US embassy cable - 05BOGOTA3747

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SCENESETTER FOR THE SECRETARY'S VISIT TO COLOMBIA

Identifier: 05BOGOTA3747
Wikileaks: View 05BOGOTA3747 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Bogota
Created: 2005-04-19 21:38:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL CO
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 003747 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/19/2015 
TAGS: PREL, CO 
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE SECRETARY'S VISIT TO COLOMBIA 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
------------ 
Introduction 
------------ 
 
1. (C) President Uribe and the embassy welcome the visit of 
Secretary of State Rice with enthusiasm.  Current hot topics 
 
SIPDIS 
include: 
 
--U.S. support in out years 
 
--Demobilization and reinsertion of almost 5,000 paramilitary 
terrorists and several thousand more expected 
 
--Extradition 
 
--Growing concern about Venezuela 
 
--Military progress and Plan Patriota 
 
--Human rights 
 
--Record-breaking drug eradication and seizures 
 
--Status of U.S. hostages 
 
--Free Trade Agreement negotiations 
 
--Judicial reform 
 
--Presidential re-election 
 
------------ 
U.S. Support 
------------ 
 
2. (C) Colombia faces a four front war -- narcos, FARC, ELN, 
paramilitaries -- and a growing concern about Venezuela.  It 
is fighting each of the fronts with a slightly different mix 
of political, military, and police measures, all of which are 
expensive and at times controversial.  The GOC will be 
looking for private and public reaffirmations of sustained 
U.S. support, including financial support.  Requested U.S. 
assistance tops $556 million in FY06, plus a number of other 
agency operating accounts, continuing the steady decline from 
about $602 million in FY03.  The Colombian security forces 
face serious helicopter shortages for counter-drug and 
counter-terrorism operations and struggle to afford 
maintenance, pilot training, and other support.  President 
Uribe and Defense Minister Jorge Uribe (no relation) may ask 
for additional Blackhawk helicopters. 
 
------------------------------ 
Demobilization and Reinsertion 
------------------------------ 
 
3. (C) The GOC may request U.S. aid for the demobilization 
and reinsertion process for the paramilitaries.  President 
Uribe raised the issue with the President and Secretary 
Powell more than once.  Although you have stated our public 
support for the program, after 18 months we are still 
awaiting a DOJ decision that would make aid legal under the 
Patriot Act.  In the meantime, the GOC program reflects the 
lack of U.S. input. 
 
4. (C) Since 2003, 5,000 paramilitaries (AUC) have 
demobilized and another 7,000 from all groups have deserted. 
Several thousand more may demobilize this year.  But they 
have no place to go.  The program is under-funded and the OAS 
verification chief has issued an international call for help. 
 Although some Europeans are providing bilateral assistance, 
the EU refuses to help, partly at the behest of NGOs, until 
an "acceptable" law of Peace and Justice, which provides 
lesser sentences to demobilized persons guilty of major 
crimes, is approved.  The controversial law has passed in 
committee and is awaiting plenary debate.  We expect adoption 
by the end of June. 
 
5. (C) In a related peace process, the ELN rejected Mexican 
facilitation on April 18, ostensibly over the GOM's vote 
against Cuba at the UN Commission on Human Rights.  We 
believe that the FARC influenced the ELN to end the talks and 
that the ELN will engage in "forum shopping" to find a more 
pliable facilitator.  The FARC has steadily refused peace 
talks or an acceptable humanitarian prisoner exchange. 
 
----------- 
Extradition 
----------- 
 
6. (C) President Uribe has approved 214 extraditions to the 
U.S. since taking office.  He will likely ask for more 
coordination to conform our actions to Colombian legal 
requirements relating to length of sentence and other 
political sensitivities.  He has resisted both corrupt and 
honestly nationalistic attempts to curtail extraditions, 
including in the peace process with the paramilitaries.  But 
we need to reaffirm our adherence to commitments to Colombia, 
and follow through. 
--------- 
Venezuela 
--------- 
 
7. (C) Colombia-Venezuela relations deteriorated further 
after FARC international spokesman Rodrigo Granda was 
captured in Caracas.  You should encourage regional 
counter-terror and counter-drug cooperation, a major theme of 
last month's summit among Presidents Chavez, Lula, Zapatero, 
and Uribe.  Colombia remains concerned about Venezuela's arms 
build-up, and is tempted to divert needed resources away from 
counter-drug and counter-terror priorities.  Colombia has 
proposed a closer bilateral defense relationship as a partial 
solution; Doug Feith leads a team in early May that will 
discuss the issue. 
 
----------------------------------- 
Military Progress and Plan Patriota 
----------------------------------- 
 
8. (C) Plan Patriota, the campaign to re-take national 
territory from illegal armed groups, is in its third year and 
focused in FARC-dominated, heavily forested southeastern 
Colombia.  Phase One largely restored security to the Bogota 
area.  The logistical strain of keeping 15,500 troops in 
deep, hostile jungle has been a huge challenge; the troops 
have suffered casualties from both FARC action and disease. 
But they are winning.  FARC violence in the first quarter of 
2005, although tactically aggressive, remained localized.  We 
believe it was calculated, at least in part, to divert scarce 
Colombian resources away from Plan Patriota. 
 
------------ 
Human Rights 
------------ 
 
9. (C) The Uribe Administration continues to make progress in 
human rights, but needs to do more to ensure accountability, 
strengthen the military justice system, break military ties 
to paramilitary groups, and end corruption.  You should 
stress in private the crucial need for the GOC to investigate 
and prosecute crimes in which the military may have been 
directly or indirectly involved.  However, the vast majority 
of human rights crimes are attributable to the illegal armed 
groups; e.g., in the second week of April 300 FARC attacked 
an Indian village, killing a number of civilians and local 
police.  The government has a difficult but active dialogue 
with NGOs, the United Nations, and foreign governments. 
Human rights training is mandatory for all members of the 
military and police.  The Embassy vets all units that receive 
U.S. assistance, in accordance with the Leahy Amendment.  In 
2004, homicides fell by 16 percent, kidnappings by 42 
percent, and forced displacements by 37 percent. 
 
----------------------------- 
Drug Eradication/Interdiction 
----------------------------- 
 
10. (C) Cooperation with Colombia remains excellent, 
complicated at times by the competition for scarce 
helicopters between the counter-terror and counter-drug 
priorities.  Eradication and interdiction are at record 
levels.  Some 60,500 hectares of coca and 900 hectares of 
opium poppy had been sprayed since the beginning of the year 
and 1,300 hectares of coca and poppy were manually 
eradicated.  In 2004, over 136,000 hectares of coca and 3,000 
hectares of poppy were sprayed, and almost 200 metric tons of 
cocaine and cocaine base were seized inside Colombia.  Ground 
fire against spray planes is below 2003 levels but remains 
problematic. 
------------- 
U.S. Hostages 
------------- 
 
11. (C) The three U.S. contractors captured by the FARC in 
February 2003 are now the longest U.S. terror captives in the 
world.  Their safe release continues to be one of our top 
priorities.  The Colombians are providing full assistance. 
They have assured us that our hostages will be included in 
any humanitarian exchange and have done their best to avoid 
military operations that might unnecessarily jeopardize the 
hostages. 
 
---------------------------- 
Free Trade Agreement/Economy 
---------------------------- 
 
12. (U) The ninth round of FTA talks began on April 18 in 
Lima, Peru.  President Uribe remains a strong proponent.  The 
Colombians are concerned that their congressional and 
national elections in 2006 will block approval if agreement 
waits too long.  Agriculture continues to be a major issue. 
Our goal of conclusion by early 2005 is uncertain. 
 
13. (U) Overall economic growth continues to be strong (about 
4 percent), investment is growing, and unemployment is 
falling.  But Uribe faces fiscal and political pressure from 
the competition between defense and social needs. 
 
--------------- 
Judicial Reform 
--------------- 
 
14. (C) The U.S.-backed switch to an oral trial system has 
been successful.  The Colombian military justice system, 
however, is unreformed, giving rise to justified accusations 
of impunity in selected cases.  Last month, the military 
submitted a "shock" reform package to Congress as the first 
step towards streamlining military justice.  You should press 
for more rapid, effective progress, especially in a few 
critical cases. 
 
----------------------- 
Presidential Reelection 
----------------------- 
 
15. (C) Congressional elections will take place next March; 
presidential elections next May.  Constitutional reform to 
permit Uribe's re-election has been approved by Congress but 
faces review by the Constitutional Court; the outcome is 
uncertain.  Uribe is above 65 percent approval in polls. 
Re-election and the Peace and Justice Law are the two big 
political issues at present. 
WOOD 

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