US embassy cable - 05SANAA968

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SANAA EAC MEETING 04/17/2005

Identifier: 05SANAA968
Wikileaks: View 05SANAA968 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Sanaa
Created: 2005-04-18 11:30:00
Classification: SECRET//NOFORN
Tags: AMGT ASEC PREL PTER EAC COUNTER TERRORISM
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000968 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
DS/DSS, DS/IP/NEA, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/ICI/PII, S/CT, NEA, NEA/ 
ARP, NEA/EX, NEA/P, CA, CENTCOM FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/18/2015 
TAGS: AMGT, ASEC, PREL, PTER, EAC, COUNTER TERRORISM 
SUBJECT: SANAA EAC MEETING 04/17/2005 
 
REF: A. SANAA 955 
     B. SANAA 912 
     C. SANAA 896 
     D. SANAA 895 
     E. SANAA 891 
     F. SANAA 883 
     G. SANAA 882 
     H. SANAA 876 
     I. SANAA 875 
     J. SANAA 863 
     K. SANAA 860 
     L. SANAA 836 
 
Classified By: RSO Timothy Laas for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) 
 
1. (S/NF)  Begin Summary: The Ambassador convened a general 
EAC meeting on April 17, 2005, to review the current threat 
assessment and to consider changes to post travel 
restrictions.  The EAC determined that the threat condition 
remains as described in reftel A, with no specific 
information suggesting any major changes.  The committee 
determined that requests for official in-country travel will 
be examined and approved by post on a case-by-case basis. 
The committee further decided to continue with restrictions 
on Embassy personnel visiting parts of the downtown area, but 
will consider lower restrictions on direct-hire employee 
movement within Sana'a at the next EAC meeting.  Key offices 
and personnel represented at the meeting included: AMB, DCM, 
DATT, FPD, IPC, MO, LEGATT, POL/E, RMAS, OMC, RSO, CONS, PD, 
and USAID.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (S/NF)  RSO provided information regarding an incident 
the evening of April 15 of an attempted detonation of a 
string of 15 grenades by unknown individuals in northeast 
Sana'a.  Although the facts are unclear, MOI has suggested 
that the incident was related to an ongoing land dispute in 
the neighborhood and is unrelated to the other recent grenade 
attacks on ROYG security personnel.  RSO also mentioned 
unconfirmed reports in the press of the shooting of an armed 
Yemeni national by local police near an NSB office building. 
RSO also noted the absence of surveillance detection 
incidents since the last EAC on 13 April. 
 
3.  (S/NF)  In considering amendments to current restrictions 
on in-country travel, the EAC discussed the various means by 
which potential travel is examined for security 
considerations, as well as Post's concern regarding ROYG 
clearances for mission travel requests, especially as regards 
possible lapses in communication between MOI, MFA, and other 
ROYG agencies.  The EAC concluded that, given the current 
threat environment, it is appropriate to begin assessing and 
approving official in-country travel for mission personnel on 
a case-by-case basis.  All travel requests under 
consideration will continue to be reviewed and approved 
through RSO prior to submission to MFA/MOI.  MO reiterated 
that any travel plans for individuals originating from 
outside of Yemen will require Departmental consent as long as 
post remains under Authorized Departure. 
 
4.  (S/NF)  Turning to the question of in-city restrictions 
for Embassy staff within Sana'a, the EAC reviewed current 
policy, which provides for limited movement for American 
staff but disallows travel to the Old City and other parts of 
downtown Sana'a.  The EAC concluded that, given the 
uncertainty regarding the grenade incident on April 15, 
further monitoring and assessment is required before post 
revises this policy.  As such, restrictions on unnecessary 
travel to the downtown parts of Sana'a will remain in place 
pending the EAC's reassessment on Wednesday. 
 
 
5.  (S/NF)  The EAC reviewed concerns stemming from recent 
events in Sa'ada.  OMC and RSO expressed some concern that 
displaced fighters from the Sa'ada region, having been 
stymied in Sa'ada, may attempt to target security 
installations and individuals in Sana'a, and that US military 
personnel may be at risk of direct or incidental attack. 
CCE-Y explained that its staff is maintaining an extremely 
low profile and are traveling in unmarked vehicles to 
mitigate the possibility of being targeted. 
 
6.  (SBU)  The Ambassador and RSO reasserted the importance 
of ensuring that all American staff continue to adhere to 
good security practices, particularly varying the times and 
routes used to go between home and the Embassy.  EAC members 
were instructed to advise their colleagues of the importance 
of these practices. 
 
7.  (SBU)  The committee confirmed that a subsequent EAC 
meeting would be held Wednesday, April 20, at 2:30 PM. 
Krajeski 

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