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| Identifier: | 05CARACAS1139 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05CARACAS1139 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Caracas |
| Created: | 2005-04-18 20:30:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | EPET EINV PGOV VE |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. 182030Z Apr 05
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CARACAS 001139 SIPDIS NSC FOR CBARTON ENERGY FOR DPUMPHREY AND ALOCKWOOD TOKYO FOR SFLATT E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2015 TAGS: EPET, EINV, PGOV, VE SUBJECT: VENEZUELA: PLAN PETROLEUM SOVEREIGNTY ADVANCES Classified By: Acting DCM Abelardo Arias; for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ------- SUMMARY ------- 1, (C) With announcements about the proposed forced migration of contracts to vehicles under Venezuela's 2001 Hydrocarbons Law as well as changes in oil sector income taxes, the GOV has launched another strong attack against the legal basis of current international oil company operations in Venezuela. Energy attorneys are skeptical that the GOV has the wherewithall to negotiate the migration of the 32 Operating Service Agreement (OSA) contracts within the next eight months. One attorney believes the tax announcement was intended to be a further spur for companies to line up to migrate their contracts. With the exception of ExxonMobil, we believe the companies will cave. Current oil prices as well as Venezuela's large reserves give them incentive to hold their tongues and negotiate. End Summary. -------------- ALL OUT ATTACK -------------- 2. (U) In an all out attack on what the PDVSA publicity machine has dubbed "the pernicious" Oil Opening of the 1990's, Energy Minister/PDVSA President Rafael Ramirez announced April 14 that the GOV will force the migration of the 32 Operating Service Agreements (OSAs) to mixed companies under the Hydrocarbons Law by the end of 2005. Ramirez also alleged that many of the companies have not been paying the appropriate income tax. Thus, he said, the Ministry had instructed PDVSA to cap its payments to the operators at 66.67 percent of the value of the crude produced. Following Ramirez's statements, on April 15, President Chavez announced in a televized cabinet meeting that the taxes on the four projects that process the extra heavy crude of Venezuela's Orinoco heavy oil belt would be increased from 34 to 50 percent. Ramirez subsequently said that the 50 percent tax rate will now apply to all operators. ---------- BACKGROUND ---------- 3. (U) In the 1990's, as an important part of its "Oil Opening" (Apertura Petrolera), PDVSA offered three bidding "rounds" of marginal oil fields to international bidders. The international oil companies (IOCs) that bid on these fields took over field operations under operating service contracts. The companies did not receive equity in the fields. The contract provisions for the three rounds vary. The first and second round contracts, for instance, stipulated specific royalty provisions (16.67 percent) while the third round contracts contained only a general reference to the royalty applicable under Venezuelan law. The income tax levied on the projects was 34 percent, or the tax on the oil sector prior to the 2001 Hydrocarbons Law. The GOV's refusal to grandfather these contracts was one of the controversies surrounding passage of the Hydrocarbons Law. At that time, the GOV argued that the contracts would be protected by non-retroactivity provisions of Venezuela law. Now, however, the GOV is arguing that the contracts were illegal because they were never approved by the National Assembly and that they were not true "service" contracts. ------------------------ WHAT IS A MIXED COMPANY? ------------------------ 4. (C) Local energy attornies are skeptical that the GOV has the staff or the wherewithall to negotiate the migration of the 32 OSA contracts in the next eight months. For one thing, there still is no model for what a "mixed company" might look like and how it might operate. Attorneys in the local offices of Steel,Hector & Davis have worked for over a year with PDVSA to develop a draft but Vice Minister Bernard Mommer has now reportedly rejected it. The list of other outstanding issues is long: how would company sunk costs be valued for migration to a mixed company? How would PDVSA pay for its 51 percent share in each mixed company? What would be the tax implications of a transfer of company assets from an OSA to a mixed company? How much control would the companies have over field operations? What arbitration provisions would apply? And so on. It does appear, however, that the GOV realizes it will have to grant more acreage or a longer contract as compensation to the companies that agree to migrate their contracts. 5. (C) Gabriela Rachadell, a partner in the energy division of Canadian law firm MacLeod Dixon, noted to econoff that it will be interesting to see on what legal basis the GOV plans to implement the tax increase on the extra heavy oil projects particularly. Two of the four projects, she said, have provisions in their contracts that stipulate a 34 percent tax rate while the other two have non-discrimination clauses. Rachadell believes this decision could be fought, although it would have to be handled through quiet negotiations. The tax increase for the OSAs would be more difficult to fight, she said, but not impossible. Rachadell, however, believes the April 15 GOV announcements about tax changes were intended to put more pressure on the companies to line up to migrate their contracts. -------------- COMPANY OPTICS -------------- 6. (C) In April 18 calls to a number of the IOCs, we were informed that they are "considering their options." However, with the exception of ExxonMobil, which is now consulting its corporate headquarters following an unsatisfactory meeting with Mommer, we believe the companies will cave. A recent meeting between the Ambassador and Harvest International CEO Peter Hill provides interesting insight. The Ambassador asked Hill how low oil prices would have to drop before it became uneconomical for the company to operate its South Monagas Unit, a first round asset acquired in 1992. Although Harvest was particularly hard hit by the GOV's decision in late 2004 to cap its 2005 capital investment program, Hill acknowledged that the company had just had its best quarter ever. Oil prices would have to drop as low as $12-14 per barrel, he said, before it would become uneconomical for the company to continue to operate its three South Monagas fields. In sum, current oil prices as well as the attractiveness of Venezuela's large reserves will give the companies the incentive to hold their tongues and negotiate. ------- COMMENT ------- 7. (C) Since its inception in 1998, the Chavez administration has made no bones about its dislike of the contracts associated with the "apertura" of the 1990's. In May 2003, at the Houston Offshore Technology Conference, then Vice Minister of Energy Luis Vierma first said publicly that the GOV would seek to re-negotiate the OSA contracts. Two years later, with Bernard Mommer, the intellectual author of Venezuela's oil policy firmly in place as Vice Minister, the GOV is now ready to play hard ball. Brownfield
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