US embassy cable - 05BOGOTA3636

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 003636 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/15/2011 
TAGS: MARR, PREL, SNAR, CO 
SUBJECT: APIAY DRUG SMUGGLING INCIDENT 
 
Classified By: DCM:MKDrucker, Reason 1.4 (d) 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  On March 28 cocaine was discovered on a 
military aircraft arriving at Fort Bliss, Texas from 
Colombia.  After initial investigation three soldiers were 
detained and returned to the US.  Investigation is ongoing. 
End Summary. 
 
2.  (C) On March 28, 2005 law enforcement authorities acting 
on information obtained from the JTTF in Dallas, seized 34.9 
pounds of cocaine hidden on a military aircraft arriving from 
Apiay Colombian Air Force Base, at Fort Bliss, Texas.  U.S. 
military personnel at Apiay (in Meta Department, Colombia) 
are providing support to Colombian counterinsurgency and 
counterdrug operations.  Law enforcement officials in CONUS 
suspected that U.S. military personnel were involved in the 
cocaine shipment.   Early on the morning of March 29 at the 
request of law enforcement personnel in Fort Bliss,  the 
Bogota MilGroup Commander requested that two U.S. military 
personnel be detained at the U.S. Embassy and transported to 
their unit at Fort Bliss in CONUS. 
 
3.  (C) The Embassy Force Protection Detachment (FPD) 
contacted the military unit commander and verified that FPD 
agents had authorization to detain and transport the suspects 
and conduct local searches of the unit areas both in Bogota, 
and at Apiay Air Base.  At 5:19 AM the FPD detained Staff 
Sergeant Daniel Rosas and Specialist de la Tejera (later 
released in the United States), and informed the two U.S. 
military personnel of their rights under Article 31, UCMJ. 
 
4.  (C) Mr. Rojas provided a voluntary, sworn statement that 
led to the identification and detention of a third military 
person, Sergeant Kelvin Irizarry, at Apiay Air Base, in 
addition to other leads that are being pursued at this time. 
 Rosas also stated that he had cocaine samples in his living 
quarters at Apiay.  Both detainees provided written consent 
to search their areas at Apiay Air Base and their hotel rooms 
in Bogota.   OSI agents at Apiay, conducted a search and 
seized eight test tubes of cocaine from Rosas, quarters. 
Evidence was collected and handed over to the Bogota DEA 
office. 
 
5.  (C) At approximately 0845 hours, on March 29, 2005, the 
FPD notified the unit leadership in the United States 
regarding the third suspect and received authorization to 
detain and transport him.    The Ambassador requested that 
all measures be taken to assure the safety and security of 
everyone involved and that travel arrangements be expedited. 
He offered full Embassy support to the investigation. 
 
6.  (C) Two suspects (Rosas and de la Tejera),  departed 
Colombia in a DEA aircraft later that afternoon on Tuesday, 
March 29, 2005, approximately nine hours after their 
detention and arrived in El Paso to be placed in custody of 
U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Division (CID) personnel. 
 
7.  (C) At the request of the FPD, the Defense Attache Office 
transported the third suspect, and evidence, from Apiay to 
Bogota.   U.S. Air Force Security Policeman Luis Rucova 
stationed at Apiay Air Base escorted the suspect and evidence 
on board the DAO aircraft from Apiay to Bogota.  On arrival 
in Bogota,  at approximately 18:41 hours the evidence was 
turned over to  DEA Bogota, and the suspect, Irizarry, was 
turned over to representatives of his unit to await 
transportation the following day.  He left Bogota on a 
commercial flight for Houston , Texas the following morning 
(March 30). 
 
8.  (C) The RSO coordinated federal law enforcement team 
linkup at Houston Bush Intercontinental Airport to provide in 
transit security of the third suspect.  The  FPD agents in 
cooperation with RSO and DEA in Bogota, Dallas, and Houston, 
and the USDAO pilots, had interviewed the primary suspect, 
developed information leading to the further identification 
of the illegal ring and a third suspect, conducted searches 
and seizures of evidence, and transported all suspects to 
their military unit in El Paso. 
 
9.  (C) On April 4, 2005, the FPD and MilGroup Commander 
briefed Colombian Air Force Commander General Lesmez, and 
Colombian Military Commander General Ospina.   Both Colombian 
Generals assured the MILGRP Commander and FPD that the USDR 
and FPD Colombia would receive all possible assistance in any 
investigations and joint force protection measures.  General 
Lesmez said that Brigadier General (BG) Parga would be his 
staff point of contact for the matter.  BG Parga is currently 
the Chief of Colombian Air Force Intelligence, but 
ironically,  was the Commander at Apiay when some of the 
criminal activity was being conducted. 
 
10.  (C) On Tuesday, 5 April, FPD interviewed a U.S. walk-in 
source at Apiay Air Base and obtained a sworn statement 
providing further leads and suggesting that Rosas, the 
primary suspect in the criminal case, had made mistakes in 
intelligence missions in which he participated that could 
have resulted in faulty analysis. 
 
11.   (C) On April 6 the Ambassador ordered the FPD  to 
organize and coordinate a threat working group to coordinate 
investigative activity with selected U.S. law enforcement and 
counterintelligence organizations, including host nation, to 
determine the scope and nature of the criminal activity, and 
to confirm or reject any security compromises occurring as a 
result of the criminal activity.  The working group met on 
Wednesday, April 6, and exchanged information. 
 
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Conclusion 
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12.  (C)  This issue has become a matter of public 
controversy here, based mostly on press and congressional 
questions (including formal hearings) as to why the U.S. 
servicemen implicated in the matter were not turned over to 
Colombian authorities.  Nationalism, resentment over 
extraditions, and other factors have combined to allow some 
to portray the removal of the servicemen as a unilateral 
disregard for Colombian military law enforcement.  Some have 
even suggested that Colombia should seek the extradition of 
the servicemen back to Colombia. 
 
13.  (C) Embassy, in coordination with Southcom and with the 
cooperation of the Colombian Government, have kept details 
out of the public record, on the grounds that the 
investigation is still under way.  We have noted, however, 
that in keeping with a 1974 bilateral agreement the military 
personnel had been notified by name in advance of arrival to 
the Colombian Ministry of Defense and formally accepted by 
the Ministry, which afforded them the privileges and 
immunities specified in the agreement.  Although this reduced 
the shrillness of the public debate, it also re-focused it on 
the agreement.  We privately told the Minister of Defense 
that, in the context of reviewing our defense relationship, 
we would be willing to update the agreement (leading perhaps 
to a full SOFA).  The Minister has said publicly that the 
1974 agreement might/might be in need of updating.  This 
issue will form an important part of the context for the 
early May BWG discussions in Cartagena. 
 
14.  (C) The investigation continues in Texas and in 
Colombia.  It will be crucial--in light of politicization of 
issue in Colombia--for all/all U.S. authorities working on 
the case to cooperate with appropriate Colombian officials 
through the Embassy.  Embassy, of course, stands ready to 
assist and coordinate here. 
 
15.   (U) Post wishes to express its appreciation to the 
Office of the Legal Advisor for the copious assistance 
provided during the night of March 28/29, 2005. 
 
WOOD