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| Identifier: | 05SANAA974 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05SANAA974 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Sanaa |
| Created: | 2005-04-19 04:01:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PTER PREL KNNP YM IAEA NPT COUNTER TERRORISM ENVIRONMENT |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000974 SIPDIS ENERGY PLEASE PASS TO NNSA DIRECTOR US LINTON F. BROOKS, STATE PLEASE PASS TO KATHY CROUCH NP/ECC E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2015 TAGS: PTER, PREL, KNNP, YM, IAEA, NPT, COUNTER TERRORISM, ENVIRONMENT/S&T SUBJECT: NATEC'S BAHRAN: WE NEED USG SUPPORT, INVITE TO US LINTON BROOKS Classified By: Ambassador Thomas C. Krajeski for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d ). 1. (C) Summary: In an April 17 meeting with Ambassador, Director of the Yemen National Atomic Energy Commission (NATEC), Dr. Moustafa Bahran, asked for USG assistance to train NATEC staff and pushed for Yemen's acquisition of radioactive detection equipment. Bahran also invited Under Secretary (US) of Energy for Nuclear Security and SIPDIS Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Linton F. Brooks, to a May sub-regional conference. End Summary. --------------------------------------------- -- Bahran: No One in the Region Is Better Than Us --------------------------------------------- -- 2. (C) In an April 17 meeting with Ambassador, NATEC Director Bahran asked for USG help to train NATEC security personnel. (Note: NATEC Security personnel are commissioned with enforcing laws and procedures to secure radioactive materials in Yemen. End Note). Stating that his agency had the competency and potential to deal with nuclear and radioactive security, Bahran asked for training by the Department of Energy (DOE) and/or the National Regulatory Commission (NRC). "No one in the region is better than us," exclaimed Bahran, but training would greatly help in "sustaining" and "strengthening" Yemen's ability to deal with radioactive materials. He stressed that it would also help by exposing his staff to the "vigilance" required in radioactive source management. Ambassador assured Bahran that he would pass his requests to Washington, but patience would be required. --------------------------------------------- --- Yemen COULD Become a Way Station... God Forbid! --------------------------------------------- --- 3. (C) Discussing once again Yemen's need for radioactive detection equipment to patrol points of entry, Bahran readily conceded that Yemen did not have a problem with radioactive orphan source smuggling. "But Yemen could become a way station... God forbid!" he warned. "We are not controlling any borders," noted Bahran in highlighting NATEC's need for help, "but this is the year that we start." He added that the DOE's "MegaPorts" initiative has agreed to help NATEC. 4. (C) Bahran also revealed that his plans to secure Yemen's borders from radioactive smuggling would require several low-end radioactive detection pagers that would be used by Coastguard and border crossing personnel to initially screen any suspect cargo. Then, if the case warranted, trained specialists with higher end pagers, capable of detecting exact radioactive sources, would conduct subsequent inspections. 5. (C) While making his case, Bahran showed Ambassador what he described to be a "confidential" document highlighting Yemen's nuclear security needs. (Note: The document was most likely Yemen's Nuclear Security Plan that it presented to the IAEA to ask for radioactive detection equipment. Bahran has presented separate requests to the IAEA and the DOE for radioactive detection equipment. It is unclear to post whether the two requests highlight the need for identical or different equipment. End Note). Bahran was confident that with the requested equipment and training he could stop any non-legal transport of radioactive sources through Yemen. -------------------------- Invite to US Linton Brooks -------------------------- 6. (U) Bahran also asked Ambassador to pass an invitation to US of Energy for Nuclear Security and Administrator of the NNSA, Linton F. Brooks to a conference on controlling nuclear and radioactive materials at borders. The conference, sponsored by the IAEA, will be held on May 26-24 at the Grand Mohur Sheraton in Aden, Yemen. 7. (U) Begin Text of invitation letter: The National Energy Commission presents it compliments to you. It is my pleasure to inform you that the Republic of Yemen is hosting the Sub-Regional Seminar on Measures to Monitor, Detect, Identify and Respond to Incidents Involving Nuclear and Radioactive Materials at Borders, 24-26 May 2005, in Aden. The seminar is intended to raise awareness on the subject and the participants are decision makers and experts from participating countries that are Member States of the IAEA (Eritrea, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, UAE, Yemen). Also I would like to inform you that (Bahrain, Djibouti, Oman, Palestinian National Authority, and Somalia) have been invited to participate in the seminar by Yemen because they are not Member States in the IAEA. It is my opinion that this seminar is an excellent opportunity for the NNSA to participate and maybe deliver a presentation on the kind of efforts and assistance that your government is providing in this regard. Accordingly, it is my pleasure to invite representatives from your side to participate in this seminar. The National Atomic Energy Commission avails itself of this opportunity to renew to you the assurances of its highest consideration. Accept my best regards, Dr. Moustafa Bahran Science and Technology Advisor to the President of the Rep. NATEC Chairman End text. 8. (C) Action Request and Comment: Post has previously determined that Yemen does not have an identifiable radioactive source smuggling problem and that Bahran's request for radioactive detection equipment is not justifiable at this time. However, providing training would be a measured and pragmatic option through which the USG could demonstrate its appreciation to an ally in the IAEA and a potential regional leader in nuclear and radioactive source management. Post asks Department, DOE and NRC for information on training programs to help an aspiring agency with the potential to be a role model in the region. End Action Request and Comment. Krajeski
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