US embassy cable - 05BOGOTA3726

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 003726 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/18/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, PREL, CO, MX, ELN Peace Process 
SUBJECT: PEACE PROCESS WITH ELN STALLS 
 
REF: A. BOGOTA 1775 
 
     B. BOGOTA 3422 
     C. CARACAS 0951 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
Summary 
-------- 
 
1. (C) On April 15, the Ambassador met with Mexican 
facilitator for the peace process with the National 
Liberation Army (ELN) Andres Valencia and Mexican Ambassador 
Chacon.  Valencia said the peace process remained stalled due 
to the ELN's unwillingness to renounce kidnapping during 
talks.  Nevertheless, the GOC and ELN were proceeding with 
his facilitation because neither wanted to walk away just 
yet.  In March, Brazil, Venezuela, and Spain offered to 
mediate peace talks if the Mexican facilitation stalled, but 
the GOC rallied them behind Mexico's lead.  Valencia noted an 
internal split between negotiation ready-ELN members, led by 
Francisco Galan, and more violent leaders such as Antonio 
Garcia, who were closely aligned with the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia (FARC).  Valencia also probed for more 
active U.S. involvement as a way to jump-start the process. 
 
2. (U) On April 18, in a surprise move, the ELN rejected 
further Mexican facilitation due to the GOM's vote against a 
resolution criticizing Cuba's human rights record at the 
Commission on Human Rights last week.  As a result, this 
cable is provided largely for the record.  End Summary. 
 
Stalled Peace Process 
--------------------- 
 
3. (C) Andres Valencia told the Ambassador on April 15 after 
a week in Bogota that the ELN peace process, stalled since 
early February, was likely to remain stuck for the 
foreseeable future.  ELN leaders remained adamant that the 
organization be allowed to continue kidnapping to finance its 
operations during talks, despite the GOC's refusal to accept 
that condition. (Note: the Mexicans agree with the GOC.) 
Valencia's March ultimatum message to the ELN demanded that 
the group agree to either negotiate or end the process. 
Valencia hoped that the threat would press the ELN to accept 
the necessary preconditions for negotiations set out by the 
GOC.  Valencia did not end the talks, he said, because other 
nations would serve as mediators if he left and a year of 
negotiation would be wasted.  The Colombian Government also 
threatened to end the process and reveal the ELN's 
culpability for the breakdown but decided not to since some 
officials feared returning to a two-front conflict with the 
ELN and the FARC.  All three parties continue to participate 
in written negotiations despite frustrations with the 
progress. 
 
Uribe's Public Secret 
--------------------- 
 
4. (C) Valencia recounted ELN Leader Francisco Galan's 
irritation with President Uribe's comments on GOC talks with 
the ELN, broadcast during the March 29 four-party summit (ref 
C).  Galan told Valencia he was upset that Uribe had made 
public statements about the process and claimed it undermined 
what little trust had existed between the two sides. 
Valencia told the Ambassador he was surprised by the 
broadcast but commented that, intentionally or not, Uribe's 
"little secret with 26 million people" had raised the 
process's visibility and the public's awareness of the ELN's 
kidnapping demand.  Before the summit, imprisoned ELN leader 
Galan sent letters to the presidents of Spain, Venezuela, and 
Brazil requesting international support.  In response, the 
presidents directed their ambassadors to Colombia to visit 
Galan in prison, but reaffirmed their faith in the Mexican 
facilitation process.  The three urged the ELN to continue 
forward with the process rather than seek new facilitators. 
In this regard, Valencia also expressed concern that Cuba, 
active in negotiations up to 1999, was attempting to exert 
influence on the ELN and become a spoiler.  He noted that 
Cuban attacks against Mexico following the GOM's vote at the 
Commission for Human Rights could work against his 
facilitation. 
 
ELN Divided on Way Ahead 
------------------------ 
 
5. (C) Valencia stressed that the ELN's internal divisions 
stymied his efforts to negotiate the terms for peace talks. 
As an example, Valencia mentioned a meeting with Francisco 
Galan where he received word that the ELN would consider 
suspending violent actions (including kidnapping) during 
peace talks in Mexico.  Hours later, however, ELN leader 
Antonio Garcia retracted the offer.  Valencia told the 
Ambassador that he believed Garcia had painted himself into a 
corner on the issue of suspending violent acts and needed 
some concession to save face.  He raised the possibility of 
meeting the international community or a judicial pardon for 
imprisoned ELN members who worked towards peace.  He 
acknowledged that either option would require the support of 
the international community, including the U.S.  In more 
general terms, he suggested that U.S. involvement could be 
useful to jump-start the process, and urged the Ambassador to 
discuss it with Washington. 
 
6.  (C) The stalemate will continue, according to Valencia, 
since both sides enjoy the appearance of talks without 
concessions.  He expressed cautious optimism that the ELN or 
GOC would find a way forward, but said he did not see either 
moving in the immediate future.  He doubted that Mexico would 
be able to host peace talks, but said he was still working 
towards that goal.  The Ambassador agreed that the process 
should be given every chance to succeed, but also underscored 
the importance of ending a failed process. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
7. (C) Despite the internal ELN divisions, Uribe's public 
comments, and increasing offers from others to restart the 
process, Valencia had managed, up to April 18, to keep the 
parties engaged.  That said, the ELN's surprise announcement 
ending Mexican facilitation and Valencia's comments about 
divisions in the ELN leadership also suggest that a large 
part of the ELN may be now so dependent on the FARC, that the 
time has passed for meaningful negotiations with the GOC. 
 
8. (C) Although Valencia expressed some concern about how 
harsh statements from Havana against Mexico following the 
Geneva vote might affect his facilitation, he gave no 
indication that it would lead to Mexico's dismissal.  While 
this is mostly an ELN gambit, we do not underestimate Cuba's 
role here.  We plan to tell the Colombians, still grateful to 
Cuba for helping resolve the crisis with Venezuela, that they 
would best keep their distance from the Cubans as an 
alternate facilitator, and that the episode proves Cuba is 
more interested in seeking retribution against Mexico than in 
helping the Colombian peace process.  This latest development 
may also be helpful in dealing with the Cuban resolution on 
Guantanamo at the CHR in Geneva. 
 
9. (C) Finally, Embassy believes we should be encouraging 
Ambassador Valencia to publish his voluminous, 
minute-by-minute history of the facilitation (per reftel), 
which will make clear the flexibility shown by the GOC in 
trying to get these talks underway, and discouraging the 
Brazilians and Spanish from filling the space left by 
Mexico's withdrawal from the peace process. 
WOOD