US embassy cable - 05ABUDHABI1712

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PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR ON U.S. - UAE BILATERAL RELATIONS: SAUDI ARABIA

Identifier: 05ABUDHABI1712
Wikileaks: View 05ABUDHABI1712 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Abu Dhabi
Created: 2005-04-17 11:17:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV EPET PHUM ELAB ETRD SA TC
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 001712 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PASS USTR FOR DOUG BELL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, EPET, PHUM, ELAB, ETRD, SA, TC 
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR ON U.S. - UAE BILATERAL 
RELATIONS: SAUDI ARABIA 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
 1. (C) Summary: On April 16, Ambassador called on long-time 
presidential advisor Mohammed Habroush Al-Suwaidi to review 
our bilateral agenda (FTA, MLAT, and Camel Jockey 
Trafficking).  On FTA, Al-Suwaidi opined that there was no 
reason the process would not move ahead.  The concerns of 
some businesspeople about the agency law should not override 
the interest of the nation, which was to conclude an FTA as 
quickly as possible, he underscored.  Al-Suwaidi suggested 
that the U.S. explain its reasons for wanting to separate out 
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty negotiations from extradition 
negotiations in as simple, straightforward a way as possible. 
 He added that both sides should endeavor to move forward and 
not let one issue stymie progress.  Al-Suwaidi called the 
practice of using children as camel jockeys a violation of 
their human rights and said that the practice must be 
stopped.  Al-Suwaidi told Ambassador that the Saudi crackdown 
on extremists was not a complete solution, since it did not 
fix the fundamental problems in the Kingdom, including 
pervasive corruption.  He also said that Saudi relations with 
their neighbors were poor and that the Saudis continued to 
object to the proposed Qatar-UAE causeway.  End Summary. 
 
------------------------------------- 
FTA - No Need to Prolong Negotiations 
------------------------------------- 
 
2. (C) Ambassador told Al-Suwaidi that the second round of 
FTA negotiations would take place in Washington from May 10 
to 12.  Al-Suwaidi replied that he did not see that there 
were any major issues that would force the negotiations to be 
prolonged unduly.  He agreed with Ambassador's observation 
that much of the "opposition" to the FTA stemmed from 
ignorance and that outreach to the UAE business community was 
important. 
 
3. (C) Ambassador highlighted a few areas of concern for 
Al-Suwaidi, including labor rights and the Agencies' law. 
Al-Suwaidi emphasized that the concerns of agents were "not 
valid" and short sighted.  According to Al-Suwaidi, agents 
should work for their money and the practice of getting paid 
"for lying in bed and not working could not continue."  He 
noted that the world was getting smaller through 
globalization and that it was far better for the UAE to make 
changes now, while it had some control over the changes, 
rather than be forced to change in the future.  He told 
Ambassador that individual interests should not outweigh the 
interest of the majority, which was in an FTA with the U.S. 
He said that President Khalifa and Abu Dhabi Crown Prince 
Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ) both wanted this FTA to move forward. 
 
---- 
MLAT 
---- 
 
4. (C) Ambassador briefed Al-Suwaidi on the progress of the 
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) discussions.  She 
explained that the USG preferred to keep the discussions on 
MLAT and extradition on parallel, but separate tracks, 
whereas the UAE Ministry of Justice preferred to negotiate 
the two as a package.  Al-Suwaidi replied that both sides 
needed to look at how to move forward.  In his view, the way 
to do this was to move forward in stages and not tie issues 
together, if this stalled progress.  He suggested that the 
USG prepare its points in writing for the UAEG to review, 
since some objections were likely due to a lack of 
understanding on the part of the UAEG.  He stressed that "the 
simpler" this memo "the better." 
 
------------- 
Camel Jockeys 
------------- 
 
5. (C) Ambassador noted the steps that the UAEG has taken to 
deal with the problem of using children as camel jockeys, but 
asked for more action on rehabilitation and rescue.  She said 
the Minister of Labor had invited her to join him on April 18 
for a visit to an Abu Dhabi Emirate rescue center. 
Al-Suwaidi emphasized that the use of children as camel 
jockeys was a violation of their human rights and was not 
consistent with the traditions of the UAE.  He noted that, in 
the past, the UAE had held camel races on celebratory 
occasions, such as Eids or marriages and that the camel 
owners or their children had been the jockeys.  The use of 
foreign boys was a fairly recent development.  He stressed 
that it was not fair to use an 8-year-old boy as a jockey for 
6 years then "throw him away" after he was no longer useful. 
The job took away the "best years" of the boy's childhood and 
left him with no education or useful skills.  He noted that 
the lure of large prizes in current races made people lose 
perspective, but stressed that the practice needed to be 
stopped.  Although Al-Suwaidi stated that poor source 
countries also shared responsibility for the problem, he 
stressed that the UAE must not be instrumental in supporting 
this traffic. 
 
----------------------------- 
Overall Bilateral Cooperation 
----------------------------- 
 
6. (C) Ambassador told Al-Suwaidi that overall cooperation 
between the U.S. and the UAEG was excellent in a number of 
areas, including military-to military, counter-terror and 
counter-terror finance.  She expressed appreciation for the 
UAEG's efforts to increase security to the U.S. Mission after 
the March attack in Doha, Qatar. 
 
7. (C) Ambassador noted the Supreme Petroleum Council's (SPC, 
of which Al-Suwaidi is a member) recent decision to negotiate 
only with Exxon/Mobil for the 28 percent stake in the Upper 
Zakkum field. Al-Suwaidi explained that the SPC had made the 
decision after long and careful consideration.  He emphasized 
that Upper Zakkum is a complicated field, with high reserves, 
but a low recovery rate.  The UAE, he said, preferred to go 
with a company that had the technology to increase the rate 
of recovery.  He also acknowledged that the UAE preferred to 
deal with one of its current shareholders (such as 
Exxon/Mobil) rather than a new company, since its 
shareholders had "stayed with" the UAE when prices were low.. 
 
 
8. (U) Ambassador also expressed appreciation that UAE 
President Khalifa would attend the May 3 F-16 handover 
ceremony at Al Dhafra airbase. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
Saudi Arabia - instability and attitude a problem 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
9. (C) Al-Suwaidi raised his concerns about Saudi Arabia with 
Ambassador.  He noted that Saudi instability could spill over 
to affect its neighbors.  He emphasized, however, that he 
thought the Saudi solution to the terrorism problem -- i.e., 
a crackdown -- was not the right approach, because it didn't 
address the "fundamental problems" in Saudi Arabia. He said 
that some changes, such as in the education system, take 
time, but that the Saudis were not addressing urgent issues 
that could be resolved quickly, such as tackling corruption. 
 
10. (C) Al-Suwaidi also noted that the Saudis were on bad 
terms with their neighbors.  He cited Saudi objections to the 
proposed UAE-Qatar causeway.  He said that the Saudis were 
"envious" of direct UAE-Qatari contact and that it was 
frustrating to the UAE.  He explained that if the Saudis had 
taken a different attitude to the GCC when it was founded, 
political integration would be much further along than it 
was.  He gave as an example Sheikh Zayed's more nuanced 
approach to creating the UAE.  He allowed the individual 
emirates to retain their authority, even when the 
constitution provided that the authority resided with the 
federal government.  Over time, the individual emirates 
realized that they were much better off under a federation 
and ceded more of their authority to the federal government. 
The Saudis, for their part, had not followed this gentle 
approach and the GCC had suffered as a result.  He stressed 
that the Saudi policy in a number of areas, including 
objecting to the Bahrain - U.S. FTA, was short sighted. 
SISON 

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