is extremely 
unpopular.  His reputation among local citizens and NGO's 
grows continuously worse.  In addition, Pelligrini said the 
SDL had not delivered on its claims that most members would 
join Smer.  A month later, only 40 of 400 SDL members in 
Banska Bystrica had re-registered. 
 
7. (C) As a member of the Smer board of directors, Pelligrini 
cast a risky dissenting vote against the merger, believing 
the agreement was made too quickly and ideological 
differences could come to a fray.  He fears that fiercely 
loyal SDL members may use Smer to get elected, and then in 
the future may break from Smer and steal parliamentary seats. 
 
8. (C) According to Pelligrini, the only advantage of the 
merger was to be a stepping-stone to membership in Socialist 
International and in the EU parliament Social Democrat club. 
 
 
Pelligrini said it was important for Smer to adopt the label 
"Social Democrat" and erase the confusing campaign slogan 
"the third way."  Eugen Skultety, the Vice President for 
Labor Policy at the Confederation of Trade Unions (KOZ), told 
emboff that cooperation with Smer could become easier and 
more acceptable under the guise of the Social Democratic 
label.  He stated unionists in Europe are inclined to work 
with Social Democrats on some issues, even while maintaining 
loyalties to other parties. 
 
Next Steps 
---------- 
 
9. (C) The December 2005 Smer congress will begin to discuss 
the 2006 parliamentary elections and candidate lists.  Both 
Pelligrinni and Petrak said they don't expect ideological 
disputes in the timeframe leading up to elections, though 
internal problems could result from candidate selection and 
personality conflicts.  Petrak said completing this merger 
nearly two years in advance of elections would give SDL 
members time to shift their loyalty to Smer and contribute to 
its growth.  Pelligrini viewed future negotiations of 
candidate lists as a Pandora's box, since SDL members are 
more experienced at political maneuvering than young Smer 
upstarts. 
 
10. (C) Michal Vasecka, a sociologist from the Institute for 
Public Affairs (IVO), told emboff that SDL members may become 
dissatisfied if they don't get top positions in candidate 
lists for the November 2005 regional elections.  He said the 
regional elections will be the litmus test of Smer's 
strength, the merger, and the party's penetration in the 
regions.  If Smer has good results, analysts will have to 
start viewing their popularity ratings as real numbers rather 
than inflated.  (Note: In the 2002 parliamentary elections, 
Smer led the polls at nearly 20 percent, but only got 13 
percent of the vote.) 
 
11. (SBU) A small group within Vladimir Meciar's Movement for 
a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) favors closer cooperation with 
Smer.  They have publicly and privately expressed dismay that 
Meciar is taking the party closer to Dzurinda's SDKU and away 
from its voters.  HZDS MP Dusan Jarabik left the party in 
mid-April for this reason, and it is rumored he may join 
Smer. 
 
Comment: Has Anything Really Changed? 
------------------------------------- 
 
12. (C) Smer has consolidated the center-left, and may gain a 
few percentage points in the 2006 elections as a result, but 
it has not acquired more coalition potential.  Fico behaves 
in a confrontational manner toward all other major party 
leaders.  He has proven he can make deals with nearly-extinct 
parties, but he can't get along with the bigger ones. 
 
13. (C) Fico continues to employ the populist rhetoric that 
keeps him near the 30-percent mark in polls.  He recently 
promised that, if elected, he would eliminate fees for health 
care, increase the minimum wage, and cut the VAT on fuel, 
medicine, and food.  However, most Slovaks remain skeptical. 
Economic reforms are well-entrenched, and even a Fico-led 
government would find it hard to dramatically reverse course. 
 Even if a new "Social Democrat" label brings clarity to the 
party program, Smer is still not offering a simple,  concise 
alternative to the current government.  Smer's support is 
traditionally very "soft" because its (mostly young) 
supporters tend not to vote, even when they indicate in polls 
that they will.  Most pollsters to whom we have spoken 
interpret Smer's strong showing as an expression of 
dissatisfaction with the current government, rather than a 
real vote for Fico.  Like Vasecka, we remain doubtful of 
Smer's true strength. 
THAYER 
 
 
NNNN 

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