US embassy cable - 05QUITO855

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STATE OF EMERGENCY: USG OUTREACH CRITICAL

Identifier: 05QUITO855
Wikileaks: View 05QUITO855 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Quito
Created: 2005-04-19 17:33:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV PREL EC
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 QUITO 000855 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/18/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, EC 
SUBJECT: STATE OF EMERGENCY: USG OUTREACH CRITICAL 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Kristie A. Kenney, Reason 1.4 (b&d) 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  After the declaration of a state of 
emergency by President Gutierrez on the evening of April 15, 
Embassy Quito and Consulate Guayaquil, working with other USG 
colleagues, acted quickly to encourage GOE restraint and 
non-violence.  The Mission team (including several Embassy 
sections and Consulate Guayaquil), with terrific support from 
DOD, DOS, and Treasury colleagues in Washington and Miami, 
conducted extensive outreach to contacts, including the 
President and other GOE officials, opposition politicians, 
GOE military, business leaders, indigenous leaders, and NGO 
contacts.  We believe these coordinated efforts contributed 
to the early end of the state of emergency and commendable 
restraint on the part of the GOE military.  End Summary. 
 
Ambassador Leads Embassy Outreach To GOE 
---------------------------------------- 
 
2.  (C) Team Effort:  The Ambassador convened three Country 
Team/EAC meetings over the weekend of April 16-17 to assess 
the political situation.  At these meetings, various sections 
were able to share information gathered from their outreach. 
The Ambassador led this outreach by calling President 
Gutierrez on the evening of April 15, as well as on the 
morning of April 16, to urge the lifting of the state of 
emergency as soon as possible, and to urge restraint in the 
face of peaceful protests and respect for civil rights.  The 
Ambassador and DCM had breakfast with Gutierrez on April 18 
and suggested he signal conciliation by complimenting 
Congress on its April 17 resolution and calling for dialogue. 
 They also suggested the Cabinet be more actively involved in 
resolving the turbulent political situation. 
 
3.  (C) Presidency:  Upon learning from clandestine sources 
that the state of emergency would be declared, the Ambassador 
spoke with Presidential Legal Advisor Carlos Larrea to 
express USG concern.  Larrea told us the state of emergency 
was "a fact" and could not be changed.  Shortly after the 
President issued his declaration publicly (the announcement 
was apparently taped hours before), Ambassador-designate to 
the US Mauricio Pozo called the Ambassador to convey 
Gutierrez' reasons for the decree.  The Ambassador and 
EconCouns also spoke with Presidential Secretary Carlos Polit 
several times over the weekend, though he was in the US. 
 
4.  (C) Cabinet and Other Embassies:  The Ambassador and 
EconCouns also contacted several Cabinet members including 
Minister of Commerce Ivonne Baki, Minister of Finance 
Mauricio Yepez (in Washington), Minister of Labor Raul 
Izurieta, and Presidential Secretary Carlos Polit, urging 
them to help bring about a quick end to the state of 
emergency.  The Ministers unanimously agreed with a call for 
restraint and dialogue and said they would convey this 
message to the President at the Cabinet meeting held on April 
16.  With a visit by Chilean President Lagos in the offing, 
the Ambassador called her Chilean counterpart to enlist 
Chilean intervention with Gutierrez to encourage the lifting 
of the state of emergency.  President Lagos called Gutierrez 
on April 17 to promise to reschedule his visit, and encourage 
GOE respect for democratic norms, according to the Chilean 
Ambassador here.  Ambassador and DCM worked their Spanish 
Embassy counterparts over the weekend as well, who have been 
urging moderation from their contacts within the Democratic 
Left opposition. 
 
5.  (C) Opposition:  PolOffs called various opposition 
leaders to gauge Congressional reaction to the state of 
emergency and urge restraint and constructive dialogue. 
 
6.  (C) Military:  DAO and MILGP spoke with Joint Forces 
Chief Admiral Victor Rosero and Army Commander General Luis 
Aguas on April 16.  Rosero was later able to confirm that 
Aguas had not been dismissed, as had been rumored.  DAO also 
spoke with the Chilean Defense Attache who confirmed that 
Chilean President had canceled his trip to Quito, planned for 
April 18-19.  On April 18, the Ambassador spoke with Minister 
of Defense Nelson Herrera to praise the military's 
professionalism under difficult circumstances.  The 
Ambassador also met with Rosero on April 18 to encourage 
continued military respect for constitutional norms. 
 
Reaching Out to Civil Society 
----------------------------- 
 
7.  (SBU) ECON counseled calm and monitored reaction by key 
private sector leaders. 
 
8.  (C) Citizens Groups:  The DCM called Cesar Montufar of 
NGO Citizen Participation on April 15 to urge calm and 
recommend he (a possible target of GOE suspension of civil 
rights) go to a secure location.  AID extended our outreach 
to other NGO contacts, such as Cornelio Marchan of the Esquel 
Foundation, to monitor civil society efforts and promote 
dialogue. 
 
9.  (C) Indigenous:  POL made several calls to gauge the 
indigenous reaction to the declaration of a state of 
emergency.  On April 16, PolOff spoke with indigenous leaders 
(Santiago de la Cruz, CONAIE; Raul Ilaquiche, ECUARUNARI; and 
Marco Murillo, FEINE) who were meeting within their 
respective organizations to decide next steps.  PolOff also 
spoke with indigenous Congressman Jorge Guaman (Pachakutik) 
on April 16.  PolOff spoke again with indigenous leaders on 
April 18 confirming the President's revocation of the state 
of emergency had lowered tensions and made a general 
indigenous anti-government mobilization less likely. 
 
Support AmCit Safety, Embassy Operations 
---------------------------------------- 
 
10.  (U) Activating immediately as part of Embassy EAC, RSO 
and CONS combined efforts to keep Embassy and AmCits safe and 
informed about evolving risks.  Making all these outreach and 
reporting efforts possible, MGT provided crucial 
communications and logistical support which allowed for 
24-hour Embassy operations. 
 
Guayaquil Contacts Coastal Leaders 
---------------------------------- 
 
11.  (SBU) On April 15-16, CG and Pol/EconOff spoke with PSC 
party leaders as well as business leaders.  On April 15-16, 
the CG spoke with Miguel Orellana, son-in-law of PSC leader 
Leon Febres Cordero.  CG stressed our desire to see a 
government functioning with stable democratic institutions. 
The CG also spoke with Guayaquil mayor Jaime Nebot (PSC) and 
expressed the Ambassador's appreciation of his measured 
response to the state of emergency.  Reaching out to the 
private sector, Pol/EconOff also spoke with Chamber of 
Commerce VP Teodoro Maldonado on April 16, who described the 
efforts of business chambers to support Nebot's evolving 
protest strategy.  Consulate Guayaquil also spoke with former 
government officials, private business representatives, as 
well as the AmCham president to encourage calm and promote 
dialogue. 
 
DOD Urges GOE Military Restraint 
-------------------------------- 
 
12.  (C) Support from high-ranking DOD officials was 
essential in helping get out our message of restraint on the 
part of the military during the state of emergency.  On April 
11, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Richard Myers visit 
to Quito had already helped support our pro-democracy and 
pro-stability agenda and our continued commitment to military 
cooperation.  US SOUTHCOM CDR General Brantz Craddock's April 
16 call to Ecuador Joint Forces Chief Admiral Victor Rosero 
furthered our message of military restraint during the state 
of emergency. 
 
13.  (U) In the end, GOE military acted very professionally 
and with great restraint during the crisis.  It is worth 
noting that Admiral Rosero received training in the US under 
the IMET program and his excellent leadership shows the 
lasting results of this type of exchange.  Unfortunately, 
future military leaders will not have the same development 
opportunities with IMET suspended. 
 
Washington Officials Pitch In 
----------------------------- 
 
14.  (C) A/S Roger Noriega and DAS Charles Shapiro spoke with 
GOE Presidential Advisor Carlos Polit early on to express USG 
concern over the state of emergency.  Department officials 
did the same with the Ecuadorian Charge in Washington. 
Department of Treasury and international financial 
institutions also played an important role, counseling 
Minister of Finance Mauricio Yepez on the possible negative 
repercussions of recent events.  Yepez, in turn, relayed 
their concern to President Gutierrez. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
15.  (C) Ultimately, President Gutierrez decision to lift the 
state of emergency was probably the result of a wide range of 
factors.  The USG's immediate and unequivocal response was 
undoubtedly one key factor, of which we can be proud.  With 
the emergency over, but the resulting political crisis in 
full sway, we will continue to use our contacts to follow the 
political situation and urge dialogue and reconciliation. 
Support from our colleagues in Washington and Miami will 
continue to multiply our efforts here to promote 
constitutional order, political stability, and dialogue. 
KENNEY 

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