US embassy cable - 05NEWDELHI2884

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 002884 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PTER, IN, PK, INDO-PAK 
SUBJECT: INDO-PAK MINI-SUMMIT BURIES "GHOST OF AGRA" 
 
REF: NEW DELHI 2866 
 
Classified By: Charge Robert O. Blake, Jr., for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
1.  (C) Summary: India and Pakistan exorcised the ghost of 
the (failed) 2001 Agra Summit during President Musharraf's 
April 16-18 visit to New Delhi, with a solid list of CBMs, 
muted discussion on Kashmir, and very positive personal 
interactions (with more high-level visits possible this 
year).  Both sides' use of common terms and complimentary 
language, particularly regarding a "soft border" on Kashmir, 
was new.  Agreeing that the two sides had an historic 
opportunity to create a durable peace, they declared that the 
process of rapprochement was "irreversible."  Taking place 
with the backdrop of a successful nine-city tour by the 
Pakistan cricket team (which trounced India in the one-day 
match that Musharraf attended) and a legion of positive 
people-to-people stories centered on the visiting Pakistani 
cricket fans/tourists, this mini-summit was a significant 
milestone in Indo-Pak relations and a testimony to the PM's 
commitment to normalization with Islamabad.  End Summary. 
 
More Deliverables Than Originally Expected 
------------------------------------------ 
 
2.  (U) Exceeding the cautious expectations that the GOI set 
in the run-up to the summit (Reftel), PM Manmohan Singh and 
Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf agreed on a number of new 
CBMs in addition to advancing other issues that have been on 
the table for some time.  Building on the two Indo-Pak recent 
summits (January 6 and September 24), PM Singh listed the 
following agreements in the joint statement released on April 
18, after an overnight delay to resolve differences: 
 
-- Increasing the frequency of the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus 
service (to an unannounced level) and adding additional 
trans-Kashmir routes to include Poonch-Rawalkote; 
 
-- Expanding cross-LOC transit to include trade, pilgrimage, 
and cultural exchanges; 
 
-- Creating a mechanism to allow "divided families" (i.e. 
with members living on both sides of the LOC to meet (details 
are unclear, but a reference to meeting points along the LOC); 
 
-- Pushing for an "early start" on the proposed 
Lahore-Amritsar-Nankana Sahib bus links (particularly 
relevant to Sikhs who wish to visit a shrine located in 
Pakistani Punjab); 
 
-- Committing to open the Khokhrapar-Munnabao rail link by 
January 1, 2006 (pushing back the expected date of completion 
from the original October 2005 target); 
 
-- Setting a January 1, 2006 deadline to open 
consulates-general in Mumbai and Karachi; 
 
-- Agreeing to continue the Composite Dialogue talks, with 
the foreign ministries to work out the schedule; 
 
-- Seeking to alleviate the situation of Indian and Pakistani 
prisoners who have served their sentences in each other's 
jails but have not yet been repatriated; 
 
-- "Immediately" convening "the existing institutions" to 
"expeditiously" resolve the Siachen Glacier and Sir Creek 
issues; 
 
-- Directing the two Petroleum Ministers to meet by May to 
discuss common issues including gas pipelines 
(Iran-Pakistan-India and Turkmenistan-Pakistan-India); and 
 
-- Setting up a private sector Joint Business Council to 
intensify trade ties and reviving the official Joint Economic 
Commission, which last met in 1989, in order to stimulate 
economic exchanges to cooperation. 
 
-- The PM also accepted in principle Musharraf's invitation 
to visit Pakistan.  In addition, BJP Leader of the Opposition 
LK Advani accepted an invitation to visit Pakistan in June. 
Musharraf also invited Congress Party President Sonia Gandhi. 
 The details and timings are to be worked out by the 
respective foreign ministries. 
 
3.  (C) Notably absent from this list, and opening the PM to 
potential BJP criticism, was the omission of an explicit 
reaffirmation of earlier Pakistani assurances on cross-border 
terrorism.  The joint statement stated simply that the 
leaders "would not allow terrorism to impede the peace 
process."  This Indian climb-down on the language regarding 
cross-border infiltration is one more data point for those 
who are skeptical of Manmohan Singh's willingness to make 
concessions in furtherance of the peace process.  We will 
report septel on the story behind this language, which 
reportedly was the reason for the overnight delay in 
releasing the joint statement. 
 
Keeping Kashmir Quiet 
--------------------- 
 
4.  (C) As expected, President Musharraf dwelled at some 
length on Kashmir, but the tone was by all accounts positive 
and absent of rancor.  The PM reportedly couched his response 
in terms of what he cannot (vice will not) deliver ("I cannot 
offer you any adjustment of the border, I have no mandate to 
do that," restating his position at their September 2004 
meeting on the sidelines of the UNGA).  Musharraf seems to 
have accepted this position, as reflected in the Joint 
Statement which referred merely to continued discussions on 
J&K.  The CBMs were heavily Kashmir-oriented and a testament 
to the success of the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus in enabling 
spin-off CBMs. 
 
Consolidating the Personal Touch 
-------------------------------- 
 
5.  (C) The two leaders exchanged numerous gifts, which 
highlighted the unusually strong personal connections between 
the PM and the Pakistani President.  Singh presented 
Musharraf with a painting of the President's pre-Partition 
family home in Delhi and birth certificates for Musharraf and 
his siblings who were born there.  In return, Musharraf 
presented an engraving to the PM and, to Opposition Leader LK 
Advani, a book of photographs of Advani in Pakistan from his 
school days in Karachi (at St. Patrick's, which Musharraf 
also attended) through adulthood.  Similar bonhomie was 
visible during the Advani meeting, and was particularly 
useful in burying the ghosts of Agra, as Advani was blamed by 
some for having helped scuttle that summit. 
 
Common Vocabulary Emerging 
-------------------------- 
 
6.  (C) Of particular interest was the GOI's and GOP's use of 
a similar vocabulary to describe their policy objectives for 
Kashmir.  Echoing terms such as "soft borders," using the LOC 
as a "bridge," and seeking "out-of-the-box ideas," Musharraf, 
in the eyes of the GOI and the Indian public, presented 
himself as a far cry from the man obsessed with Kashmir when 
he met PM Vajpayee in Agra in 2001.  The April 18 joint 
statement went even further than Musharraf's pre-summit 
interview by defining the peace process, in the eyes of both 
the GOI and the GOP, as "irreversible" (on April 14, he had 
termed it "fairly irreversible"). 
 
Saying (and Not Saying) the Right Things 
---------------------------------------- 
 
7.  (C) Both Musharraf and Singh displayed skill at making 
each other comfortable over the weekend with friendly 
comments and compliments: 
-- Musharraf reiterated his Reuters interview comment that 
the Delhi meeting was "180 degrees" from the failed 2001 Agra 
Summit; 
 
-- He telegraphed his commitment to the dialogue process 
before he arrived by declaring that "the period of conflict 
management is over, we have entered an era of conflict 
resolution." 
 
-- He also reiterated his April 6 condemnation of attack 
against the Indian passengers for the inaugural 
Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus trip and labeled it as "terrorism." 
 
-- His references on TV to "Jammu and Kashmir," rather than 
the more vague "Kashmir," were viewed by some as an implicit 
acceptance that Pakistan would move away from claiming the 
entire state for itself. 
-- Singh appealed to Musharraf's personal side by remarking 
that he found the Pakistani President's mother "utterly 
charming" and "your son was quite a hit with young people 
here." 
 
8.  (C) As important to the atmospherics were the comments 
left unsaid.  Accusations of Islamabad promoting cross-border 
terrorism and of human rights abuses in J&K fell by the 
wayside.  Musharraf lobbied India to act "magnanimously" as 
the larger country, on the grounds that when smaller 
countries compromise, their leaders are accused of knuckling 
under pressure.  The joint statement reflected an unusual 
attempt at compromise. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
9.  (C) This interaction made no progress on a number of key 
issues (for example, the Baglihar Dam impasse and the final 
shape and identity of "Kashmir"), but the constructive and 
incremental approach is now delivering benefits to Kashmiris 
while simultaneously building and strengthening the "peace 
constituency."  On Baglihar the GOI reportedly restated its 
call for bilateral dialogue.  We will follow up with MEA. 
Indians have grown more comfortable accepting Musharraf as a 
partner in the peace process -- his public statements here 
immeasurably improved his stature -- although a hard core of 
skeptics remain who continue to anticipate the next Kargil 
will scuttle the current bonhomie.  This mini-summit was well 
organized to deliver results, and is a testimony to the PM's 
personal leadership on Indo-Pak rapprochement. 
BLAKE