US embassy cable - 05OTTAWA1166

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 OTTAWA 001166 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
FOR PM ACTING A/S LIKINS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/2015 
TAGS: PREL, MARR, CA, Scenesetter 
SUBJECT: CANADA SCENESETTER FOR POL-MIL BILATS 
 
Classified By: POL M/C Brian Flora.  Reason 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
1. (C) Your leadership of the U.S. delegation at the 
inaugural US-Canada political-military consultations is 
greatly appreciated.  While the United States and Canada meet 
regularly in continental security and defense forums, there 
has been growing recognition in both governments that broader 
policy discussions on security goals outside the North 
American context would be useful.  We hope that the April 27 
talks will help to set a precedent for a regular bilateral 
dialogue on shared international security interests and 
concerns. 
 
2. (C) Our discussions are taking place against the backdrop 
of domestic political uncertainty.  The fragile Martin 
government has been trying to avert a loss-of-confidence vote 
that could propel the country to the polls less than a year 
after the June 2004 elections.  Prime Minister Martin's 
overriding concern is to reverse his party's parliamentary 
minority and to win a majority mandate.  But the Liberals 
continue to be battered by ugly fallout from a Chretien-era 
spending scandal involving Quebec.  Sealed evidence from the 
investigation revealing illegal activity by the Liberal party 
was leaked to the public in early April, reviving the specter 
of Quebec "sovereignty" and ratcheting political tensions in 
Ottawa to a fever pitch. 
 
3. (C) True to the political winds and its minority mandate, 
the government is not pursuing an aggressive agenda in 
foreign policy.  At the same time, within the constraints of 
political scandal, limited funding, and slipping global 
clout, Canada continues to seek an active diplomatic agenda 
in multilateral institutions to address concerns such as 
non-proliferation, Iran, and the Middle East peace process. 
Low defense spending and a host of related limitations 
notwithstanding, the government also strives to maintain a 
respectable level of involvement in Afghanistan and other 
field missions, usually under a multilateral umbrella. 
Foreign policy topics of significance under the Martin 
government are addressed below. 
 
U.S.-CANADA RELATIONS 
 
4. (C/NF) Though PM Martin has made it a top priority of his 
government to get Canada-US relations back on track, his 
good intentions have been subsumed by domestic politics.  The 
Prime Minister's Office (PMO) continues to believe it was 
absolutely correct to walk away from controversial 
participation in the U.S. missile defense program.  But the 
government has not managed to shut down its pro-defense 
critics at home and has been at some pains to demonstrate 
that Canada remains a committed U.S. partner on international 
defense and security matters.  Though Canada had maintained a 
wary distance from any Iraq-related military assistance, for 
example, within days of the decision on missile defense, the 
PMO announced a contribution to the NATO Training Mission's 
Iraq Trust Fund of CAD 1 million (USD 800,000) and pledged 
military trainers (albeit not in country) for the Iraqi 
military. 
 
TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS 
 
5. (C/NF) Closer to the U.S. than ever on border 
collaboration and continental defense, Canada no longer sees 
itself as a bridge between Europe and the United States, but 
rather seeks a special relationship with each.  This is a 
natural evolution, as Canada finds its pocketbook linked 
increasingly to the U.S. (two-way trade between the EU and 
Canada is 10 percent of that between the U.S. and Canada), 
while its international values lie closer to those of Europe 
(Canada voted with the EU common position on 50 of 52 UNGA 
resolutions; the U.S. voted with the EU on 21 resolutions). 
 
6. (C/NF) Canada's relations with the EU, which some in the 
francophone-dominated Foreign Affairs bureaucracy see as a 
diplomatic counterweight to the U.S., are evolving rapidly. 
Of six states designated by the EU as a strategic partner, 
Canada probably has the most advanced and complex 
relationship with Europe.  At the March 2004 bi-annual 
Canada-EU Summit, PM Martin, EU Commission President Prodi, 
and Acting EU President Ahern agreed to a Partnership Agenda, 
which improved cooperation on security, foreign policy, 
trade, and investment.  Once content to manage transatlantic 
security relations exclusively through NATO and the OSCE, 
recently Canada has been negotiating terms of participation 
in potential EU field missions where NATO is not a player but 
in which Canada may have human security or other interests. 
7. (C/NF) Canada regularly affirms its commitment to NATO and 
the OSCE as the principal anchors in the transatlantic 
security relationship.  But an appetite for spending on 
social programs and aversion to military expenditure 
continues to dominate the budgeting priorities of the 
Liberals who have been in power since 1993.  Defense spending 
as a percentage of GDP ranks Canada in the bottom third of 
NATO countries. 
 
UN REFORM 
 
8. (SBU) The centrality of multilateral institutions--the UN 
especially--to Canada's foreign policy cannot be overstated. 
In his UNGA address, PM Martin urged bold reforms to 
strengthen the UN's capability to conduct humanitarian 
intervention, to deny WMD to terrorists and hostile states, 
to protect human rights and dignity, and to build better 
public institutions in failing states.  Canada has been 
active in the more mundane agenda of the "Group of Friends"; 
it has lobbied for a more open and transparent UNSC and is in 
favor of a modest increase in its elected--not 
permanent--membership.  Canada's deteriorating capacity to 
assist with any of this agenda, however, has seriously 
weakened its voice in the international forum. 
 
9. (C) At the recent G-8 Political Directors' meeting, 
Foreign Affairs Assistant Deputy Minister Jim Wright said 
that Canada supports UNSYG Annan's proposed Peace-Building 
Commission and the principle of "Responsibility to Protect." 
Though acknowledging that Canada understands the latter 
concept would be problematic for some, Wright said the GOC 
wishes to pursue it in a "practical" way. 
 
NATION-BUILDING AND HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 
 
10. (C) Sudan: Underscoring the Prime Minister's declared 
interest in alleviating the situation in Sudan, Canada 
pledged CAD 90 million in assistance at the Oslo Donors' 
Conference.  The GOC also announced that up to 31 Canadian 
Forces (CF) personnel will be deployed to southern Sudan over 
the coming months as part of UNMIS.  In London April 6, ADM 
Wright told U/S Burns that Chief of Defence Staff Hillier 
would visit Sudan in the second half of April to examine 
options for potential other contributions--possibly 
helicopter support or training. 
 
11. (C) Haiti:  Prime Minister Martin consistently has made 
the case for Canada's "special responsibility" toward Haiti, 
a francophone country where Canada played a major role in the 
1990s.  In addition to diplomatic efforts, and 
notwithstanding its operationally-stretched Forces, Canada 
contributed 500 troops to stability operations under UNSCR 
1529, followed by a policing contingent of 100 RCMP officers. 
 ADM Wright recently proposed to U/S Burns a bilateral 
dialogue on Haiti at a senior level. 
 
CAMPAIGN AGAINST TERRORISM 
 
12. (C) Afghanistan:  Canada has been with us fully in 
Afghanistan, contributing troops (and leadership of ISAF V in 
2004), money (USD 500 million through 2009), and political 
support consistently.  Following Cabinet approval of the 
government's 2005-06 Afghanistan package, ADM Wright informed 
A/S Burns that Canada would deploy 180-250 CF personnel to 
the PRT in Kandahar at the end of the summer.  The GOC also 
plans to deploy a battalion in spring 2006, at conclusion of 
the Canadian army's 18-month "operational pause". 
 
13. (SBU) Iraq:  Canada just as surely was not with us on 
Iraq, maintaining a position of non-involvement in the war 
while withholding overt criticism of the U.S.-led coalition. 
Canada did lead the maritime task force monitoring movement 
in the Persian Gulf, a service that began with an eye on 
Afghanistan but proved useful in the lead-up to the 
liberation of Iraq.  Though the GOC pledged CAD 300 million 
(approx. USD 235 million) for reconstruction efforts, sent 
RCMP trainers to help with the Iraqi civilian police program 
in Jordan, and is prepared to assist with capacity building 
in the Iraqi government, it steadfastly declines to put 
"boots on the ground", even as a NATO member. 
 
NONPROLIFERATION - IRAN 
 
14. (SBU) Iran: Though not on the agenda for our talks, 
Canada shares U.S. concern over Tehran's nuclear program and 
has led efforts alongside the USG, UK and Australia, to reign 
in Tehran's nuclear ambitions via the IAEA.  Canada termed 
its bilateral approach to Iran "controlled engagement" until 
the 2003 killing of a Canadian-Iranian journalist in police 
custody in Tehran, when it shifted to "no engagement" in 
protest.  A new Canadian Ambassador recently returned to 
Tehran, but relations remain tense. 
 
LANDMINES 
 
15. (C) A leading advocate of the 1997 Anti-Personnel Mine 
Ban Convention (also known as the "Ottawa Convention"), the 
government of Canada acknowledges U.S. commitment to and 
activism in de-mining in spite of U.S. non-accession, and we 
have been able to work together on humanitarian de-mining 
initiatives.  At the same time, Ottawa was highly offended by 
the U.S. proposal in the CD last year for a transfer ban on 
"persistent" landmines because it undermined "the only 
multilateral disarmament agreement on landmines", which 
advocates a comprehensive ban. 
 
Visit Canada's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/ottawa 
 
DICKSON