US embassy cable - 05QUITO842

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ECUADOR: PRESIDENT ENDS STATE OF EMERGENCY

Identifier: 05QUITO842
Wikileaks: View 05QUITO842 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Quito
Created: 2005-04-17 19:54:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV ASEC EC
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 QUITO 000842 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/12/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, ASEC, EC 
SUBJECT: ECUADOR: PRESIDENT ENDS STATE OF EMERGENCY 
 
REF: QUITO 840 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Kristie A. Kenney.  Reason 1.4 (b&d). 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  President Lucio Gutierrez revoked the state 
of emergency declared on April 15 the following day. 
Anti-government citizen protests continued after the lifting 
of the emergency, though generally peacefully.  The political 
situation here remains fluid--a special session of Congress 
will take place this afternoon, but is unlikely to achieve 
common ground.  Police and military acted with restraint 
during the state of emergency, and no violence or suspension 
of civil rights has been reported.  Ongoing intensive and 
coordinated USG actions are focused on contributing to 
peaceful resolution of political conflict. 
 
State of Emergency Lifted 
------------------------- 
 
2.  (U) In the face of universal condemnation of his April 15 
state of emergency declaration for Quito and surrounding 
Pichincha province, President Gutierrez on April 16 lifted 
the state of emergency in Quito.  In doing so, at 
approximately 1700, Gutierrez said his action was in 
recognition of the progressive return of tranquility in the 
country.  He also said the action was in response to a 
request from the President of Congress, who had convoked a 
special session of Congress for April 17.  The agenda for the 
session would be legislative action to vacate the current 
Supreme Court (already dismissed by Gutierrez' April 15 
decree) and to begin debate on the President's proposed 
reforms to the Judiciary Law, which would determine how to 
select a replacement court.  Gutierrez also thanked the 
Ecuadorian people for their understanding, called for unity 
and calm, and called on Ecuadorians to seek solutions to 
Ecuador's problems in the spirit of brotherhood. 
 
Reaction 
-------- 
 
3.  (U) The opposition appeared more emboldened than 
mollified by Gutierrez' about-face on the state of emergency. 
 PSC leader Leon Febres-Cordero exhorted citizens to continue 
protests calling for Gutierrez' resignation.  Guayaquil mayor 
Jaime Nebot convoked a mobile demonstration in defense of 
democracy and for a return to rule of law in Guayaquil and 
surrounding provinces for April 18.  Forty-eight opposition 
Congress members forcibly crossed police lines to enter 
Congress on April 16, but could not initiate a special 
session for lack of a quorum.  After another false start on 
April 17, opposition legislators announced that they would 
instead participate in the special session convoked by 
Quintana later that day.  The Church issued a statement 
criticizing the government's actions, warning that "mistakes 
and violations cannot be corrected with more of the same." 
Effects on the Street 
--------------------- 
 
4.  (U) The lifting of the state of emergency in Quito will 
have little noticeable effect because few provisions of the 
state of emergency decree were actually implemented.  There 
were no reports of arrests or suspension of civil rights. 
Freedom of expression was not abridged, and the government 
did not move against the anti-government radio station (Radio 
Luna) of dubious provenance which has been exhorting citizens 
into the streets and setting the agenda for ongoing protests. 
 There was no visible military presence in the city except in 
the vicinity of the national palace and on transport arteries 
along the periphery of the city.  Even the police presence in 
the capital was limited during the emergency and police acted 
with restraint in the face of peaceful protests. 
 
5.  (U) After the lifting of the emergency, peaceful protests 
(8,000 in one location, 3-4,000 in another) continued into 
the evening of April 16.  EmbOffs observed the main 
celebratory protest, noting that participants were initially 
predominantly middle class families making noise together and 
showing support by draping their cars in toilet paper (the 
protest gimmick of the day).  Opposition political figures 
did not participate, knowing they were not welcome at this 
non-partisan event.  After midnight, however, a smaller group 
of approximately 3,000 converged on the heavily-guarded 
presidential palace.  Police obstructed their progress using 
tear gas. 
 
US Mission Actions 
------------------ 
 
6.  (U) As a precautionary measure, RSO restricted mission 
personnel to their homes on the evening of April 16, and 
extended the measure on April 17.  There were few inquiries 
from AmCits during the state of emergency and no untoward 
incidents were reported.  Elsewhere, Peace Corps volunteers 
remained in their villages, also reporting no incidents and 
little echo of the political turbulence at the village level. 
 Anti-government protests did reportedly take place in 
several cities outside the capital, again without incident. 
 
7.  (C) Mission outreach during the state of emergency was 
extensive and coordinated by the country team.  The 
Ambassador spoke with President Gutierrez (RefTel), and 
Minister of Finance Yepez (who was in Washington at the 
time).  CONS issued a warden message, quelling AmCit concerns 
by reducing uncertainty.  PAS issued a statement early on 
April 16 signaling USG concern and calling for dialogue, 
which was well received.  MILGRP and DAO were in constant 
contact with the armed forces leadership, monitoring signs of 
internal dissent and effectively urging restraint.  POL 
monitored evolving attitudes of the opposition and ECON 
reached out to government economic officials and the private 
sector.  The Am-Cham issued a helpful call reinforcing the 
Embassy's call for dialogue. 
 
8.  (C) US officials in Washington and Miami contributed 
significantly to USG outreach efforts, with Department 
officials expressing strong USG concern to the Ecuadorian 
Embassy.  SOUTHCOM commander Gen. Craddock urged restraint on 
the Ecuadorian armed forces in a call to Ecuadorian Joint 
Chief VADM Victor Rosero, reinforcing mission actions here. 
 
Next Steps 
---------- 
 
9.  (C) The Ambassador will breakfast with President 
Gutierrez on April 18.  She will emphasize USG concern that 
the state of emergency damaged the government's credibility 
and is not an appropriate substitute for real dialogue, and 
strongly warn the president that any move to dissolve 
Congress would be unacceptable.  Progress to resolve the 
court issue will require greater efforts to find common 
ground with an increasingly emboldened opposition.  The 
Ambassador will also meet later the same day with Joint Chief 
Rosero, to reinforce the military's restrained and 
professional behavior during the emergency.  With rumors that 
Army Chief Luis Aguas opposed the measure, she will also use 
the occasion to gauge whether internal dissent remains an 
issue in the Army. 
 
Comment:  Prospects for Peace 
----------------------------- 
 
10.  (C) Many here see the hand of ex-president Bucaram 
behind the state of emergency decree; few believe Gutierrez 
would risk dissolving the Supreme Court without a prior 
accord with Bucaram.  Gutierrez' lifting of the emergency in 
conjunction with the re-opening of debate on the court issue 
in Congress would have been coordinated with Bucaram, through 
his henchman Congress President Quintana.  The government's 
current dependence on Bucaram for its political survival is 
worrisome, especially given that Bucaram recently called 
publicly for the dissolution of Congress, if necessary, to 
prevent the opposition from hi-jacking the president's agenda. 
 
11.  (C) We are convinced that the real issue in play between 
Bucaram, Gutierrez and the opposition is not the exalted 
independence of the courts but rather the permanence of the 
controversial decision permitting Bucaram to return.  It 
appears Gutierrez and Bucaram now have an agreement on how to 
dump the discredited court, essential to ensure this 
government's survival, without reversing its decisions. 
Passing that into law, however, requires cooperation of some 
segment of the opposition, which after the state of emergency 
appears unified (with the exception of Alvaro Noboa's PRIAN) 
in seeking to bring Gutierrez down. 
 
12.  (C) The situation here remains fluid, given the level of 
polarization and animosity on both sides.  With the state of 
emergency lifted, our efforts must now focus on contributing 
to political stability by preventing the government from 
further missteps (esp. any move against Congress) and 
encouraging both sides toward dialogue and compromise.  To 
succeed will require renewed efforts here and continued 
engagement from Washington. 
KENNEY 

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