US embassy cable - 05QUITO850

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 QUITO 000850 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ASEC, EC 
SUBJECT: EXHAUSTED GUTIERREZ JUSTIFIES EMERGENCY, OUTLINES 
NEXT STEPS 
 
REF: A. QUITO 842 
 
     B. QUITO 841 
     C. QUITO 840 
     D. QUITO 839 
     E. QUITO 836 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Kristie A. Kenney, Reason 1.4 (b) 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  A fatigued President Lucio Gutierrez met 
with the Ambassador over breakfast April 18 and discussed the 
now-withdrawn state of emergency (Reftels) and his plans for 
reducing political temperatures.  Gutierrez defended the 
April 15 decree, but claimed security conditions had improved 
sufficiently to merit its next-day retraction.  He worried 
that street protests demanding his resignation would 
continue, however. 
 
2.  (C) Ordering the state of emergency was a bad tactical 
move, the Ambassador asserted, and not notifying the Embassy 
beforehand a breach of trust.  She warned that other harsh 
GoE moves, especially any attempt at dissolving the 
legislature, would not be tolerated by the USG.  Congress's 
resolution April 17 that vacated the Supreme Court (Septel) 
offered the president a chance to be conciliatory and perhaps 
reduce calls for his head; he needed to capitalize. 
Gutierrez claimed his team was reaching out the opposition 
and had sought a Church role in spurring dialog.  We are not 
sanguine over his long term political prospects.  END SUMMARY. 
 
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Demonstrations Taking Their Toll 
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3.  (C) During the 22-hour Quito state of emergency, the 
Ambassador and Gutierrez conversed twice; in their second 
telcon, she requested a face-to-face.  A bleary-eyed 
president greeted her April 18 at their Presidential Palace 
working breakfast (Administration Secretary Carlos Polit 
later confirmed that Gutierrez had worked straight through 
the night).  He turned immediately to the emergency decree, 
again claiming it was the only option available to ensure the 
Supreme Court did not nullify arrest orders against two 
fugitive bankers and simultaneously foment a bank run (Ref 
D).  The order had had its desired effect:  dismissing the 
temporary Court and calming Quito's streets.  As such, 
repealing it after less than one day was an easy call. 
 
4.  (C) Quito's social convulsions were the capital's alone, 
Gutierrez argued.  Elsewhere he was as popular as ever -- in 
western lowlands province Los Rios, which the president had 
visited April 17, residents had called for his re-election. 
He believed street protests in Quito would continue, however, 
and recognized their potentially destabilizing effects. 
Nonetheless, Gutierrez would not clamp down on press 
freedoms, even allowing the borderline-seditious Radio Luna 
to continue broadcasting.  He congratulated Congress for its 
day-earlier decision to vacate the Supreme Court, and hoped 
members would make good on their commitment to repopulate it 
with apolitical justices. 
 
5.  (C) Gutierrez accepted and understood the public's 
disgust with the return of exiled former President Abdala 
Bucaram (PRE), the work of now ex-Supreme Court president 
Guillermo Castro.  The president disliked having to turn to 
parties like the PRE and PRIAN, but six months ago, he had no 
other choice (referring to the opposition's October/November 
2004 attempt to impeach him).  With 89 deputies supporting 
the April 16 resolution, Gutierrez hoped a new spirit of 
cooperation might reign in Congress.  He waxed confident that 
history would judge him well for forcing debate and ultimate 
independence of Ecuador's judiciary. 
 
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Cause for Concern, Not Emergency 
-------------------------------- 
 
6.  (C) The Ambassador differed with Gutierrez's rosy 
portrayal of the situation.  While the media harangue and 
daily "cacerolazos" (noisy but non-violent street protests) 
were nuisances and merited GoE attention, declaring a state 
of emergency was a mistake.  If anything, it had steeled the 
opposition's resolve and tilted a wavering public solidly 
against the president.  She also expressed indignance that 
the Embassy learned of the decree unofficially, noting she 
and the foreign minister had spoken just one hour before 
Gutierrez announced the measure on nationwide television. 
(Gutierrez said the FM was out of the loop; only a few 
insiders knew of the plan.)  USG opposition aside, the 
Ambassador praised the restraint shown by Ecuador's security 
forces during the 22-hour emergency. 
 
7.  (C) She cautioned Gutierrez that the USG would not 
tolerate further moves that threatened the independence of 
Ecuadorian institutions, Congress in particular.  In passing 
the April 16 resolution, the legislature had displayed rare 
unanimity and concern for the national interest.  The 
president would be wise to praise publicly Congress's move 
and promise his administration's full cooperation in birthing 
a truly independent judiciary.  Conversely, inflammatory 
public remarks such as the president's "If I leave, it will 
only be feet first" would only embolden his political enemies. 
 
8.  (C) Administration press outreach was a good beginning, 
she offered.  The government might also look to restart 
dialog with political opponents.  Aware the presence of 
certain Gutierrez insiders infuriated the opposition, the 
Ambassador queried whether another Cabinet "re-oxygenation" 
awaited.  Last, she emphasized that Ecuador had friends in 
the hemisphere wanting to help -- had he thought of 
requesting OAS or further UN assistance? 
 
---------------- 
Similar Thoughts 
---------------- 
 
9.  (C) Gutierrez revealed the Cabinet would assemble later 
in the morning.  Topping the agenda was an analysis of 
Congress's resolution and how it might be utilized to lower 
temperatures and spur compromise.  His administration already 
had reached out to Guayaquil Mayor Jaime Nebot (PSC), whom he 
considered approachable.  Concurrently, unofficial advisor 
Guayaquil banker Guillermo Lasso was gauging the Church's 
interest in assuming a conciliatory role in resolving the 
political crisis.  Gutierrez dodged the Ambassador's 
inquiries regarding a Cabinet but hinted at invitation to the 
OAS and/or UN, however. 
 
10.  (C) Two hours later, the Ambassador dialed Defense 
Minister Nelson Herrera.  Ecuador's armed forces had 
performed responsibly in an unenviable job, she believed.  As 
the president looked exhausted and thus apt to err, the 
Ambassador hoped Herrera might advise the chief executive to 
get some rest.  Herrera promised that the troops would 
continue to comply with their constitutional obligations and 
not play politics.  He considered the state of emergency 
tactically and morally wrong, but the Constitution mandated 
he enforce the order.  The president regularly burned 
midnight oil; Herrera agreed he appeared sleep-deprived. 
 
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COMMENT: 
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11.  (C) An optimist would consider last night's 
Congressional unanimity proof the legislature has 
back-burnered partisanship in hopes of fixing Ecuador's 
dysfunctional judiciary.  Pressure against Gutierrez 
therefore should diminish, the theory goes.  Having witnessed 
Ecuador dispose eight presidents in eight years, however, we 
aren't so optimistic, despite the president's enviable 
survival instincts.  The "street" continues to protest, for 
example, with calls of "Fuera (Out!) Lucio" joining the 
incessant horn-honking and pot-banging now commonplace 
city-wide.  Business elite in Quito also now calling for his 
ouste.  And an opposition lawmaker, shortly before Congress 
passed the resolution, claimed that sufficient votes existed 
(51) to declare Gutierrez mentally unfit to govern.  Septel 
details Embassy next steps; we will continue to tell all who 
will listen (and some who won't) that dialogue is key, and 
that a rotating-door presidency benefits no one. 
KENNEY