US embassy cable - 05THEHAGUE1057

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DUTCH RESPONSE TO DEMARCHE ON PROTECTING THE UN IN IRAQ

Identifier: 05THEHAGUE1057
Wikileaks: View 05THEHAGUE1057 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy The Hague
Created: 2005-04-19 12:22:00
Classification: SECRET
Tags: PREL MARR IZ NL
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

191222Z Apr 05
S E C R E T THE HAGUE 001057 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/18/2015 
TAGS: PREL, MARR, IZ, NL 
SUBJECT: DUTCH RESPONSE TO DEMARCHE ON PROTECTING THE UN IN 
IRAQ 
 
REF: STATE 65106 
 
Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR CLIFFORD M. SOBEL FOR REASONS 1 
.4 (B AND D) 
 
1. (S) Ambassador Sobel raised reftel request directly with 
PM Balkenende on April 11, and followed up with DefMin Kamp 
and the PM's Foreign Policy Advisor Rob Swartbol on April 13. 
 PolMilOff also discussed this issue with MFA Security Policy 
Bureau Operations Office Director Rob Gabrielse on April 12 
and 14.  Although Balkenende's initial reaction had been 
noncommittal, Kamp reacted very negatively to the proposal, 
arguing that for the Dutch to go back into Iraq so soon after 
having left (the last members of the Dutch deployment to 
AlMuthanna province departed Iraq on April 2) would undermine 
the rationale for their departure.  Kamp said this request 
represented an unfair burden on the Netherlands, and that the 
U.S. and the UN should be able to find another country to 
handle the task.  Separately, PM Balkenende's Foreign Policy 
Advisor Swartbol advised that sending an armed Dutch presence 
back into Iraq at this time would not be appropriate. 
Swartbol said that PM Balkenende and Kamp had spoken on this 
issue following the Ambassador's discussion with Balkenende 
and were agreed on this point. 
 
2. (S) Comment:  We do not believe that the Dutch government 
will take on this mission.  While DefMin Kamp was willing to 
defy the main opposition Labor Party over deployment of 
special operations forces to Afghanistan for OEF, he is 
sensitive to public perceptions and feels that to go back to 
Iraq, even for such a different mission, would signal weak 
leadership on his part.  Given his success in resisting 
pressure for a further extension of the Dutch AlMuthanna 
deployment last January, we judge that his cabinet 
colleagues, even if they were inclined to support this 
mission, would not attempt to reverse his position.  End 
comment. 
 
3. (U) Baghdad minimize considered. 
SOBEL 

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